What Would Zero Look Like? A Treaty for the Abolition of Nuclear Weapons by Koplow, David A
Georgetown University Law Center 
Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW 
2014 
What Would Zero Look Like? A Treaty for the Abolition of Nuclear 
Weapons 
David A. Koplow 
Georgetown University Law Center, koplow@law.georgetown.edu 
 
 
This paper can be downloaded free of charge from: 
https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/1804 
 
45 Geo. J. Int'l L. 683-781 (2014) 
This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub 
 Part of the National Security Law Commons 
WHAT WOULD ZERO LOOK LIKE?
A TREATY FOR THE ABOLITION OF
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
DAVID A. KoPLOW*
ABSTRACT
Nuclear disarmament-the comprehensive, universal, and permanent aboli-
tion of all nuclear weapons, pursuant to a verifiable, legally binding interna-
tional agreement-has long been one of the most ambitious, controversial, and
urgent items on the agenda for arms control. To date, however, most of the
discussion of "getting to zero" has highlighted the political, military, technical
and diplomatic dimensions of this complex problem, and there has been relatively
little attention to the legal requirements for drafting such a novel treaty.
This Article fills that gap by offering two proposed agreements. The first, a
non-legally-binding framework accord, would be designed for signature relatively
soon (e.g., in 2015) to re-commit states to the goal of nuclear elimination and to
energize their concerted individual and collective action on a set of prescribed
steps in pursuit of it. The second, a legally-binding document, would be
concluded at some point in the more distant future, when states had accom-
plished great reductions in their current nuclear arsenals and were ready, at last,
to plunge forward to true abolition.
The Article describes the conditions necessary for the further articulation of
these two novel agreements, and the text of each instrument carries numerous
annotations that identify competing options, describe the negotiating range, and
illuminate the drafter's choices. The hope is that something novel can be
gained-fresh insights can be suggested, and new questions can be raised (even
if answering them remains elusive)-by advancing the dialogue about nuclear
disarmament to the concrete stage of treaty drafting.
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. The author gratefully thanks Robert
(Bodie) Stewart and Kirsten A. Harmon for their extraordinarily careful and persistent research
assistance; Dean William M. Treanor; participants in the Georgetown Law summer faculty
research workshop; students in my "Issues in Disarmament: Proliferation and Terrorism" Semi-
nar; and the following individuals who responded to my questions, commented upon prior drafts
of this article, or otherwise generously assisted in its preparation: James M. Acton, Barry
Blechman,James E. Goodby, Thomas Graham,Jr.,Jonathan Granoff, MichaelJ. Mazarr, Christo-
pher E. Paine, Steven Pifer, and Alyn Ware. @ 2014, David A. Koplow.
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"Where there is no vision, the people perish. "Proverbs 29:18
I. INTRODUCTION
The vision of abolishing nuclear weapons-a goal to be achieved
through a comprehensive, permanent, verifiable, and legally binding
treaty-has been vigorously pursued with the Biblical objective of
preventing the people around the world from perishing. This stunning
image has become one of the most prominent, urgent, and controver-
sial items on the contemporary international disarmament agenda, but
the world today is so far from "getting to zero" that it is difficult, at our
current heavily-armed, mutually-suspicious vantage point, even to imag-
ine what such a profoundly different regime would look like.
Nuclear disarmament is also an idea that has experienced radical
oscillations in attention, interest, and legitimacy. The goal of prohibit-
ing nuclear weapons is as old as nuclear devices themselves, but the
whole notion had long been derided as hopelessly idealistic or utopian,
unfit for the deliberations of serious people and powerful countries.
That dismissiveness, however, was suddenly punctured on January 4,
2007, when four of the most "realistic" senior U.S. statesmen-George P.
Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger, and Sam Nunn-
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published a provocative essay, entitled "A World Free of Nuclear
Weapons" in the Wall Street Journal.' In that short piece, the Gang of
Four upended the skeptics and inaugurated an outpouring of support-
ive reports and analyses, "me too" opinion columns from sympathetic
converts to the cause of nuclear abolition, and endorsements by the
President of the United States and by the Security Council of the
United Nations.
To date, however, the wellspring of publication has been relatively
heavy on the policy, strategy, technology, and military aspects of the
question of nuclear abolition and relatively light on the legal dimen-
sion. This Article therefore posits that something additional can be
gained-further insights can be achieved and additional questions can
be posed, even if answering them remains puzzling-by advancing the
dialogue to the stage of treaty drafting. The bulk of the Article,
therefore, consists of two heavily annotated proposed international
agreements (one intended for adoption relatively soon, the other for
the distant future) describing in more concrete detail what a "zero
regime" could look like.
The Article proceeds with the following structure: After this Introduc-
tion, Part II provides four elements of necessary background, includ-
ing: (a) an abbreviated history of the concept of eliminating nuclear
weapons, noting the erratic development, adoption, abandonment,
and resurrection of the audacious idea; (b) an exploration of the fact
that most of the countries of the world, including the United States, are
already constrained by an important international legal obligation to
pursue the objective of nuclear disarmament "in good faith"; (c) a
survey of the world's existing nuclear arsenals, highlighting the clear
and present dangers of proliferation and terrorism; and (d) an account-
ing of the contributions, but also the inadequacy, of historical and
contemporary arms control efforts, including the Strategic Arms Limi-
tation Treaties (SALT), the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START)
and an alphabet soup of other accords.
Part III then highlights several of the most difficult substantive issues
emerging from the treaty-drafting exercise. Challenges such as: (a) the
appropriate definition of "zero"; (b) the arrangements for verification
and enforcement of the regime; (c) the articulation of the plausible
series of intermediate stages on the road to abolition; and (d) impor-
tant collateral questions such as the resolution or at least amelioration
1. George P. Shultz, WilliamJ. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger & Sam Nunn, A World F'ree of Nuclear
Weapons, WAIL ST.J.,Jan. 4, 2007, at A15 [hereinafter 2007 Op Ed].
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of a range of vexing regional security issues are examined. The draft
treaty texts cannot, at this point, offer definitive solutions, but may at
least serve to highlight and clarify future challenges.
Parts IV and V present the heart of the matter: proposed texts
for a Zero Agreement and a Zero Treaty. The first instrument would
be a non-legally binding framework accord that could be adopted by
participating states soon-perhaps in 2015-to re-commit them-
selves publicly, authoritatively, and collectively to the goal of nuclear
elimination and to energize action on a prescribed pathway of
specified steps in dedicated pursuit of that bold objective. The second
document would be legally binding; it is intended for that point
in the future when the countries of the world will have reduced
their nuclear arsenals to very low levels and will have undertaken
the other necessary precursor steps, so they will be ready, at last, to
plunge forward to true abolition. The Zero Treaty is, necessarily,
somewhat speculative-it will rely upon still undetermined tech-
nology and barely-imaginable political rapprochements to create
more favorable conditions for accommodation, verification, and en-
forcement. For each document, the article presents a proposed text
together with numerous annotations that highlight obvious and sub-
surface problems, explain the drafter's choices, and suggest alternative
formulations.
Finally, Part VI presents some conclusions and recommendations.
The animating spirit for this effort is derived from a metaphor relied
upon repeatedly by the Gang of Four, who liken the nuclear abolition
exercise to undertaking to climb a distant mountain, when the top of
the peak is now shrouded by clouds. From our current lowly starting
point, we can only vaguely discern the shape of the summit, and we
cannot ascertain what will be the most suitable path to scale it, how long
it will take to ascend, or what severe challenges will have to be
overcome en route. But we are determined to go forward, and we are
dedicated to finding a route that will, somehow, empower eventual
success.
Two special acknowledgements must be inserted. First, the author
participated, under the leadership of retired ambassadors James E.
Goodby and Thomas Graham, Jr., in a remarkable drafting exercise
culminating in a high-level Joint Enterprise Workshop convened by
George Shultz and William Perry at the Hoover Institution at Stanford
University,July 25-26, 2012. Many of the issues articulated in this article
and its draft documents were vetted at that conference, and the analysis
was immensely improved thereby. Participants at that workshop, of
course, are not responsible for what follows (still less for any errors or
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omissions) and may not endorse the contents or concepts of this
article, but they provided many important and useful insights.
Second, the author gratefully acknowledges the pioneering contribu-
tions of the one prior model for drafting a treaty in this area. An
international consortium of legal, technical, and diplomatic experts,
assembled by the Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy, drafted a
detailed and highly innovative Model Nuclear Weapons Convention
(NWC) in 1997. The draft was submitted by Costa Rica to the United
Nations, revised and updated in 2007, and distributed in 2008 by U.N.
Secretary General Ban Ki-moon in his Five Point Proposal for Nuclear
Disarmament as a starting point for multilateral negotiations.2 The
materials contained in the current article differ significantly from the
Model NWC (most prominently, in presenting two proposed docu-
ments, notjust one) but the author has benefited greatly from consult-
ing that first effort to articulate an operational legal text on point.
II. THE BACKGROUND FOR ZERO
As a preliminary matter, this section addresses, in turn, the (a) histori-
cal, (b) legal, (c) military, and (d) political dimensions of the pursuit of
nuclear abolition. In the interest of space, each discussion is necessarily
truncated, but the swelling literature regarding the elimination of
nuclear weapons provides ample resources for further exploration.3
2. MERAV DATAN ET AL., SECURING OUR SURVIVAL (SOS): THE CASE FOR A NUCLEAR WEAPONS
CONVENTION: THE UPDATED MODEL CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE DEVELOPMENT, TEST-
ING, PRODUCTION, STOCKPILING, TRANSFER, USE AND THREAT OF USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND ON
THEIR ELIMINATION (2007) [hereinafter NUCLEAR WEAPONS CONVENTION or NWC], available at
http://www.disarmsecure.org/pdfs/securingoursurvival2007.pdf; U.N. General Assembly,
Letter dated 31 October 1997 from the Charg6 d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of
Costa Rica to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary General, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/52/7
(Nov. 17, 1997), available at http://www.un.org/ga/search/view-doc.asp?symbol=A%2FC.+1
%2F52%2F7&Lang=E; U.N. General Assembly, Letter dated 17 December 2007 from the
Permanent Representatives of Costa Rica and Malaysia to the United Nations addressed to the
Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/62/650 (Jan. 17, 2008) (conveying updated text of NWC); Ban
Ki-Moon, Secretary-General, Address to the East-West Institute: The United Nations and Security
in a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World (Oct. 24, 2008), available at http://www.un.org/apps/news/
infocus/sgspeeches/search_full.asp?statlD=351 (citing the Secretary-General's Five Point Pro-
posal on Nuclear Disarmament).
3. PHILIP TAUBMAN, THE PARTNERSHIP: FIVE COLD WARRIORS AND TIIEIR QUEST TO BAN THE BOMB
(2012); GETrING TO ZERO: THE PATH 1O NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT (Catherine McArdle Kelleher &
Judith Reppy eds., 2011) (hereinafter GETTING TO ZERO]; REYKjAVIK REVISITED: STEPS TOWARD A
WORLD FREE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONs (George P. Shultz et al. eds., 2008) [hereinafter REVKJAVIK
REVISITED]; ELEMENTS OF A NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT TREATY (Bary M. Blechman & Alexander K.
Bollfrass eds., 2010); CULTIVATING CONFIDENCE: VERIFICATION, MONITORING, AND ENFORCEMENT FOR A
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A. The History of Zero
Even some of the scientists instrumental in the Manhattan Project,
which centered on the development of atomic bombs during
World War II, contemporaneously questioned whether the human
species was capable of intelligently coping with the massive power then
being unleashed, and almost immediately after the horror of Hiro-
shima and Nagasaki, populations around the world galvanized into
political efforts to "ban the bomb."4 The new United Nations General
Assembly devoted its very first resolution to the question of abolishing
nuclear weapons, unanimously establishing an Atomic Energy Commis-
sion on January 24, 1946, and referring to it the urgent mission of
developing specific proposals "for the elimination from national arma-
ments of atomic weapons and of all other major weapons adaptable to
mass destruction," and "for effective safeguards by way of inspection
and other means to protect complying States against the hazards of
violations and evasions."5
The most prominent early public expression of U.S. willingness to
surrender its monopoly over nuclear weapons was the Baruch Plan,
presented to the United Nations in June 1946. Under that remarkable
structure, all existing atomic bombs would be destroyed and an interna-
tional organization would succeed to all information and functions
related to atomic energy-but only after the establishment of a strict
WORLD FREE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (Corey Hinderstein ed., 2010) [hereinafter CuLrlVATNG
CONFIDENCE]; ABOLIStIING NucLEAR WEAPoNs: A DEBATE (George Perkovich & James Acton eds.,
2009) [hereinafter DEBATE], available at http://carnegieendowment.org/files/abolishing_
nuclear_weapons._debate.pdf.
4. INrERNATIONAL ARMs CONTROL: ISSUES AND AGREEMENIs 68 (John H. Barton & Lawrence D.
Weiler eds., 1976) [hereinafter ARms CoNrRot I] (noting that some of the nuclear weapons
designers had advocated using the device only in a "demonstration" event, rather than dropping it
on Japanese cities); Peter R. Lavoy, 7Te Enduring Effects of Atoms for Ieace, ARMs CONTROL. TODAY,
Dec. 2003, available at http://www.armscontrol.org/print/1430 (noting that Danish physicist
Niels Bohr and U.S. nuclear weapons program leader Robert Oppenheimer tried to convince U.S.
and British officials, even before the end of World War II, that international control of nuclear
weaponry was essential); IWERNATIONAL ARMs CONTROL: ISSUES AND AGREEMENrs 45-47 (Coit D.
Blacker & Gloria Duffy eds., 2d ed. 1984) [hereinafter ARMs CONROL II] (discussing public
attitudes about nuclear weapons);John P. Holdren, Getting to 7ero: Is Pursuing a Nuclear-Weapon-Free
World Too Dificult? Too Dangerous? Too Distracting? (Belfer Ctr. for Sci. & Int'l Aff., Discussion Paper
98-24, 1998), availabk at http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/discpaper_98_24.pdf.
5. Establishment of a Commission to Deal with the Problems Raised by the Discovery of
Atomic Energy, GA. Res. 1, 11 5(c)-(d), U.N. Doc. A/Res/I (Jan. 24, 1946), available at
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NRO/032/52/IMG/NR003252.pdPOpen
Element.
[Vol. 45688
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system of controls and immediate condign punishment for violations."
The Soviet Union curtly rejected the Baruch Plan, apprehending it as a
tool for Western espionage and domination, and insisting (in argumen-
tation that echoes eerily into our own era) that the international
control system should be effectuated only after the United States had
dissolved its extant nuclear inventory and that any sanctions for viola-
tions should be imposed only by the Security Council (where Moscow
retained a veto).
The Cold War and its mutual suspiciousness then precluded any
meaningful dialogue on nuclear weapons restraints through the 1950s.
Partisans feuded inconclusively over whether any interim or partial
measures of arms control could be concluded independently, as circum-
stances might permit, or would have to be inextricably linked to a
pre-conceived overarching comprehensive program of universal arms
control (soon known by the abbreviation GCD, for "general and
complete disarmament"). During the 1960s and 1970s and into the
1980s, there was little talk about, and no appreciable progress toward,
the ultimate desiderata, and "serious people" rarely engaged in mean-
ingful security consultation on that aspiration."
6. ARMS CONTROl. I, supra note 4, at 71 (insisting that effective international controls and
sanctions could be created step-by-step, in successive stages, and that the United States would
divulge its nuclear secrets incrementally, in a corresponding sequence); Leneice N. Wu, The
Baruch Plan 1946-1949, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT 771 (Richard Dean
Burns ed., 1993).
7. JOZEF Goi.tir, ARMS CONrROl.: A GUIDE TO NEGOTIArIoNS AND AGREEMENTs 30-32 (1994);
AiVA MYRDAL, TIE GAME OF DISARMAMENT: How T IE UNITED STATES AND RtssIA RUN I IE ARMS RACE
73-76 (1976) (stressing the concept of "condign punishment" - swift and certain response to any
violation of the disarmament agreements); David Holloway, The Vision of a World Fee of Nucear
Weapons, in GfErINo To ZERO, sunpn note 3, at 18-19; Tie Acheson-Lilienthal & ianich Plans, 1946,
U.S. DEII'T OF STATE, http://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/baruch-plans\ (last visited
Mar. 20, 2014) (discussing the series of early U.S. nuclear disarmament proposals).
8. George Perkovich &James Acton, Abolishing Nuclear Weapons, AnFI.PI' , no. 396, 2008, at 69
(commenting that after the 1940s "[t]he total elimination of nuclear arsenals almost disappeared
from the international agenda until after the Cold War."); Myrdal, sulna note 7, at 77-84, 297-99,
304-05 (criticizing the "propaganda game" the superpowers played with their respective disarma-
nient proposals, arguing "[t]his is the way disarmament was, and is, continually torpedoed.");
Alessandro Corradini, General and G(mplete Disarmament, in 2 ENCvel.orEDIA OF ARMS CONTROL AND
DISARMAMENT 1041 (Richard Dean Burns ed., 1993); Randy Rydell, Nuclear Disarmamnent and General
and Complete Disarmanment, in TIE CH ALLENGE OF AlostiilIING1 NuCiEAR WEAPONS 227 (David Krieger
ed., 2009) (describing the history and implications of the concept of GCD); Randy Rydell,
Advwayfor Nuclear Disarnanent: A Global Revival?, in GErrING To ZERO, supra note 3, at 28-29. Bl
seeJimmy Carter, President of the United States, Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 1977), available at
http://www.bartleby.com/124/pres60.html (declaring that "we will move this year a step toward
ultimate goal-the elimination of all nuclear weapons from this Earth").
2014] 689
GEORGETOWNJOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
A sudden, completely unforeseen-and wholly temporary-revival
of interest in nuclear disarmament occurred at the October 11-12, 1986
summit meeting between U.S. President Ronald Reagan and Soviet
General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev in Reykjavik, Iceland. There, the
two leaders-abandoning their respective cadres of national security
advisors and running far beyond the anticipated modest agenda for the
conference-came within a hair's breadth of reaching an historic
agreement to utterly eliminate their respective nuclear arsenals. At the
last minute, such a tectonic shift eluded the leaders' grasp, however,
and its exact parameters-its precise content and timetable, the provi-
sions for verification and enforcement, etc.-were never specified or
reduced to draft text.9 Still, the Reykjavik "bolt from the blue" reso-
nates through the international arms control community even today,
empowering advocates of nuclear elimination to ponder what might
have happened and emboldening them to contemplate its reprise.o
Other insistent voices also helped sustain the goal of nuclear aboli-
tion. India's Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, for example, presented his
vision to the U.N. General Assembly in 1988." High-level international
congresses-notably the 1996 Canberra Commission on the Elimina-
tion of Nuclear Weapons" and the 2006 Blix Commission on Weapons
of Mass Destruction' 5-likewise kept the flame of disarmament alive.
9. TAUBMAN, sunw note 3, at 248-70 (describing the Reykjavik summit); David Holloway, The
Vision ofa World Free ofNuclear Weapons, in GETTING TO ZERO, sufra note 3, at 20-22.
10. See, e.g., IMPLICATIONS OF THE REYKJAVIK SUMmrr ON ITS TWENTIETH ANNIVERSARY (Sidney D.
Drell & George P. Shultz eds., 2007); REYKJAVIK REVISITED, supra note 3; Thomas Blanton &
Svetlana Savranskaya, Reykjavik: Wien Abolition Was Within Reach, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, Oct. 2011,
available at http://www.armscontrol.org/act/201 1O/ReykjavikWhenAbolition Was_Within
Reach.
11. INFORMAL GROUP ON PRIME MINISTER RAJIV GANDHI's ACTION PLAN FOR A NucLEAR-WEAPONS-
FREE AND NONVIOLENT WORLD ORDER 1988 (RGAP 88), REPORT OF THE INFORMAL GROUP ON RGAP
88 (Aug. 20, 2011), available at http://www.pugwashindia.org/images/uploads/Report.pdf;
Manpreet Sethi, Identifying hinciples for a Nuclear Weapons-Free World: The Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan as
a Relevant Guide, in 2 NUCLEAR ABOLITION FORUM, MOVING BEYOND NUCLEAR DETERRENCE TO A
NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE WORLD 23 (Rob van Riet ed., 2013).
12. CANBERRA COMMISSION ON THE ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, REPORT (1996), available
at http://www.dfat.gov.au/publications/security/canberra-commission-report/cc-reportl.html.
13. WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION COMMISSION (BLIX COMMISSION), WEAPONS OF TERROR:
FREEING THE WORLD OF NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL ARMS (2006), available at http://
www.blixassociates.com/wpontent/uploads/2011/02/Weapons.oflTerror.pdf; see also NWC,
sufna note 2, at 25-26 (identifying salient international advocates for nuclear abolition from 1995
to 2006); CANBERRA COMMISSION, supra note 12, at 32-33 (noting international authorities support-
ing nuclear abolition); STEERING COMM, OF THE PROJECT ON ELIMINATING WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION, AN AMERICAN LEGACY: BUILDING A NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE WORLD (1997); ROBEr D.
[Vol. 45690
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Still, it is no exaggeration to claim that the commitment to nuclear
disarmament had faded through the decades, almost to the point of
extinction. Its occasional invocation felt largely ritualistic; it became
basically devoid of impact on day-to-day national security policy and
international negotiations. Hard-headed officials and their counter-
parts among the non-governmental cognoscenti simply ignored this
objective and focused on other seemingly more tractable and proxi-
mate arms control issues. The goal of nuclear abolition had not
been formally abandoned; it had just been overlooked for so long that
it no longer hovered on the agenda for contemporary international
action.14
Suddenly, however, the "Gang of Four" revivified the concept. This
remarkable ad hoc assemblage consisted of George P. Shultz (Republi-
can), Secretary of State in the Reagan administration, from 1982 to
1989;15 William J. Perry (Democrat), Secretary of Defense in the
Clinton administration, from 1994 to 1997;16 Henry A. Kissinger (Re-
publican), Secretary of State during the Nixon and Ford administra-
tions, from 1973 to 1977;'1 and Sam Nunn (Democrat), chairman of
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee from 1987 to 1995.8 They are
among the most prominent, authoritative, mainstream leaders on U.S.
foreign and national security policy, with deep roots in the theory and
practice of cold war strategy and diplomacy; individually-and cer-
tainly collectively-they command respect from across the U.S. and
global national security community. When these four leaders speak in
unison, others need not necessarily agree, but they have to pay atten-
tion-the mere act of endorsement by these elder statesmen guaranties
that the concept of nuclear abolition can no longer be blithely dis-
missed as unrealistic, utopian, or impractical.
The Gang of Four-assisted and prodded by a cadre of senior
associates who are themselves enormously prominent within the national
security community, even if they are not quite "household names,"
GREEN, FAST TRACK TO ZERO NUCLEAR WEAPONS (1999), available at http://www.ippnw.org/pdf/fast-
track-to-zero-nuclear-weapons.pdf; Holdren, supra note 4.
14. See TAUBMAN, suna note 3, at 287 (reporting that for most nuclear experts in 2000,
the idea of nuclear disarmament "bespoke a flaky idealism and profound ignorance about the
realities of the nuclear age"); Frank Blackaby, Introduction and Summary, in NUCLEAR WEAPONS:
THE ROAD TO ZERO 1, 6 (Joseph Rotblat ed., 1998) (noting that governments simply ignored
recommendations to proceed toward nuclear disarmament).
15. SeeTAUBMAN, supra note 3, at 4.
16. See id. at 5.
17. See id. at 4.
18. See id. at 5.
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such as Max Kampelman,'" Sidney Drell,"2 1 and James Goodby 2 -
rattled the nuclear priesthood with theirJanuary 4, 2007 op-ed." They
then persistently followed that initial broadside with additional salvos,
also published in the Wall Street Joumal in 200823 2010,24 2011,25 and
2013,2 attracting renewed attention and a virtual "who's who" of
bipartisan endorsers."
Mikhail Gorbachev was an early ally, penning his own supportive
column in the Wall Street fournal in January 2007;21 similar expressions
soon came from prominent defense officials in the United Kingdom,
Italy, Germany, and elsewhere." Of course, opposition voices were also
19. See id. at xii.
20. See id. at 16.
21. See id. at 20.
22. 2007 Op Ed, supm note I (endorsing "setting the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons
and working energetically on the actions required to achieve that goal").
23. George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger & Sam Nunn, Toward a Nuclear-liee
World, WA.L Sr.J.,Jan. 15, 2008, at A13 [hereinafter 2008 Op Ed] (expressing concern about "a
nuclear tipping point," due to the accelerating spread of nuclear weapons, and outlining specific
steps to reverse the dangers; introducing the metaphor likening pursuit of nuclear disarmament
to climbing a distant mountain).
24. George P. Shultz, Williai J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger & Sam Nunn, How To Proled Our
NuclearDeteent, WAL.ST.J.,Jan. 20, 2010, at Al7 [hereinafter 2010 Op Ed] (stressing the need to
maintain the safety, security, and reliability of weapons stockpiles, while pursuing arms control
efforts to reduce and eliminate them).
25. George P. Shultz, WilliamJ. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger & Sam Nunn, Deterence in theAgeof
Nuckar fIbjeration, WALL Sr.J., Mar. 7, 2011 [hereinafter 2011 Op Ed] (proposing a movement
toward a safer and more secure form of deterrence that does not rely primarily upon nuclear
weapons).
26. George P. Shultz, WilliamJ. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger & Sam Nunn, Next Steps in Reducing
Nuclear Risks: The 'ace of Nonproliferation Wonk Today Doesn't Match the hgemy of the Treat, WALL
ST. J., Mar. 5, 2013 [hereinafter 2013 Op Ed] (outlining four areas requiring urgent attention,
including securing nuclear materials, increasing the time for making critical decisions, pursuing
additional measures of arms control, and enhancing verification capabilities).
27. 2008 Op Ed, supra note 23 (noting that the Gang of Four had received indications of
support from many former senior U.S. government officials, including Madeleine Albright,
Richard V. Allen, James A. Baker III, Samuel R. Berger, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Frank Carlucci,
Warren Christopher, William Cohen, Lawrence Eagleburger, Melvin Laird, Anthony Lake, Robert
McFarlane, Robert McNamara and Colin Powell).
28. Mikhail Gorbachev, The Nuclear Danger, WALL Sr. J., Jan. 31, 2007 (asserting that "[w]e
must put the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons back on the agenda, not in some distant futture,
but as soon as possible.").
29. TAUBMAN, supta note 3, at 338; Perkovich & Acton, supra note 8, at 183; Manmohan Singh,
Prime Minister of India, Inaugural Speech at the International Conference on a Nuclear Weapons
Free World: Towards a World Free of Nuclear Weapons (Jun. 9, 2008), available at http://
pmindia.nic.in/speech-details.php?nodeid=665; G6tz Neuneck, Is a World without Nuclear Weap-
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emphatically expressed, including those of Harold Brown (Secretary of
Defense in the Carter administration),"o James Schlesinger (Secretary
of Defense under Presidents Nixon and Ford)-' and Richard Perle
(Assistant Secretary of Defense under President Reagan). 2 But a
cottage industry of "zero" advocacy quickly sprang up, with a dra-
matic flow of books,' articles,34 speeches,' and movies;3 " two non-
governmental organizations 7 adopted "getting to zero" as their pri-
ons Attainable? Conparative Perspectives on Goat and Prospects, in GErInN To ZERO, sufna note 3, at 43,
46-54 (identifying spokespersons from Poland, Norway, France, Sweden, Belgium and elsewhere
contemporaneously endorsing the concept of nuclear disarmament).
30. Harold Brown & John Deutch, The Nuclear Disarmament Fantasy, WALL Sr. J., Nov. 19,
2007, available at http://www.wagingpeace.0rg/articles/2007/11/26_brownarticle_responses.
php (arguing that "the goal, even the aspirational goal, of eliminating all nuclear weapons is
counterproductive" and "there is no realistic path to a world free of nuclear weapons").
31. See TAUBMAN, sifna note 3, at 14 (quoting Schlesinger's 2010 speech stating that "[t]he
dividing line between vision and hallucination is never very clear.").
32. Richard Perle, Yes, Nukes: The Global Zew Utopia, WoRojn AFFAiRsJ., Mar. 10, 2011, available
at http://www.aei.org/article/foreign-and-defense-policy/defense/yes-nukes-the-global-zero-
utopia/; Kin R. Holmes, How Barack Obamas Vivion of a Nuclear-luee World Weakens America's
Security: Deconstructing the "Road to Zero", HERrTAGE FOUND. (Sept. 10, 2010), http://www.
hieri tage.org/ research /Iectu re/how-barack-obamiaesvision-of-a-nu tclear--free-wor-ld-wveakenis-amierica-
s-security; DouglasJ. Feith, FrankJ. Gaffney,James A. Lyons & R.Jamnes Woolsey, Obama's "Nuclear
Zero"ItetoricIsl)angeoius, WAsii. Post, Mar. 29, 2013;JamesJay Carafano, The Road to Zer: Keeping
Swo(ls, Builing Piughshaies, HERIAGE FOUND. (Aug. 20, 2009), ittp://www.heritage.org/research/
commentaiy/2009/08/the-oad-to-zero-keeping-swords-buildi ng-ploughshares.
33. SIDNEY D. DRELL & JAMES E. Goonliv, A WORLD Wrrilotrr NucI.EAR WEAP'ONS: ENo-SrATE
IssUEs (2009) [hereinafter END-STATE ISSUES); IMPLICATIONS OF THE REYKjAVIK SuMMrr TON ITs
TWENTIET i ANNIVERSARY (Sidney D. Drell & George P. Shultz eds., 2007); REYKJAVIK REVISITED, ll/ffa
note 3; GErrITNG To ZERO, s1/na note 3; Ctl:IrIVAIN; CONFIDENCE, supia note 3; RUSSIA AND TI E
DII.EIuAS or NucIEAR DISARMAMErNT (Alexei Arbatov et al. eds., 2012).
34. See, e.g., Ivo Daalder &Jan Lodal, The Logic ojiero: Towaid a World Without Nuclear Weapmns,
FoREIGN AFF., Nov.-Dec. 2008, at 80-95; Christopher Ford, A New Paradigm: Shattering Obsolete
Thinking on Arms Control and Nonroliferation, ARMS CONTRoi. TonAY, Nov. 2008; DEIIATE, Slna
note 3; Michael Krepon, Ban the Bmnb, Really, 3 The AM. INTERESr, no. 3, Jan.-Feb. 2008, at 88; 2
NuctLAR AloITION FORUM, MovING BEYoND NUCIAR DETERRENCE TO A NUtE.AR WEAroNs FREE
WORLD (Rob van Riet ed., 2013); JAMN-S M. ACroN, Low NUMEus: A Puw:rcxi. PAT ITO DEEP
NUCLEAR REDntjCIONS (2011), available at http://carnegieendowment.org/files/low-numbers.
pdf.
35. See TAIJlMAN, slpn note 3, at 458 (listing speeches related to nuclear disarmament after
the Gang of Four 0p Ed columns). Notably, during the 2008 presidential election campaign, both
Barack Obama andJohn McCain formally endorsed the concept of nuclear disarmament. Id. at
335, 342-43.
36. Id. at 340 (describing "Countdown to Zero" and "Nuclear Tipping Point").
37. Id. at 338-40 (noting shared goals, but different approaches by-and some tension
between-the Nuclear Threat Institute (headed by Sam Nunn) and Global Zero (headed by
Bruce Blair, Matt Brown and Barny Blechman)); see abo Randy Rydell, Advocacy fJr Nuclear
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mary mandate.38
The most important endorsement came from President Barack
Obama, in his celebrated April 5, 2009 speech in Prague.39 There,
citing the persistent and growing dangers of nuclear warfare, the
imperative of avoiding any insidious "fatalism" about the inevitability
of further proliferation, and the special responsibility of the United
States, as the only country ever to have used nuclear weapons in
combat, he declared:
So today, I state clearly and with conviction America's commit-
ment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear
weapons. I'm not naive. This goal will not be reached quickly-
perhaps not in my lifetime. It will take patience and persistence.
But now we, too, must ignore the voices who tell us that the
world cannot change. We have to insist, 'Yes, we can."
Six months later, Obama chaired a heads-of-state session of the U.N.
Security Council (the first time a U.S. president had done so) and led
the advocacy in support of the unanimous adoption of resolution
Disarmamrnt: A Global Revival?, in GETTING TO ZERO, sufna note 3, at 30-32 (identifying numerous
public and private sector "recent initiatives" aimed at nuclear disarmament).
38. In 2012, the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons reported that its survey
of governmental positions regarding a proposed new treaty to ban nuclear weapons revealed that
146 countries supported the immediate commencement of negotiations leading to such a treaty,
22 were "on the fence," and 26 opposed. TIM WRIGHT, TOWARDS A TREATY BANNING NUCLEAR
WEAPONS: A GUIDE To GOVERNMENT POSITIONS ON A NUCLEAR WEAPONS CONVENTION (2012).
39. Barack Obama, President of the United States, Speech in Prague, Czech Republic
(Apr. 5, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press_office/Remarks-By-President-
Barack-Obama-In-Prague-As-Delivered/ [hereinafter Prague Speech]. The concept was also en-
dorsed in the April 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report, the Department of Defense's top-level
"roadmap for implementing President Obama's agenda for reducing nuclear risks to the United
States, our allies and partners, and the international community." U.S. DEPT. OF DEFENSE, NUCLEAR
POSTURE REVIEw REPORT (2010). In a section entitled "Looking Ahead: Toward a World Without
Nuclear Weapons," the NPR Report concludes that "[t] he long-term goal of U.S. policy is the
complete elimination of nuclear weapons. At this point, it is not clear when this goal can be
achieved" and that "[t]he conditions that would ultimately permit the United States and others to
give up their nuclear weapons without risking greater international instability and insecurity are
very demanding.. . . Clearly, such conditions do not exist today. But we can-and must-work
actively to create those conditions." Id. at 45-49.
40. Prague Speech, sufna note 39; see also Barack Obama, President of the United States
and Dmitry Medvedev, President of the Russian Federation, Joint Statement, Apr. 1, 2009, in
END-STATE ISSUES, supra note 33, at 1-2 (committing both countries to achieve a nuclear weapons
free world).
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1887.41 In it, the Security Council, "[r]esolving to seek a safer world
for all and to create the conditions for a world without nuclear
weapons,"4 2 and "[r]eaffirming that proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, and their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to in-
ternational peace and security,"'1 called upon parties to the 1968
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)44 to pursue the treaty-
specified negotiations in good faith on nuclear arms reduction and
disarmament, and similarly called on NPT non-parties to join that
endeavor.
To conclude this chronology on a downbeat note, it must be ob-
served that the momentum for taking meaningful steps toward the
elimination of nuclear weapons has faded in 2011-2013. The advocates
have not changed their minds or abandoned the enterprise, but no
new major accomplishments have been recorded, and no new ground-
swell of additional political support has emerged-indeed, there has
been retrograde movement, with a renewed emphasis on nuclear
weapons and revivified nuclear postures." Whether this faltering sig-
nals that the wave of enthusiasm for zero has already crested, or
whether it is merely a temporary pause before even greater political
and popular support emerges, will soon be tested.
B. The Law of Zero
The lodestar for legal analysis of nuclear weapons is the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty,47 arguably the most important arms control
41. S.C. Res. 1887, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1887 (Sept. 24, 2009).
42. Id. at 1.
43. Id.
44. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Jul. 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729
U.N.T.S. 161 [hereinafter NPT].
45. S.C. Res. 1887, sufna note 41, 5.
46. See 2013 Op Ed, sufna note 26 (observing that "[t]he continuing risk posed by nuclear
weapons remains an overarching strategic problem, but the pace of work doesn't match the
urgency of the threat."); Ward Wilson, The Myth of Nuclear Necessity, NUCLEAR ABOLITION FORUM,
no. 2, 2013, at 1 (noting that "the abolition movement seems stalled."); George Perkovich,
Do UNTO OTHERS: TOWARD A DEFENSIBLE NUCLEAR DOCrRINE 2 (2013), available at http://carnegie
endowment.org/files/dounto-others.pdf; William J. Perry, My PersonalJourney at the Nuclear
Brink, EUR. LEADERSHIP NETWORK (June 17, 2013), available at http://www.europeanleadership
network.org/my-personaljourneyat-the-nuclear-brink-by-bill-perry_633.html (commenting that
"in 2011 that progress and forward momentum [toward dealing with the nuclear legacy of the cold
war] began to stall out and even reverse").
47. NPT, supna note 44.
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agreement in history. This instrument constitutes a grand bargain
between the "nuclear weapon states" (NWS) (a set identical to the five
permanent members (the P5) of the U.N. Security Council)"" and the
"non-nuclear weapon states" (NNWS) (i.e., everyone else)."' The NPT
rests upon three related "pillars": non-proliferation (the NNWS pledge
never to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons50 ); disar-
mament (the NWS commit to measures of arms control, as elaborated
below'); and peaceful uses of nuclear energy (all parties without
discrimination retain the right to pursue the full array of non-military
applications of nuclear energy, subject to international safeguards to
prevent diversion of the materials, facilities and expertise into weapons
programs5 ).
Of special interest in this context is article VI of the NPT, which
contains the fundamental commitment (levied upon the NWS and
NNWS alike) regarding the disarmament pillar:
Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue ne-
gotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to
cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to
nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and com-
plete disarmament under strict and effective international
control.5
Article VI therefore constitutes a bold, explicit, and relatively clear-
cut international law commitment, binding upon the treaty's 189
48. In the NPT, "a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a
nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior tojanuary 1, 1967." NPT, supra note 44,
art. IX.3. This includes the United States, the Soviet Union/Russia, the United Kingdom, France,
and China.
49. Regarding the history, structure, importance, and challenges of the NPT, see ARMs
CONTROL. I, supra note 4, at 288-309. See aLbo William Epstein, The Nn-ProlIfurtion Treaty andl the
Review Gomfrences 1965 to the Present, in 2 ENCYCLorEnlA OF ARMs CONrROl. AND DISARMAMENT 855
(Richard Dean Burnsed., 1993); Anis CONTROL II, sufna note 4, at 148-72; REVIEwING THE NJCLEAR
NONPROL.IFERATION TREA1Y (Henry Sokolski ed., 2010), available at http://www.strategicstudies
institute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfin?publD=987; RliUILDING THE NPT CONSENSUS (Michael May
ed., 2007).
50. NFT, supra note 44, art. II.
51. Id. art. VI.
52. Id. art IV.
53. Id. art. VI; see Scott D. Sagan, Good F'aith and Nuclear Disarmament Negotiations, in DEBATE,
supra note 3, at 203-12.
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parties" (virtually all the states in the world except India, Israel, North
Korea 55 and Pakistan-each of which possesses nuclear weapons),
obligating them to pursue nuclear disarmament in good faith.
Nevertheless, controversy has always surrounded the NPT, especially
regarding insistent claims by several NNWS that the NWS have been
insufficiently zealous and successful in their obligatory pursuit of
nuclear disarmament, and have thereby perpetuated the "discrimina-
tory" structure of the NPT.'u Particularly in 1995, when the treaty was
"extended" beyond its original twenty-five year duration, the "have-not"
countries extracted renewed commitments from the "have" states to
accelerate their pursuit of zero; at the 2000 NPT Review Conference,
that renewal of vows was captured in a series of specified "practical
steps."
The International Court of Justice (ICJ), the judicial organ of the
United Nations,5X was drawn into the fray when the General Assembly
requested an advisory opinion regarding the legality of the threat or
use of nuclear weapons.-' In a 1996 decision correctly characterized as
being both pathbreaking in its articulation of legal principles and
confounding in its circumlocution and indecision, the ICJ determined,
54. Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, UNIE) N/VnONS OFFICE FOR DISARMAMENT
AFFAIRs, http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/NPT.shtml (last visited Nov. 10, 2013).
55. Arms Control and Proliferation PInfile: Norlh Korea, ARMS CONTROl. A.SS'N, http://
www.arnscontr ol.org/factsheets/northkoreaprofile (last updated Apr. 2013) (noting that
North Korea had joined the NPT, then withdrew from it in 2003; the United Nations Security
Council has ordered North Korea to return to the treaty, but it has not done so).
56. Ramesh Thakur, The Desirability of a Nuclear Weapon live World, inl CANBERRA COMMIsSION
ON TilE EuMINAIloN OF NuLFAR WEAPONS, BACKGROUND PAPERS 74, 83-85 (1996) (arguing that
"tt]he NPT is discriminatory, is seen as discriminatory, and will be progressively delegitimised
unless there is continual movement towards nuiclear disarmament."); Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu,
India and iclear Zemo, in GErING To ZERo, sulpa note 3, at 224, 232 (noting that India's
longstanding critique of the NPT includes its discriminatory nature); Thomas Graham, Jr., NPT
Article VI Origin and Interinetation, in REmBLDING THE NPT CONSENSUS, sipa note 49, at 45, 51-61.
57. TilouAs GRAllAM, JR., DisARMAMENT SKErciES: THREE DECADES OF ARMs CONTROl. AND
INTERNAlONALI LAw 257-93 (2002); 2000 Review ranji',ence o] the Iarlies to the Treaty on the Non-
Poliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Final Document, NYT/CONF.2000/28 (Parts I and 11), available at
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2000_06/docjun.
58. U.N. Charter art. 92; Statute of the International Court ofJustice art. 1,June 26, 1945,
3 Bevans 1179.
59. Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 226 (July 8)
[hereinafter ICJ Advisory Opinion on Nuclear Weapons]; see Dean Granoff &Jonathan Granoff,
International lAmanitarian Law and Nuclear Weapons: Ireconcilable Diffrences, 67 Btui.i.. Of THIE
AToMIC SCIENTISis, no. 6, 2011, at 53; CharlesJ. Moxley,Jr.,John Burroughs, &Jonathan Granoff,
Nuclear Weapons and Comipliance with International Humanitarian Lawn and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty, 34 FORDIAM INT'I. L.J. 595 (2011).
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inter alia, that: (a) nuclear weapons were governed by the same law of
armed conflict principles applicable to all other weapons;6 o (b) all
parties to the NPT are bound by the article VI commitment not only to
pursue nuclear disarmament in good faith, but to successfully conclude
their negotiations and achieve the desired result;' (c) the widespread,
severe, and long-lasting effects of nuclear weapons mean that their use
is "scarcely reconcilable" with the legal requirements of proportionality
and avoidance of civilian casualties;"2 and (d) nevertheless, the court
could not definitively conclude that all possible uses of nuclear weap-
ons would be illegitimate-such as firing against an isolated military
target far removed from civilian areas, or in an instance where a
nation's very survival depended upon the application of such overwhelm-
ing force."
C. The Military Aspect of Zero
The current "box score" of global holdings of nuclear weapons is
somewhat complex because it must differentiate states that currently
possess nuclear weapons, states that formerly possessed them, states
with considerable current potential to develop them, and other nu-
anced categories. The NPT acknowledges five of its parties as long-time
NWS possessors of nuclear weapons: China, France, Russia, the United
Kingdom, and the United States."4 In addition, three non-NPT states
60. ICJ Advisory Opinion on Nuclear Weapons, sUpia note 59, 1 105 (2) C and D (unani-
mously concluding that the provisions of the UN Charter and of international humanitarian law
apply to the threat or use of nuclear weapons).
61. Id. 105 (2) F (unanimously).
62. Id. 195.
63. Id. 105 (2) E (by seven votes to seven, with the president of the court casting the
deciding vote).
64. See Arms Control and Prolifration Profile: China, ARMS CONTROL Ass'N, http://www.arms
control.org/factsheets/chinaprofile (last updatedJuly, 2013); Arms Control and Proliferation Profile:
France, ARMs CONTROL Ass'N, http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/franceprofile (last updated
July, 2013); Arms Control and Prolifeation Profile: Russia, ARMS CONTROL Ass'N, http://www.arms
control.org/factsheets/russiaprofile (last updatedJuly, 2013); Arms Control and Proliferation Profile:
United Kingdom, ARMS CONTROL Ass'N, http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/ukprofile (last
updated July, 2013); Arms Control and Poliferation Profile: United States, ARMS CONTROL AsS'N,
http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/unitedstatesprofile (last updated July, 2013). See also
Countiy Profile: China, NucLEAR THREAT INST., http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/china/nuclear/
(last updated Feb., 2013); County Profile: France, NUCLEAR THREAT INST., http://www.nti.org/country-
profiles/france/nuclear/ (last updated Aug., 2013); County Profile: Russia, NUCLEAR THREAT INsT.,
http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/r-ussia/nuclear/ (last updated Aug., 2013); Countiy Profile:
United Kingdom, NUCLEAR THREAT INST., http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/united-kingdom/
nuclear/ (last updated July, 2013); Country Profile: United States, NUCLEAR THREAT INST., http://
www.nti.org/country-profiles/united-states/ (last updatedJuly, 2013).
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have overtly tested and produced nuclear weapons: India, North Korea,
and Pakistan.6 5 Israel, another NPT non-party, is widely credited with a
nuclear weapon inventory, but it has not publicly acknowledged that
status. 6
In addition, a handful of other states formerly possessed nuclear
weapons. When the U.S.S.R. dissolved in 1991, some of its massive
nuclear arsenal was suddenly "inherited" by successor states Belarus,
Kazakhstan, and Ukraine; after difficult negotiations, each of those
new republics shipped the nuclear warheads back to Russia.67
South Africa is a special case of "rollback": the apartheid regime had
secretly constructed a small nuclear weapons stockpile in the 1980s,
but then dismantled it and the weapons infrastructure, shortly before
the institution of majority rule in the country. 8 In addition, several
states, including Cuba, Czechoslovakia, East and West Germany,
Italy, South Korea, and Turkey, have allowed one of the superpowers to
base nuclear weapons on their territories, under secret arrangements
that may have afforded the host some degree of influence over any
65. See Arms Control and Proliferation Profile: India, ARMs CONTROL Ass'N, http://www.armscon-
trol.org/factsheets/indiaprofile (last updated July, 2013); Arms Control and Proliferation Profile:
North Korea, ARMS CONTROL Ass'N, sufna note 55; Arms Control and Prolhferation Profile: Pakistan, ARMS
CONTROL Ass'N, http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/pakistanprofile (last updatedJuly, 2013);
Country Profile: India, NUCLEAR THREAT INST., http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/india/nuclear/
(last updatedJune, 2013); Country Profile: North Korea, NUCLEAR THREAT INST., http://www.nti.org/
country-profiles/north-korea/nuclear/ (last updated Sept., 2013); Coniy Profile: Pakistan, NUCLEAR
THREAT INST., http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/pakistan/nuclear/ (last updated July, 2013);
see generally Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu, India and Nuclear Zero, in GETrING TO ZERO, supra note 3,
at 224-42.
66. See Arms Control and Proliferation Profile: Isrmel, ARMS CONTROL Ass'N, http://www.arms
control.org/factsheets/israelprofile (last updatedJuly, 2013) (noting that Israel is considered to
have a substantial nuclear arsenal, although it has not officially acknowledged any, and maintains
that it "will not be the first country to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East"); Country
Prmfile: Israe4 NUCLEAR THREAT INST, http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/israel/nuclear/ (last
updated Aug., 2013); see generally Avner Cohen, Israel's Nuclear Future: Iran, Opacity, and the Vision of
Global Zero, in GErTING TO ZERO, sufna note 3, at 187-205.
67. See Country Profile: Belarus, NUCLEAR THREAT INST., http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/
belarus/ (last updated Aug., 2013); Country Pofile: Kazakhstan, NUCLEAR THREAT INST., http://
www.nti.org/country-profiles/kazakhstan/nuclear/ (last updated Feb., 2013); Country Profile:
Ukraine, NUCLEAR THREAT INST., http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/ukraine/ nuclear/ (last up-
dated Feb., 2013).
68. See Country Profile: South Afica, NUCLEAR THREAT INST. http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/
south-africa/nuclear/ (last updated July, 2013); REBUILDING THE NPT CONSENSUS, supra note 49,
at 151.
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potential use.'"
The next category would embrace states that have pursued a nuclear
weapons capability with some degree of vigor and some measure of
success, without (at least yet) completing the program. Iran is currently
the country most precariously poised on the threshold of acquiring a
nuclear weapons capacity;71o Syria 7 ' and Libya7 2 are similar relatively
recent examples. Going somewhat further back in time, Argentina,
Brazil, South Korea, and several others would fit the description.7
Moreover, there are several states that could probably develop nuclear
weapons in short order-they possess the indigenous intellectual,
physical, economic, and other resources-but they have as a policy and
legal matter rejected that avenue. Perhaps forty countries-Australia,
Canada, GermanyJapan, Sweden, Switzerland, and many other NATO
members-would be characterized this way.7"
Finally, it must be acknowledged thatjust about any state potentially
could be implicated in the acquisition of nuclear weapons or their
critical components. Hypothetically, almost any location on earth
could be utilized (with the active collaboration of the relevant govern-
ment, or perhaps without its knowledge) by another state for secretly
69. Rose Gottemoeller, Eliminating Shrti-Range Nuclear Weapons Designed to Be Fonard Dephyed,
in REYKjAVIK RFvistrED, suam note 3, at 107, 155 (depicting U.S. short-range nuclear weapons
deployed in seven European countries in 2005).
70. See ARMs CONTRO. AssocIAtoN, BRIEFING BoOK: SOlVING 11I IRANIAN NuCiLAR PuzzLE
(Sept. 2013), availabk at http://iv .arscontrol.org/system/files/ACAIranBriefingBook
UpdateSeptember_2013_0.pdf; Couniiy Profile: Iran, NUC LEAR Ti IRFAT INST., http://www.nti.org/
country-profiles/iran/nuclear/ (last updated Sept., 2013); Rebecca Bornstein, Enfanremeal Sce-
tioari: Ian, in ELEMENTS OF A NucLFAR DISARMAMENT TREAtY, supra note 3, at 255-70.
71. Arm.sCo(nutiol and I'ialifra-tion 1jile: Syria, ARMS CON!TRot Ass'N, http://ww.amiiscontrol.
org/factsheets/syriaprofile (last updated Sept. 2013); CounitIy Pi file: Syria, NucLEAR Ti IREAT INST.,
http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/syiia/nuclear/ (last updatedJune 2013).
72. Counitry Profile: Lilya, NUcLEAR TiREAT INST., http://WWW.nti.org/coUnty-pioflles/
libya/nuclear/ (last updated Feb. 2013); Peter Crail, Lilya Adds Newo Pieces to iIs Nuclear Ilistiny,
ARms CONTROl. TonAY, Oct. 2008.
73. Couniy 1nyfile: Aigentina, NuciFEAR TiIREAT INST., http://Ayw.nti.org/country-profiles/
argentina/ (last updated Aug. 2012); Nuclear Threat Institute, Counhy lI'file: Brazi, Nucl.EAR
TliREAr INST., http://WW.nti.org/country-profiles/brazil/ (last updated Aug. 2012); Cniqnty
Proile: Souith Kora, NUCL.EAR TimRAT INST., http://www.inti.org/counny-profiles/south-korea/
nuclear/ (last updated Sept. 2013).
74. IIGG Repopl Card Nuclear Nonpooliferation: Background, CoUNCIl. ON FOREIGN RFLiATIONS
1, 2 (Apr. 2013), http://www.cfr.org/thinktank/iigg/reportcard/PDFs/CFR%20Nuclear%20
Nonproliferation %2OReport%2OCard%2OBackgrou nder.pdf; Nuclear Materials Security Index,
NUCLEAR TiHREAT INITIATIVE 1, 20 (Jan. 2014), http://ntiindex.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/
2014-NTI-Index-Reportl.pdf.
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hiding a weapon or components or undertaking other key actions."
An area beyond the jurisdiction of any country-such as the high seas
or Antarctica-could likewise be exploited." So a disarmament treaty's
verification regime would have to be of universal application.
An additional set of definitional and taxonomic points must also be
briefly addressed. The term "nuclear weapon" is itself ambiguous.
Sometimes, that designator embraces both of the two indispensable
elements: the nuclear explosive component (a missile warhead, artil-
lery shell, bomb, etc.) and the "delivery vehicle" (the missile, projectile,
aircraft, etc. that is used to transport the explosive to its target);
sometimes, "weapon" refers only to the explosive. Usually (including in
this article), discussion about eliminating nuclear weapons focuses
principally upon the explosives, but any comprehensive treaty must
also address the question of retention, limitation, or modification of
nuclear-capable delivery systems.7
Nuclear-armed delivery systems are often categorized by the mission
they are assigned or the range they are capable of reaching; the
vocabulary is not well standardized, but the customary three tiers are:
"strategic" (consisting of inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs),
submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers,
75. Countries have frequently tested their nuclear weapons outside their home territories, on
the high seas, or within the boundaries of another state. Nuclear Tesing Tally, ARMS CONfROLASS'N,
http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/nucleartesttally (Feb. 2013). Concealing a nuclear
weapon, or conducting nuclear weapons-related activities, on the territory of another state
without its knowledge would be highly problematic, but it might not be impossible in some
circumstances.
76. Regarding an alleged (but not confirmed, and not authoritatively attributed to any
specific country) nuclear weapon test explosion in the South Atlantic in 1979, see Carey Sublette,
Report on the 1979 Vela Incident, NUCLEAR WEAPON ARCHIVE (Sept. 1, 2001), available at http://
nucleanveaponarchive.org/Safrica/Vela.htmli; 1979 South Atlantic "Flash" Is Consislent with a
Nuclear Explosion, According to Newly DechlassiJied Enegy Department Documents, INSr, FOR SC:. AND
INT'i. SEc. (ISIS) (Mar. 2001), available at http://www.isis-online.org/publications/southafrica/
03012001 %20press%20release%20on%20flash.html; E.M. Jones, R.W. Whitaker, H.G. Horak &
J.W. Kodis, Low-Yield Nuclear Explosion Calculatios: The 9/22/79 Vel Signa4 INST. FOR Set. AND
INT'l, SEC. (ISIS) (May 1982), available at http://www.isis-online.org/publications/southafrica/
lanl%20doc.pdf.
77. See NoOEiRGA K. CAIyO-GoL.ER & MiclsEI. A. CALVO, THE SALT AGREEMENTS: CONTEWT,
API'CATION, VERIFICAION 29-32 (1987) (discussing definitions of terns used in SALT I); DEBATE,
supra note 3, at 54. Sometimes, analysts speak of three components: the explosive unit (consisting
of one or more nuclear devices inside a radiation case); the "nuclear warhead system" (in which
the encased weapon is integrated into a deliverable gravity bomb, artillery shell, missile re-entry
vehicle, or other mechanism); and the delivery system (a ballistic missile, bomber, submarine, or
other carrier).
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with ranges generally exceeding 5500 kilometers); 78 "intermediate,"
"theater," or "medium-range";"7 and "tactical" or "battlefield" (with
ranges generally under 500 kilometers).80 Furthermore, weapons may
be classified as "deployed" (i.e., in operational status); "non-deployed"
(including systems that are undergoing repair or maintenance); "re-
serve" (not mated to a delivery system, but available in principle for a
return to deployed status); "retired" (removed from the active-duty
stockpile, with no intention of being maintained in operational condi-
tion); and "awaiting disassembly" (in the queue for dismantling-a
status that can linger for years, depending on the availability of appro-
priate facilities). 8
At a deeper level of detail, nuclear disarmament advocates must
address the "components" of a nuclear weapon-if a treaty regime
78. SeeTreaty Between the United States ofAmerica and the Russian Federation on Measures
for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, U.S.-Russ., Protocol, Part 1,
23, 37, 77, Apr. 8, 2010, S. TREAT Doc. No. 111-5 [hereinafter New START] (defining strategic
nuclear weapons covered by the treaty); AMY F. WOOLF, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33640, U.S.
STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES: BACKGROUND, DEVELOPMENTS, AND ISSUES 9-28 (Oct. 22, 2013).
79. See Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics On the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, U.S.-
U.S.S.R., art. 11.5,6, Dec. 8. 1987, 27 I.L.M. 84 (entered into force Jun. 1, 1988) [hereinafter INF
Treaty]; STEVEN PIFER & MICHAEL E. O'HANLON, THE OPPORTUNITrY NEXT STEPS IN REDUCING
NUCLEAR ARMs 81-112 (2012).
80. Dakota S. Rudesill, Regulating Tactical Nuclear Weapons, 102 GEO. L.J. 99, 108 (2013);
Steven P. Andreasen, Venfying Reductions and Elimination of Tactical Nuclear Weapons, in CULTIVATING
CONFIDENCE, supra note 3, at 213-28; Rose Gottemoeller, Eliminating Short-Range Nuclear Weapons
Designed to Be Foroard Deployed, in REYKJAVIK REVISITED, supra note 3, at 107-57; Viktor Esin, Tactical
Nuclear Weapons: Their Modern Militay Role and Arms Control Proposals, and Steven Pifer, Nonstrategic
Nuclear Weapons, Policy and Arms Control; Issues for the United States, NATO and Russia, in NATURAL
RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, FROM MUTUAL ASSURED DESTRUCTION TO MUTUAL ASSURED STABILITY:
EXPLORING A NEW COMPREHENSIVE FRAMEWORK FOR U.S. AND RUSSIAN NUCLEAR ARMS REDUCTIONs 57,
64 (2013), available at http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/files/NRDC-ISKRAN-Nuclear-Security-Report-
March2013.pdf.
81. See U.S. DEPT. OF DEFENSE, Fact Sheet: Increasing Transparency in the U.S. Nuclear Stock-
pile (May 3, 2010), http://www.defense.gov/npr/docs/10-05-03_FactSheetUS_- Nuclear_
TransparencyFINAL-wDate.pdf (defining the "nuclear stockpile" as including "active" war-
heads (including strategic and non-strategic weapons maintained in an operational, ready-to-use
configuration, as well as weapons that could be available for deployment in a short time, and
spares) and "inactive" warheads (maintained at a depot in non-operational status); a "retired"
warhead has been removed from its delivery vehicle, is not functional, and is in a queue for
dismantlement; a "dismantled" warhead has been reduced to its component parts); U.S. DEPT. OF
DEFENSE, NUCLEAR MATTERS HANDBOOK 36-43 (2011), available at http://www.acq.osd.mil/ncbdp/
nm/nm book511/index.htm(describing composition of U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile);
New START, supra note 78, Protocol, Part 1, 12-17, 47-52 (differentiating "deployed" from
"non-deployed" weapons). Other countries may not use the same categories or vocabulary.
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requires "destruction" of a nuclear weapon, may a state nonetheless
retain some disassembled pieces of the device, and if so, what are
the appropriate accountable constituent elements? The phenomenon
of "dual capability" is a persistent problem here-many of the same
substances, equipment, facilities and knowledge that are essential to
producing and sustaining nuclear weapons are also relevant to a full
range of benign applications across the civilian economy.8 2
The most important, unique ingredient in a nuclear explosive device
is the fissile material-the highly-enriched uranium or plutonium
that undergoes the fission reaction providing the massive amounts of
explosive energy. The NWS have produced enormous inventories of
fissile material-officially undisclosed, but estimated at 1,440 tons
of highly enriched uranium and 485 tons of plutonium"3-some of
which is adaptable not only for weapons, but also for use in nuclear
power plants, naval reactors, nuclear medicine, isotopic thermal genera-
tors (for deep space missions), and other benign applications. Monitor-
ing those secret mountains of hazardous radioactive elements will be a
critical challenge; the International Atomic Energy Agency currently
considers only twenty-five kilograms of highly enriched uranium, or
eight kilograms of plutonium, to be a "significant quantity," approximat-
ing the minimum amount supposedly needed for a first-generation
nuclear weapon, and therefore justifying the closest scrutiny. 8 4
82. Regarding dual capability of nuclear materials, equipment and technology, see NUCLEAR
SUPPLIERs GROUP, Guidelines for Transfers of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment, Materials, Software,
and Related Technology, http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/A-test/01-eng/09-guide.php?
%20button=91 (last visited Nov. 10, 2013). See also Int'l Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], Cornmuni-
cations Received from Certain Member States Regarding Guidelines for Transfeis of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use
Equipment, Materials, Software and Related Technology, IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/254/Rev.7/Part 2a
(Mar. 20, 2006), available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2006/
infcirc254r7p2.pdf. Many of the ingredients of a nuclear weapon, such as the neutron reflector,
are unique for this purpose and would not be suitable for many other functions; however, some
components, such as the casing, the power supply, the fusing and arming systems, the altimeters,
and the parachutes, might be more adaptable for some conventional weapons or for selected civil
industrial purposes.
83. See Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) at a Glance, ARms CONTROL ASS'N (Aug. 2013),
http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/fmct; see also INTr-ERNATIONAL PANEL ON FISSILE MATERIALS,
GLOBAL FISSILE MATERIAL REPORT 2013 8, 11 (2013), available at http://fissilematerials.org/library/
gfmrl3.pdf [hereinafter Fissi.E MATERIAL PANEL] (estimating 2012 global stocks of highly en-
riched uranium at 1380 tons (plus or minus 125 tons) and of plutonium at 495 tons (plus or minus
10 tons).
84. See Limits to the Safeguard System, INT'LATOMIC ENERGYAGENCY (IAEA), http://www.iaea.org/
Publications/Booklets/Safeguards/pia3810.htmI (last visited Nov, 10, 2013) (IAEA focuses on the
approximate quantity of material necessary to manufacture a nuclear weapon-about 25kg of
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Importantly, the disassembly of a nuclear weapon is not necessarily
irrevocable; a crucial element in a zero regime would be procedures to
guard against reconstitution of a weapons capacity that had apparently
been eliminated. As long as a country retains the essential building
blocks and knowledge, it has an inherent capability for reassembly, as
well as for new construction "from scratch.""" The function of the legal
regime, therefore, would be to ensure that any such nuclear renais-
sance would not be swift or secret."
Conceptually, a major issue in the strategic design of the verification
apparatus is how far "backwards" it must extend into the production
cycle for a nuclear weapon. That is, would it be sufficient for the future
stability of the regime to ensure only the "first level" -the internation-
ally monitored disassembly all nuclear weapons and the secure storage
or destruction of the components? Or must the control system also
intrude more deeply into the production process, ensuring the disassem-
bly of those critical components, together with international scrutiny of
the storage or destruction of the resulting subcomponents? Or, in
pursuit of still greater long-term reliability, would the treaty mechanism
have to apply safeguards to all the facilities at which weapons compo-
nents and subcomponents are manufactured, processed, and as-
sembled for various purposes, including purposes far removed from
nuclear weaponry?" 7
Finally, nuclear weapons require a considerable physical infrastruc-
ture: laboratories to design and develop the weaponry; sites to conduct
explosive developmental and proof testing; specialized installations
to assemble and maintain the devices; and military institutions to
highly enriched uranium or 8kg of plutonium); Christopher E. Paine, Thomas B. Cochran &
Robert S. Norris, Technical Realilies Gmpafronting Trnnsition to a Nickar Weapon Free World, in
CANBERRA COMMISSION ON THEmI E.MINATION OF NuCLEAR WEAPONS, BACKGROUND PAPERS, suafa
note 56, at 109, 119-23 (criticizing the IAEA's calculation of significant quantities).
85. Perkovich & Acton, supra note 8, at 102-104.
86. Simultaneously, the control system for a disarmament regime would have to ensure
against diversion of nuclear materials from permitted peaceful nuclear applications, such as
electricity generation.
87. The author is indebted to Chris Paine for this insight, as well as for the illustration of the
application of the problem in Syria today, regarding chemical weapons. There, the international
community seeks to preclude any future availability of chemical weapons, by destroying the
existing arms, the precursor chemicals that could be combined to create new weapons, and the
relevant production and handling facilities. See aLvo Holdren, supra note 4; SIDNEY D. DREu. &
RAYMOND JEANi.oZ, Nuclear Detertence in a World Withunit Nuchar Weapons, in DETERRENCE: ITs PAST
AND FITURE 99-129 (George P. Shultz et al. eds., 2011).
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deploy the weapons and train the operators-all of which have possible
implications for a treaty-drafting exercise."
Within those parameters, assessments vary about the current nuclear
weapons holdings of individual countries, as intense secrecy usually
surrounds all aspects of states' nuclear arms. By some estimates, the
United States has about 7,700 intact nuclear weapons, including 4,700
"stockpiled" weapons (about 1,700 deployed strategic weapons, 500
tactical weapons, and 2,500 weapons in reserve storage) and about
3,000 "retired" weapons.81 Russia is generally credited with about 8,500
total weapons, of which about 4,480 are currently in the stockpile
(fewer deployed strategic weapons than the United States, but many
more tactical weapons).'o Estimates for China (250),'" France (300))2
and the United Kingdom (225)"' are less detailed. The indications for
88. Christopher E. Paine, Thomas B. Cochran & Robert S. Norris, The Aisenahs of the Nuclear
Weapons Powvers, in CANBERRA COMMISSION ON TilE ELMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, BACKGROUND
PAPERS, supa note 56, at 8, 28 (identifying major nuclear infrastructure elements-including
assembly/disassembly plants, plutonium production reactors, uranium enrichment plants, and
chief design labs-for each of the P5); DEBArE, sufnu note 3, at 53-54.
89. Hans M. Kristensen & Robert S. Norris, Global Nuclear Weapons Inventoriea, 1945-2013,
69 Bji.. OF THE ATONIC SCIENTIsrs, no. 5, 2013, at 75-77 (estimating U.S. inventory at 4,650
stockpiled nuclear weapons (including 2,150 deployed) and 3,000 retired). The United States has
retained nearly 20,000 plutonium "pits" (the core of a nuclear weapon) and 5,000 canned
subassemblies (the "secondaries" in thermonuclear weapons). Id. at 78-79; see also Nuclear Weapons:
Who Has What at a Glance, ARMs CoNrRol. Ass'N (Apr. 2013), http://www.aimscontrol.org/
factsheets/Nucleaweaponswhohaswhat; Woolf, supn note 78; Neo START Treaty Aggregate Num-
bers ofStiategic OffensiveArns, U.S. DEP'r OF STIrE (Oct. 1, 2013), available at http://www.state.gov/
t/avc/rs/215000.htm; Fact Sheet: U.S. Nuclear Modernization 1rogrts, ARMS CONTRO. AsS'N,
(January 2014), https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/USNuclearModernization; Hans M.
Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, US Nucear Forces, 2014, 70 BtjI.. OF THiE AroMIc SCIENTISTS no. 1,
2014, at 85, available at ittp://thebulletin.org/2014/january/us-nuclear-forces-2014.
90. Kristensen & Norris, supma note 89, at 76, 79 (noting that Russia has 4,480 nuclear
weapons in the stockpile (including 1,800 deployed) and 4,000 retired); PAVE. Ponvi;,
IFRI SEC. STunIEs CTR., RussIA's NUCi.EAR FORCES: BETWEEN DISARMAMENT AND MODERNIZATION
(2011).
91. Kristensen & Norris, sumn note 89, at 79 (noting predictions that the Chinese nuclear
arsenal is likely to increase); DEBATE, suna note 3, at 27.
92. Kristensen & Norris, supra note 89, at 79 (noting that France intends to reduce its arsenal
to slightly fewer than 300); see generally Venance Journe, France's Nuclear Stance: Inelepentlence,
Unilateralism, and Adaptation, in GETTING To ZERO, supra note 3, at 124-48; DEBATE, su/a note 3,
at 26.
93. Kristensen & Norris, Global Nuclear Weapons Inventories, supa note 89, at 79 (also noting
that the United Kingdom plans to reduce its stockpile to 180 warheads, of which 120 will be
operationally available and 40 deployed); see generally Ian Anthony, British Thinking on Nuclear
Weapons, in GErrING To ZERO, supra note 3 at 102-23; DEBATE, sura note 3, at 26.
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the non-NPT members are even more speculative: India (110),9
Israel (80),95 North Korea (fewer than 10)96 and Pakistan (120).97 By
all calculations, the current global population of nuclear weapons is
far lower than at earlier times-at its peak, in 1967, the United States
possessed 31,000 weapons;98 the zenith for the Soviet Union, in 1986,
was over 40,000.99 However, this downward trend may now be ending
with the United States, France, and the United Kingdom seemingly
intending to make only modest reductions in the future, and the other
states on an upward trajectory.100
Non-state actors may be relevant to the story here, too. Unlike
chemical or biological weapons, which might be home-brewed by a
dedicated, well-funded terrorist organization, o0 construction of an
indigenous nuclear weapon, beginning with the production of the
requisite fissile material, is beyond the reach of entities other than
those affiliated with sophisticated states. 10 2 But a technically competent
non-state actor with access to plutonium or highly-enriched uranium
could plausibly have the capability to assemble an effective improvised
nuclear device with significant explosive power. Theft or donation of a
quantity of fissile material from a failing or rogue state may be assessed
as unlikely, but perhaps it is not as implausible as it should be; the
specter of the world's most deadly weapons in the hands of the world's
most violent actors therefore provides both a strong motivation for
94. Kristensen & Norris, supra note 89, at 80 (noting that Indian and Pakistani nuclear
weapons are thought to be held in central storage, not operationally deployed).
95. Id. at 80.
96. Id. at 80 (noting that North Korea has not yet demonstrated that it has operationalized
any nuclear weapons); Frank Valliere, Enforcement Scenario: North Korea, in ELEMENTS OF A NUCLEAR
DISARMAMENT TREAiY, supra note 3, at 271-91.
97. Kristensen & Norris, Global Nuclear Weapons Inventories, supra note 89, at 80.
98. Id. at 78; FISSILE MATERIAL PANEL, supra note 83, at 50-58.
99. Kristensen & Norris, Global Nuclear Weapons Inventories, supra note 89, at 78.
100. Id.
101. See RICHARD DANZIG ET. AL., CTR. FOR A NEw AMERICAN SEC. AUM SHINRIKYO: INSIGHTS INTO
How TERRORISTS DEVELOP BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS (2011), available at http://www.
cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNASAumShinrikyo_Danzig1.pdf (analyzing how a
Japanese cult developed biological and chemical weapons for terrorist purposes).
102. Andrew Mack, Nuclear 'Breakout': Risks and Possible Responses, in CANBERRA COMMISSION ON
THE ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, BACKGROUND PAPERS, supra note 56, at 208, 217 ("Terrorist
organizations do not have the scientific, technological, material or financial resources needed to
produce fissile material."). But see Harold A. Feiveson, Civilian Nuclear Power in a Nuclear-Weapon-
Free World, in ELEMENTS OF A NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT TREAiY, supra note 3, at 57, 70 (suggesting that
a sophisticated sub-state group could construct a crude nuclear weapon).
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pursuit of zero and a highly stressing set of conditions that a viable
nuclear disarmament regime must satisfy.103
D. The Politics of Zero
In pursuit of safety and security, the world's leading countries-
especially the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia, which have
always possessed the lions' share of the nuclear inventories-have
negotiated a series of canonical, but only partially successful, bilateral,
plurilateral, and multilateral nuclear arms control treaties. This se-
quence provides the edifice upon which any nuclear disarmament
agreements would be constructed; it can be organized into three
components.
1. Bilateral U.S.-U.S.S.R. Agreements
The oscillations of cold war, d6tente and contemporary politics have
generated a sputtering stream of major nuclear arms control agree-
ments, beginning in the SALT 1 (1972) negotiations, 104 which spawned
two ground-breaking accords, the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty'05
(which sharply restricted defensive systems intended to shoot down
incoming nuclear warheads) and the Interim Agreement on Strategic
Offensive Arms 0 (which essentially froze then-current inventories of
ICBM and SLBM launchers). Both documents have terminated. The
SALT II Treaty' 07 (1979), which would have continued the arms
control process, failed to gain the consent of the U.S. Senate, and
therefore never entered into force. The Intermediate Nuclear Forces
103. See 2010 Op Ed, suina note 24 ("We face a very real possibility that the deadliest wea-
pons ever invented could fall into dangerous hands."); NWC, supra note 2, at 118-19 (discussing
terrorist use of nuclear weapons).
104. CALVO-GOLLER & CALVO, supra note 77; ARMs CONTROL II, suna note 4, at 219-254;
Thomas Graham, Jr., NI'F Article VI Origin and Internelation, in REBUILDING THE NPT CONSENSUS,
sufna note 49, at 34-49; Woolf, sufna note 78.
105. Treaty Between The United States Of America And The Union Of Soviet Socialist
Republics On The Limitation Of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, U.S.-U.S.S.R., May 26, 1972,
23 U.S.T. 3435 (entered into force Oct. 3, 1972) (U.S. withdrew Dec. 13, 2001) [hereinafter ABM
Treaty].
106. Interim Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive
Arms, May 26, 1972, U.S.-U.S.S.R., 23 U.S.T. 3462 (entered into force Oct. 3, 1972) [hereinafter
SALT I].
107. Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, U.S.-U.S.S.R., June 18, 1979, S. Treaty
Doc. No. 96-1 (1979) (not in force) [hereinafter SALT II].
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(INF) Treaty"' (1987), banning land-based missiles of intermediate
and shorter range, is of indefinite (i.e., permanent) duration.oI
The subsequent START I Treaty"" (1991) inaugurated actual reduc-
tions in U.S. and Soviet deployed strategic nuclear weapons (in con-
trast to merely capping their increases). It expired in 2009."' A
successor START 1112 (1993) was negotiated and signed but never
brought into force. The Strategic Offensive Arms Reduction Treaty'
(SORT or Moscow Treaty) (2002) was a very brief document, built
upon START I, which further reduced the number of operationally-
deployed strategic nuclear warheads each party was allowed; it was
superseded and terminated in 2011.'" The New START Treaty (2010)
is the currently-applicable bilateral strategic nuclear arms control
instrument; it limits each party to 1,550 deployed warheads (counted in
such a way that many are excluded from the official tally) and 700
operational delivery systems by 2018.' "5 As of this writing, no follow-on
U.S.-Russia nuclear arms control negotiations are under way, with
Moscow having repeatedly rebuffed U.S. overtures."
108. INF Treaty, supa note 79.
109. But seeJosh Rogin, U.S. Knew russia Violated Intermediate-Range Nuclear Fores Tealy, DAIlty
BEAST (Nov. 26, 2013), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/11/26/u-s-knew-russia-
violated-intermediate-range-nuclear-forces-treaty.html#url=/articles/2013/11/26/u-s-knew-russia-
violated-intermediate-range-nuclear-forces-treaty.html (asserting that Russia may be interested in
terminating the INF Treaty, and may be in violation of it).
110. Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics On the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic and Offensive Arms, U.S.-U.S.S.R.,
Jul. 31, 1991, S. Treaty Doc. 102-20 (1991) [hereinafter START 1].
111. Id. art. XVll.2 (specifying a 15 year duration); STAlT I Fact Sheet, ARms CONTROL.
Asstx:IATIoN, http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/startl (last visited Mar. 25, 2014).
112. Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics On the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic and Offensive Arns, U.S.-
U.S.S.R.,Jan. 3, 1993, S. Treaty Doc. 103-1 (1993) [hereinafter START II].
113. Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic
Offensive Reductions, U.S.-Russ., May 24, 2002, S. Treaty Doc. No. 107-8 (2002) [hereinafter
SORT].
114. New START, supn note 78, art. XIV.4.
115. Id. art. II.
116. RIA Novosti, Russia Skeptical Over Obaina's New Nuclear Reduction Plosal, ANom
INFO.RU (June 20, 2013), http://www.atominfo.ru/en/news3/cG422.htn (Russian officials re-
act negatively to U.S. proposal to pursue further bilateral cuts in strategic weapons); President
Barack Obama, Remarks at the Brandenburg Gate-Berlin, Germany, (June 19, 2013), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/19/remarks-president-obama-bmandenburg-
gate-berlin-germany (proposing U.S.-Russia nuclear weapons reductions).
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2. Regional Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaties
In a series of local initiatives, the NNWS countries in several distinct
geographic regions have united to foreclose any incipient nuclear
arms races. The first of these, applicable to Latin America and the
Caribbean,' '7 also attracted the participation of the NWS through a
series of protocols in which they pledged to respect the nuclear
weapons-free nature of the zone. It has been followed by cognate
agreements regarding the South Pacific,"' South East Asia,""
Central Asia,' 2" and Africa,' 2 1 which have entered into force, but are
still somewhat works-in-progress in terms of full zonal state and P5
participation. A similar zone has been proposed for the Middle
East.' 2 3
3. Global Treaties Related to Nuclear Weapons
In addition to the NPT, the world has crafted a series of specialized
accords that regulate nuclear weapons in various respects. The Limited
117. Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean,
Feb. 14, 1967, 634 U.N.T.S. 326 (entered into force Apr. 22, 1968) [hereinafter Treaty of
Tlatelolco].
118. South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, Aug. 6, 1985, 1445 U.N.T.S. 177,24 I.L.M. 1440
(1985) (entered into force Dec. 11, 1986) [hereinafter Treaty of Rarotonga].
119. Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone, Dec. 15, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 635
(1996) (entered into force Mar. 27, 1987) [hereinafter Bangkok Treaty].
120. Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia, Sept. 8, 2006 (entered into
force Mar. 21, 2009), available at http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/canwfz [hereinafter
CANWFZ].
121. Treaty on the Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Africa, Apr. 11, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 698 (1996)
[hereinafter Pelindaba Treaty].
122. Nuclear-Weapon-F're Zines, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR DISARMAMENT AFFAIRs, http://
www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/NWFZ.shtml (last visited Mar 24, 2014); Nuclear-Weafn-
Free Ames (NW1*) at a Glance, ARMS CONTROtASSOCIATION, http://www.arnscontrol.org/factsheets/
nwfz (last visited Mar. 24, 2014); Nuclear Weapons Free ones, NuCi.FAR FILES.ORG, http://nuclear
files.org/menu/library/treaties/nuclear-free-zones/trty-nuclear-free-zone-index.htm (last visited
Nov. 12, 2013).
123. WMD-lree Middle East Proposal at a Glance, ARMS CONROt A.SSOCIATION (Jul. 2013),
http://www.ariscontrol.org/factsheets/newimdfz (last visited Mar. 24, 2014); Daryl G. Kimball,
Toward a WMD-FiEe Middle East, ARMs CONTRO. TonAY, Nov. 2012, at 4; A WMD-FREE ZONE IN THE
MIDDLE EAST: R.IoNAL PERSPETIVEs (Paolo Foradori & Martin B. Malin eds., 2013), available at
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/dp_2013-09.pdf; see also Daryl G. Kimball, Mongolia
Recognized as Nuclear-free Zone, ARMS CowrRol. TonAY, Oct. 2012 (the P5 have acknowledged
Mongolia as a nuclear weapons free "zone" on its own).
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Test Ban Treaty (LTBT)12 4 (1963) prohibits test explosions of nuclear
weapons except in deep underground chambers, where the radio-
active contaminants could be safely contained. The LTBT has at-
tracted 126 parties.' 25 The Outer Space Treaty1 26 (1967), nowjoined by
101 states,127 includes a prohibition against placing nuclear weapons in
orbit or installing them on the moon or other celestial bodies.12 8
The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)' 2 9 (1996)
extends the LTBT by banning nuclear tests in all environments,
including underground, thereby arresting further development of
additional nuclear weapons capabilities. By its terms, the CTBT will not
enter into force until ratified by 44 designated countries, several of
which (including the United States and China) have persistently failed
to do so.'so Although the immediate prospects for prompt effectuation
of this treaty are not bright, it is hard to imagine advanced progress
toward nuclear disarmament until that is accomplished.1 3 1
124. Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under
Water, Aug. 05, 1963, 480 U.N.T.S. 43, 14 U.S.T. 1313, 2 I.L.M. 889 (1963) (entered into force
Oct. 10, 1963) [hereinafter Limited Test Ban Treaty or LTBTJ.
125. Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water,
UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR DISARMAMENT AFFAIRS (UNODA), http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/
t/test ban (last visited Nov. 12, 2013).
126. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use
of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410,
610 U.N.T.S. 205, 6 I.L.M. 386 (1967) (entered into force Oct. 10, 1967) [hereinafter Outer Space
Treaty or OST].
127. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer
Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR DISARMAMENT AFFAIRS
(UNODA), http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/outer-space (last visited Nov. 12, 2013).
128. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 126, art. IV.
129. Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, Sept. 10, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 1439 (1996) (not in
force) [hereinafter CTBT].
130. Id. art. XIV, annex 2; See Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE
FOR DISARMAMENT AFFAIRS (UNODA), http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/ctbt (last visited
Nov. 12, 2013) (listing which required states have not yet ratified the treaty); OLA DAHLMAN,
JENIFER MACKBY, SVEIN MYKKEIVEIT & HEIN HAAK, DETECT AND DETER: CAN COUNTRIES VERIFY THE
NUCLEAR TEST BAN 13-20 (Springer 2011) (surveying prospects for ratification of the CTBT in the
states whose membership is necessary for the treaty to enter into force);JONATHAN MEDALIA, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., RL 33548, COMPREHENSIVE NuCLEAR-TEST-BAN TREATY: BACKGROUND AND CURRENT
DEVELOPMENTS (2013).
131. See also Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and
Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor, and in the Subsoil
Thereof art. 1, Feb. 11, 1971, 955 U.N.T.S. 115, 10 I.L.M. 145 (1971) (entered into force May 18,
1971) [hereinafter Seabed Arms Control Treaty] (prohibiting the emplacement of nuclear
weapons on the ocean floor); Antarctic Treaty art. V, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, 402 U.N.T.S. 71
(entered into forceJun. 23, 1961) (prohibiting nuclear explosions in Antarctica).
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Finally, one other element on the multilateral nuclear arms control
agenda must be noted. A Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) would
constitute an agreement to bar the production of additional highly
enriched uranium and plutonium for weapons; it could also include
accounting of past production of the critical isotopes and more strin-
gent controls upon stockpiles. FMCT has long been high on the list of
arms control priorities; however, its pursuit has been persistently stifled
by international political discord."' Overcoming those frustrations
would be an essential precondition for nuclear disarmament. For
purposes of the draft treaty documents below, it is assumed that-
somehow-a viable cutoff treaty will eventually be developed in the
years to come. 3 3
III. THE BIGGEST ISSUES
Negotiators and drafters of the instruments designed to pursue
nuclear disarmament will be compelled to confront a daunting array
of challenges. Several of these choice-points are identified in multiple
footnotes attached to the Zero Agreement and Zero Treaty in the
subsequent sections of this article, but a few are so important and
complex that further textual elaboration is required. This section will
first describe the eleven characteristics necessary for an adequate
elimination regime and will then continue by illuminating the critical
problems of: (a) the definition of "zero"; (b) verification and enforce-
ment of compliance; (c) timing and the negotiating process; and
(d) collateral measures.
A. Key Characteristics for a Valid Elimination Process
Just as important as clarifying what the documents will attempt to
incorporate is the articulation of what they will not undertake to do. In
particular, the enterprise is decidedly not about "unilateral" or "imme-
diate" disarmament, despite the (sometimes deliberate) mischaracter-
132. Fissile Material Gut-Off Treaty (FMCT) at a Glance, sufra note 83; U.N. ChiefAcknzoledges
Staff Doubts About Disarmament Forum, GLOBAL SECURrlY NEWSWIRE (Jan. 22, 2014), http://www.
nti.org/gsn/article/un-chief-airs-hopes-deadlocked-disarmament-forum/?mgsl=dl57euvx6c.
133. See Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (EMCT) at a Glance, supra note 83; James M. Acton, Fissile
Materials and Disarmament: Long-terrn Goals, Short-tern Steps, in GErrING TO ZERO, supra note 3, at
245-59; PIFER & O'HANLON, sufna note 79, at 162-74; RobertJ. Einhorn, Controlling Fissile Materials
Worliwide: A Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty and Beyond, in REYKJAVIK REVISITED, supra note 3, at 279-311.
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izations that too often proliferate.' 3" Instead, the following provides a
list of eleven key characteristics that a valid nuclear weapons elimina-
tion process must possess; it comprises the metrics against which the
feasibility and acceptability of a new treaty package would have to be
judged and is reflected in the preambles of the draft documents in
Parts IV and V.
1. Global. A zero agreement regime would ultimately have to be
universal, covering (with varying degrees of intensity based
upon the potential non-compliance risk they present) all
countries and all physical environments in the world. Obvi-
ously, the states possessing nuclear weapons, as well as the
states with advanced civil nuclear industries (and therefore
the latent capacity to produce nuclear weapons relatively
quickly), would have to be early participants. In addition,
almost any country (as well as the high seas, outer space, and
other locations outside the jurisdiction of any state) could
potentially serve as a site for clandestine evasions of the treaty.
Therefore, all would have to be subject, within some reason-
able time period, to inclusion in the verification and enforce-
ment regime. The various states need not participate immedi-
ately or in an equal or identical fashion, but proponents of
abolition have repeatedly stressed that getting to zero will have
to be a fully multilateral "joint enterprise." 3 5
2. Comprehensive. The agreement would have to embrace all types
of nuclear explosive devices, regardless of size, age, type, or
status as deployed, non-deployed, retired, or otherwise, and
regardless of the asserted purpose or function of the explo-
sive.' 3" In addition, the critical components of nuclear weap-
134. Perkovich & Acton, supra note 8, at 16 (dismissing the "mistaken[] fear" that nuclear
disarmament means "unilateral" disarmament).
135. Max M. Kampelman & Steven P. Andreasen, Turning the Goal of a World without Nuclear
Weapons into a joint Enterprise, in REYKJAVIK REVISITED, supra note 3, at 429-47;James Goodby, A World
Without Nuclear Weapons Is ajoint Entetprise, ARms CoNRoi. ToDAY, May 2011, at 23.
136. Consideration of the purpose or function of a nuclear explosive device is relevant here
in connection with the notion of "peaceful nuclear explosions" (PNEs). For many years, enthusi-
asts imagined that explosive nuclear power could be safely and inexpensively harnessed for civil
engineering purposes, such as to excavate a canal or construct an underground storage chamber.
For that reason, Article V of the NPT preserves for NNWS non-discriminatory access to PNE
services. NPT, supra note 44, art. V. More recently, however, the ardor for PNEs has dampened,
and the CTBT bans them as technologically indistinguishable from weapons tests. CTBT, supra
note 129, art. I; NINA TANNENWALD, Ti IE NUCLEAR TABOO: Ti IF UNITED SIATES AND TIE NON-USE OF
NUCLEAR WEAPONS SINCE 1945 268-73 (2007).
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ons, delivery systems, and supporting infrastructure assessed
as having either a unique or a very strong identification with
nuclear weapons design, engineering, production or mainte-
nance would have to be brought inside the monitoring and
control regime.
3. Timely. The process of climbing the mist-covered mountain
will doubtless require many years; the world should start now,
by re-affirming the goal, and by undertaking immediate steps
in pursuit of it. It is impossible today to specify a reliable
timetable for completion of the enterprise, and there may be
pauses along the way,' 3 7 but taskmasters should hold the world
community to a persistent effort.
4. Balanced. The sequence of steps in pursuit of nuclear disarma-
ment should elicit appropriate contributions from each state.
The cavalcade toward nuclear weapons elimination may in-
clude some temporary asymmetries, as different states under-
take independent actions that have no exact corollary in other
countries, but all should share the burdens and risks.
5. Predictable. The progression toward a world free of nuclear
weapons should be fully transparent, so all participants can see
where they stand vis-Ai-vis other states, and what steps are
coming next, with no surprises.
6. Secure. Each stage in the progression toward nuclear abolition
must itself be stable; the legitimate security interests of each
participant must be safeguarded at all times, and no state
should be unduly exposed or even temporarily jeopardized at
any interim point.
7. Verifiable. The agreements would have to incorporate struc-
tures and functions that would enable parties to be confident
that their neighbors were complying with the obligations.
Insistence upon "perfect" verification would be unrealistic,
but when dealing with such decisive weapons participants
must know that militarily-significant cheating would be de-
tected in sufficient time to enable an effective response.
Although earlier arms control treaties have established many
useful precedents for effective verification, significant ad-
vances in observation technology and in the sovereign accept-
ability of intrusive inspections will be required for a zero
137. See PIFER & O'HANLON, supra note 79, at 176 (discussing the idea that there might be
temporary pauses at "base camps" along the pathway up the mountain).
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regime, with monitoring algorithms and political accommoda-
tions that we cannot now specify and can only barely imagine.
8. Enforceable. If a violation is detected, the international commu-
nity must be capable of mounting a timely, effective response.
Again, the current impoverished array of legal tools-eco-
nomic sanctions, diplomatic retaliation, action through the
U.N. Security Council, or self-help under the aegis of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties1 38 -is inadequate.
New international political and legal realities-including the
possibility of the use of military force-will have to be devel-
oped both to deter and to respond to any "breakout" attempts.
9. Sustainable. The nuclear disarmament regime must be suffi-
ciently robust to be able to withstand the inevitable disrup-
tions that accompany international politics. The abolition of
nuclear weapons cannot depend upon an idealistic vision of a
conflict-free world, but must be capable of surviving all man-
ner of temporary (and even severe) perturbations.
10. Irreversible. One exceptional challenge is to make the zero
regime permanent, perpetually guarding against the unwar-
ranted resurrection of nuclear weapons. A special aspect of
this problem, considered further infra, is the possibility that
one of the most effective national responses to one country's
cheating on the treaty obligations (e.g., Country X begins to
re-create its nuclear weapons, or is found to have secretly
retained some of its original stockpile) would be for other
states to likewise re-constitute portions of their own earlier
weapons (e.g., Country Y quickly returns to building its own
offsetting nuclear force). Such a response-if done quickly,
effectively and proportionally-might cancel any benefit that
the cheater had hoped to attain, and thereby deter any such
wayward moves in the first place. But that form of self-help
retaliation is a challenge to the notion of a "permanent"
eradication of nuclear weapons, and raises the discomfiting
scenario of a dangerous "race to re-arm."
11. Legally-binding. To be weighty and reliable, the ultimate Zero
Treaty to abolish nuclear weapons must have the force of law,
as article VI of the NPT already does. Non-legally-binding and
[Vol. 45
138. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M.
679 (entered intoforceJan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter VCLT].
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unilateral national steps, such as an initial Zero Agreement,
can play a useful supporting role along the way.
B. Four Key Stumbling Points
With those predicates, therefore, the remainder of this section
scrutinizes four key stumbling points that the nuclear disarmament
process must find a way to overcome.
1. Definition of "Zero"
Everyone-especially lawyers-must recognize the importance of
definitions in any viable legal instrument. For a complex arms control
agreement, in particular, clarity about what is being regulated, in what
way, is essential; definitions often perform a great deal of the substan-
tive work of the document. Sometimes, these definitions are explicit:
the Chemical Weapons Convention's article II, for example, contains
fourteen frequently-consulted definitions that establish the scope and
content of the obligations, and the CWC's Verification Annex adds a
further twenty-six points to the lexicon.' 39 START I was even more
painstaking; its Definitions Annex comprises no fewer than 124 terms.14 0
In a Zero Agreement and Zero Treaty, the terms may not be separately
designated in the same way, but a meeting of the minds is essential
regarding precisely which items, activities, and facilities are to be
outlawed, regulated, or excluded from the scope of the agreement.
In this connection, skeptics are fond of arguing that, as a practical
matter, the elimination project is doomed to failure because "nuclear
weapons cannot be un-invented."' 4 ' They stress that even if all extant
nuclear devices could somehow be identified, corralled and destroyed,
the ability to construct replacements could not be eradicated, because
139. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and use of
Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction art. II, Jan. 13, 1993, S. TREATY Doc. No. 103-219,
1974 U.N.T.S. 317 [hereinafter CWC] (this article contains twelve paragraphs, the last of which
defines three separate terms); id. at Verification Annex, Part I.
140. START I, sufna note 110, Definitions Annex. New START, which was designed both to
extend and simplify the original accord, contains definitions of ninety terms. New START, supra
note 78, Protocol, Part 1.
141. TAUBMAN, supra note 3, at 288 (quoting former National Security Advisor Brent Scow-
croft saying "to me, the basic problem is that you cannot disinvent nuclear weapons"); see also
Perkovich & Acton, sufna note 8, at 11 (arguing that many technologies cannot be un-invented,
but have nevertheless been effectively prohibited); Mack, supna note 102, at 208; NWC, suptra
note 2, at 140-41 (arguing that even if the knowledge about how to construct a nuclear weapon
cannot be eradicated, the necessary infrastructure can be controlled).
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the key ingredients could be quickly and quietly re-assembled and the
know-how will persist in the human memory. Nuclear technology, after
all, is old technology; the basics have long been de-classified and
proliferated. 4 2
There is an important element of truth in those contentions, but,
as discussed further below, the perpetual ability to re-create a nuclear
weapons capability is not only a danger, it is also an important safe-
guard in a zero regime. The possibility that a country, imperiled by a
rival's "breakout" violation of the Zero Treaty, could undertake to
establish or re-establish a small offsetting nuclear stockpile of its own
constitutes a continuance of a "deterrence" regime-a dangerous and
delicate relationship, to be sure, but not one fatal to the aspirations of
abolitionists.
The phenomenon of "dual capability," noted above, also compli-
cates the treaty-makers' task. Some weapons-related materials-the
fissile uranium and plutonium, most prominently-are simply too
precious to eliminate; they can be of immense value in generating
electric power, in medicine, in agriculture, and in a host of other
benign applications. The challenge is to preclude the future weapons
functions while fostering the ubiquitous peaceful purposes; simple
destruction or permanent warehousing would be unsuitable.' 4 3
Those inescapable physical, technological, and economic facts
therefore require that the Zero Treaty achieve clarity about what
activities, equipment, and materials are either banned or included in
the regime under strict, verifiable standards governing their avowed
peaceful uses. In particular, how close to a nuclear weapons capability
142. John P. Holdren, Management of Siplu.s Nuclear Explosive Materials, in CANBERRA COMMIs-
SION ON THE ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, BACKGROUND PAPERS, supra note 56, at 241, 242
(arguing that it is difficult to acquire nuclear explosive materials, but "the knowledge of how to
use these materials to make (at least) crude nuclear weapons is very widely available, that is,
available to virtually any country and to many subnational groups.").
143. The primary weapons isotopes of uranium and plutonium have very long half-lives and
will not decay on any human timescale. They can, however, be rendered relatively unusable for
weapons, by down-blending (to dilute their explosive potential) or by mixing with contaminants.
See id. at 247-50; Perkovich & Acton, supra note 8, at 51; Christopher E. Paine, Thomas B. Cochran,
& Robert S. Norris, Practical Interim Steps Towanl Nuclear Weapons Elimination and a Fissile Material
Control Regi mefor Nuclear Weapon States, in CANBERRA COMMISSION ON TIE ELIMINATION OF NUCILEAR
wEAPONS, BACKGROUND PAPERS, supa note 56, at 99, 107 (noting that the United States has chosen
a "spent fuel standard" as the criterion for disposition of excess plutonium, meaning that
plutonium recovered from weapons should be rendered as difficult to retrieve as it is from spent
civil reactor fuel); NWC, supma note 2, at 130-32 (discussing final disposition of fissile materials);
Matthew Bunn, Transparent and IneversibleDismantlement of Nuclear Weapons, in REYKJAVIK REVISITED,
supra note 3, at 205-27.
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will states be allowed to hover, and for how long?"'
One approach to resolution of this conundrum lies in the consider-
ation of the key "components" of a nuclear weapon, each of which may
require its own regulatory regime.1'" For this purpose, the primary
constituents of a nuclear weapon include:
(a) fissile material, principally the highly-enriched uranium and
plutonium, together with tritium or other "boosters" that enhance
the chain reaction;
(b) specialized, conventional high explosives that initiate fissile
core compression;
(c) the electronics package that symmetrically detonates the high
explosive;
(d) the carbon fiber aeroshell (the missile re-entry vehicle) or
aerodynamic gravity bomb casing/tail assembly that takes a warhead
through the atmosphere to its target and contains the systems that
arm and initiate the firing sequence; and
(e) the ballistic missile, bomber, cruise missile or other delivery
system that transports the warhead or bomb from the launcher to or
near its intended target.
In the proposed draft agreements, countries would be allowed to
retain access to appropriate quantities of fissile material for civilian
applications, under strict international monitoring; the anticipated
Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty would likely establish some form of
international ownership, operation, or regulation of the sensitive mate-
rials and other key components of the fuel cycle. The proposed Zero
Treaty contemplates that even the fissile material recovered from
144. See Christopher E. Paine, Thomas B. Cochran, and Robert S. Norris, Intrnational
Arrungenents for the Transition to a Nuclear Weapon Iee World, in CANBERRA COMMISSION ON T-IlF
ELIMIN)lnON OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, BACKGRoUND PAPERS, supra note 56, at 141 (evaluating eight
possible "end states" for a nuclear disarmament process, in which participants would be subject to
different types of ongoing limitations).
145. See END-STATE IsSJuES, suPoa note 33, at 25-26 (describing the components of a nuclear
weapon as including: "safety-certified advanced fusing and firing systems with permissive action
links that must receive an authorized, pre-set code in order to initiate implosion of the metal
primary pits; neutron generators; the high explosives that squeeze the nuclear-explosive material
to critical densities to start the fission chain reaction; parts that control radiation flow; and
gas-transfer boost systems with supplies of tritium gas that require regular replenishment");
Steve Fetter & Ivan Oelrich, Verifying a Aohibition on Nuclear Weapons, in EiEMENTS OF A NUCLEAR
DISARMAMENT TREAIY, supra note 3, at 27, 42 (describing the key components of a nuclear weapon
as including the fissile "pit" and non-nuclear elements such as "conventional explosives, arming,
fusing, and firing systems, and structural elements."). Other relevant equipment includes radar
fusing, batteries, and radar altimeters.
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disassembled nuclear weapons would gradually be turned over to the
appropriate international authority. But for some period of time, a
country that was surrendering its NWS status would be allowed to retain
a small secure stockpile of recovered weapons-grade fissile material,
subject to tight international monitoring.
The retention of other critical chemical and electronic components-
especially those that are most suitable only for nuclear weapons,
without important alternative uses in the civilian economy-would be
constrained even further. As these elements are extracted from nuclear
weapons during the dismantling process, they would be reliably counted
and impounded; most would be promptly destroyed under interna-
tional inspection. The state would be allowed to retain only a limited
inventory of such items for a limited period of time, under conditions
that would preclude them from being quickly or secretly reunited into
a weapon, but that would enable their reassembly in response to
another state's violation. 146
Likewise, the delivery systems would have to be strictly controlled.
Many missiles, aircraft and other hardware are dual-capable-they can,
with relatively modest refurbishment, be configured (or at least jury-
rigged) to transport either nuclear or conventional weapons. As a
practical matter, however, some weapons categories have been tradition-
ally allocated exclusively to either a nuclear or a conventional mission.
ICBMs and SLBMs, for example, are so expensive that they have been
reserved essentially for nuclear missions.' 4 7 Conversely, short-range
systems now exclusively carry conventional ordnance; devices such as
nuclear artillery, torpedoes, and land mines are mostly artifacts of the
remote past, at least for the leading nuclear players.
The following draft Zero Treaty, therefore, proposes to abolish
ICBMs and SLBMs at the same time as their nuclear payloads, but to
allow retention of shorter-range ballistic and cruise missiles, as well as
dual-capable aircraft, provided they are converted to conventional-only
missions. It must be acknowledged that any such "conversion" is only
imperfectly reliable-an advanced state could probably figure out a
relatively expeditious way to re-adapt a conventional-armed bomber,
146. It might be useful to differentiate between "disassembly" of a nuclear weapon (which
could involve separation of the "nuclear explosives package" from the supporting non-nuclear
components such as radars, altimeters, batteries, and fuzing and arming systems) and "dismantle-
ment" of the nuclear explosive package (which would separate the fissile pit from the high
explosive implosion mechanism).
147. See PIFER & O'HANLON, supra note 79, at 66-68 (discussing possible application of ICBMs
for conventional prompt global strike missions).
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for example, to perform a reinvigorated nuclear mission in an emer-
gency-but perhaps even this partial safeguard has some value.' 48
In a similar fashion, the draft Zero Treaty posits the gradual elimina-
tion or conversion of key elements of the "nuclear weapons complex."
Facilities at which nuclear weapons have been designed and tested, for
example, would need case-by-case regimens. 149The Nevada Test Site,' 50
for instance, and its counterparts in other countries, would be closed to
nuclear weapons activities of any kind, and closely monitored; any
equipment optimized for nuclear testing there would be destroyed
and any existing tunnels or unused boreholes would be plugged or
collapsed. Nuclear weapons laboratories, such as Sandia, Los Alamos,
or Lawrence Livermore, pose a more subtle problem-they would
certainly continue to perform other important (and highly classified)
national security work, but would have to be subject to sufficient
inspection to ensure that they were no longer in the business of
designing, preparing, inspecting, or refining nuclear weapons. Facili-
ties that have been used in the past to assemble nuclear weapons are
likely to be the same sites employed for disassembly, so they will have to
remain functional (and closely monitored) through the disarmament
phase.' 5 2 Plants that process uranium, such as the Y-12 installation in
148. See CWC, sufna note 139, art. V.12-13, Verification Annex, Part V, Sec. D (discussing
conversion of chemical weapons production facilities to serve other purposes); New START, sufnu
note 78, art. VI, Protocol Part 3 (conversion of strategic weapons and facilities).
149. Paine, Cochran, & Norris, Arsenals, supna note 88, at 28 (listing major nuclear weapons
infrastructure elements for NWS); FISSILE MATERIAL PANEL, sufa note 83, at 24-25 (listing uranium
enrichment and plutonium reprocessing plants around the world); James Leonard, Verification
Arrangenents, in CANBERRA COMMISSION ON THE ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, BACKGROUND
PAPERS, sufna note 56, at 156, 160 (noting that a party might temporarily "mothball" a facility
(retaining an ability to restore it quickly to functionality), but eventually destruction or con-
version would be required); NWC, sujna note 2, at 142-46 (noting the conversion of nuclear
infrastructure assets).
150. This site, larger than the state of Rhode Island, has been used for decades for nuclear
tests and multiple other purposes; it is now known as the Nevada National Security Site. Nevada
National Security Site, U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY, http://www.nv.energy.gov/about/nts.aspx (last visited
Apr. 17, 2013).
151. Judith Reppy, Nuclear Zero at the Weapons Laboiitmies, in GETING TO ZERO, supra note 3,
at 260-82; see Offices, U.S. DEFT. OF ENERGY, http://energy.gov/offices#Labs%20&%20Technology
%20Centers (listing national laboratories) (last visited Nov. 13, 2013); LAWRENCE LIVERMORE
NATIONAL LABORATORY, https://www.llnl.gov/; Los ALAMos NATIONAL LABORATORY, http://www.
lanl.gov/index.php (last visited Nov. 13, 2013); SANDIA NATIONAL LABORATORIES, http://www.
sandia.gov/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2013).
152. Leonard, sulnn note 149, at 158.
2014] 719
GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Oakridge, Tennessee, would also have to be dealt with on an individual
basis.' *
In this regard, therefore, even the eventual Zero Treaty would retain
a vestige of the "discriminatory" nature of the NPT. The NWS (which
could then be re-stylized as the "former NWS" or the "provisional
NNWS," or less elegantly as the "countries that are in the process of
eschewing their NWS status") would as a practical matter remain more
capable of re-constituting their prior nuclear weapons capability than a
typical NNWS would be of creating a nuclear weapon from scratch.
Even when all nuclear weapons were eliminated, countries would, for a
time, be asymmetrically positioned regarding their retention of re-
sidual stocks of weapons-related components and therefore in their
lingering capability to craft a new nuclear weapon on short notice.
Some would therefore refer to even this far-reaching proposal as
establishing a "virtual zero," rather than an "absolute zero" regime.15 4
At some future point, perhaps, even these vestigial nuclear weapons-
related components and infrastructure would be required to be elimi-
nated, further leveling the playing field.
2. Verification and Enforcement
Verification and enforcement are actually two discrete questions,
but they are related and both incessantly confound and energize the
analysis of nuclear disarmament. "Verification," in this context, generi-
cally refers to the processes of detecting, monitoring, characterizing,
and interpreting the behavior of another state, assessing that conduct
against the requirements of an anns control accord, and reaching
judgments about compliance or non-compliance. "Enforcement," the
logically sequential step, is the process of responding to another party's
exposed violation of an agreement, by compelling the other party to
comply, punishing it for the violation, or offsetting any advantage it
might have hoped to gain from its deviant practice. In each instance,
153. See Ralph Vartabedian, Estimatefrr Umnium 14cility Goes finm $600 Million to $11.6 Billion,
LA. TIMEs (Sept. 24, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/sep/24/nation/la-na-bomb-factoy-
20130925 (cost of refurbishing the only U.S. facility that melts, casts, and machines bomb-grade
uranium has soared to nineteen times the original estimate).
154. NWC, supra note 2, at 28 (citing Stansfield Turner); Marvin Miller, Veification Annge-
nents, in CANBERRA COMMISSION ON TIIE ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, BACKGROUND PAPERS,
supra note 56, at 181, 186-87; David Holloway, Further Reductions in Nuclear Forces, in REYKJAVIK
REVISITED, sua note 3, at 1, 23 (discussing "virtual deterrence," in the absence of any deployed
nuclear weapons).
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the objectives include deterrence of cheating by ensuring that any
militarily significant violation will be reliably detected in sufficient time
to enable the innocent states to effectuate a sufficient response-
altering their own postures to deny any appreciable gain to the violator
or effectively compelling remedial behavior by that delinquent.
Both verification and enforcement are essential ingredients in an
effective arms control regime.'' 55 Of course, the standard of accom-
plishment cannot reasonably be one of "perfection"-there will always
be some chance that a determined, well-funded, and clever violator
could temporarily escape detection of some trivial breach of an obliga-
tion or that an obdurate rogue could withstand outside pressure to
conform. But the appropriate standard of "effective" or "adequate"
oversight is whether participants could have sufficiently high confi-
dence that any potential militarily-significant "breakout" attempt would
be ferreted out in sufficient time to enable the other parties to mount
appropriate, effective counter-moves.'
Of course, as the stakes go up, the stresses on the verification and
enforcement mechanisms also rise. That is, when a treaty regulates
non-nuclear weapons that may be heinous, but inherently less decisive
on the battlefield, perhaps less rigor in the supervisory functions is
tolerable. Likewise, when a nuclear weapons limitation agreement
aims to achieve only modest reductions, leaving each side with im-
mense residual inventories, the "balance of power" may remain robust,
unperturbed by any marginal cheating. But when an agreement pur-
sues deeper cuts in nuclear arsenals-and, a fortiori, when it seeks to
eradicate nuclear weapons altogether-the margin for tolerating un-
detected or uncorrected breaches is reduced accordingly.
The Zero Treaty, therefore, will demand verification and enforce-
ment mechanisms far beyond any measures that have been negotiated
and implemented-or even seriously contemplated-today. The flu-
ture system will require intrusions into installations and activities of
sovereign states far surpassing the contemporary state of the art; today's
Chemical Weapons Convention, New START Treaty, and CTBT only
barely outline the types of data reporting, on-site inspection, dispute-
resolution, and compliance mechanisms that must be conceived and
155. AiMs COTMRoL. VERIFICATION: TmIE TECIINooolws TiiAr MAKE. IT POSSIBLE (Kosta Tsipis
et al. eds., 1986); Fetter & Oelrich, supra note 145.
156. Articulation of this now-familiar standard of adequate verification is attributed to anus
negotiator Paul Nitze, as the "Nitze criterion." See Fetter & Oelrich, supra note 145, at 29.
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instituted.1 5 7
The outlines of any such verification and enforcement routines are
only barely imaginable in 2014. We can speculate about the possible
configuration of treaty rights and responsibilities, but new monitoring
modalities will have to be invented and new political relationships will
have to evolve in order to make them operational and effective. A great
deal of the time and energy between now and the adoption and
implementation of a nuclear elimination accord will have to be devoted
to the process of crafting these new anti-breakout devices, institutions
and arrangements.'
The draft Zero Agreement and Zero Treaty, therefore, only sketch
these provisions in the broadest of strokes. Regarding verification, they
identify certain generic categories of monitoring methodologies-the
traditional "national technical means" of verification, as well as new
157. CULTIVATING CONFIDENCE, sulo note 3; John Freeman, The Experience of the Chemical
Weapons Convention: Lessons for the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, in ELEMENTS OF A NUCLEAR Dis-
ARMAMENT TREATY, supra note 3, at 117-47.
158. Rose Gottemoeller, Acting Under Sec'y for Arms Control and Int'l Security, Remarks in
Helsinki, Finland on Arms Control in the Information Age: Harnessing "Sisu" (Aug. 29, 2012),
http://www.state.gov/t/us/197056.htm29, 2012), http://www.state.gov/t/us/197056.htm (em-
phasizing U.S. Department of State's search for creative new concepts for verification of arms
control treaties); 2013 Innovation in A'ms Control Challenge: What Information Technology Tools and
Concepts Can Support Future Arms Control Inspections?, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE (July 22, 2013),
https://www.innocentive.com/ar/challenge/9933381 (sponsoring a competition to design im-
proved mechanisms for arms control treaty verification); see also Alexei Arbatov, Uneasy Syneigism:
Disarmament, Verification and US-Russian Politics, in CANBERRA COMMISSION ON THE ELIMINATION OF
NUcLEAR WEAPONS, BACKGROUND PAPERS, supra note 56, at 252 (suggesting that improved political
relations can enable greater verification powers, and conversely that the trust engendered by
successful arms control agreements can reciprocally foster better political relations); NWC, supra
note 2, at 112 (arguing that the disarmament process should emphasize incentives for compli-
ance, rather than mechanisms for enforcement); id. at 158-73 (discussing principles and demands
ofverification); RaymondJ.Juzaitis &John E. McLaughlin, Challenges ofVerification and Compliance
within a State of Universal Latency, in REYKJAVIK REVISITED, supr note 3, at 159-203; Edward Ifft,
Monitoring Nuclear Warheads, in REYKjAVIK REVISrrED, supra note 3, at 229-42; Alexander K. Bollfrass,
Breaking Out of Zero: Would Cheating Be Worth the Risk?, in ELEMENTS OF A NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT
TREATY, supa note 3, at 209-53; Rebecca Bornstein, Enforcing a Nuclear Disarmament Treaty, in
ELEMENTS OF A NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT TREATY, supa note 3, at 149, 151-55 (stressing parties'
positive incentives to comply with a nuclear disarmament treaty); Barry Blechman, Why We Need to
Eliminate Nuclear Weapons-And How to Do t, in ELEMENTS OF A NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT TREATY, supra
note 3, at 1, 17-18; DEBATE, supra note 3, at 49-77, 99-115; Paul C. White, Nuclear Disarmament
Verification: Issues and Possibilities, in REBUILDING THE NPT CONSENSUS, supra note 49, at 237;
NUCLEAR WEAPONS: THE ROAD TO ZERO (Joseph Rotblat ed., 1998); James Fuller, Verification on the
Road to Zero: Issues for Nuclear Warhead Dismantlement, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, December 2010,
available at http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2010_12/%2Fuller.
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multilateral complements;15 9 submission of detailed relevant national
data to a global information bank; routine on-site inspection; installa-
tion of "black box" sensors and seals; expanded concepts for "societal
verification"; Is'o and challenge on-site inspection. Likewise, regarding
enforcement, the proposed documents simply identify the relevant
categories of mechanisms-diplomatic measures, invocation of legal
institutions, economic sanctions, criminal prosecutions, and military
operations-without detailing precisely what those procedures could
eventually include. A great deal of creative and energetic analysis has
been poured into the problems of verification and compliance, and
more will be needed. ' 6 '
Regarding the mechanisms for enforcement of the commitments,
two particular features of the future scheme deserve special con-
sideration. First, the reference to "military measures" in the enforce-
ment section conceals a major legal and political quandary. That is,
under modern international law, a state (or a collection of states) is
generally authorized to employ armed force across international
boundaries only if it is acting in self-defense or pursuant to authori-
159. The term "national technical means of verification" refers to mechanisms such as
photoreconnaissance satellites, long-distance seismometers, and sophisticated radars, which are
operated by one county to gather data relevant to assessment of another state's compliance with
its obligations under an arms control treaty. These devices generally operate outside the territory
of the targeted country, and do not require (very much) cooperation or support from within.
"Multilateral technical means of verification" would be similar types of apparatus operated
collectively by a consortium of countries. See generally AMY F. WooLF, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R41201, MONITORING AND VERIFICATION IN ARMS CONTROL (Dec. 23, 2011); Arms Control Verification,
DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY, http://www.dtra.mil/missions/ArmsControlVerification/
ArmsControlVerificationHome.aspx (last visited Nov. 13, 2013); Verification of Nuclear Arms Control
and Disarmament Treaties, NUcLEAR AGE PEACE FOUNDATION, http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/
key-issues/nuclear-weapons/issues/arms-control-disarmament/verification/index.htm (last vis-
ited Feb. 23, 2014); GRAHAM JR., sufna note 57, at 37, 51-53, 58-59; New START, supra note 78,
art. X.
160. The concept of "societal verification" refers to mechanisms for enlisting private indi-
viduals, NGOs, and civil society in all countries in monitoring and "whistleblowing" capacities
to provide greater transparency. The concept is not new, but the modem technology of social
media will provide additional, currently-unforeseeable opportunities for additional insights. See
Frank Blackaby, Societal Verification, in CANBERRA COMMISSION ON THE ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR
WEAPONS, BACKGROUND PAPERS, suna note 56, at 264; Leonard, supra note 150, at 161; Miller, sufna
note 155, at 185-86; NWC, sufna note 2, at 172-73; Nima Gerami, Attracting a Crowd: What Societal
Verification Means for Arms Control: The US Response, BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, May 1, 2013,
at 14.
161. See Perkovich & Acton, supa note 8, at 47-49 (outlining one "standard model" concept
for verifying the destruction of nuclear weapons under a treaty); id. at 83-97 (regarding options
for enforcement); Christopher E. Paine, Thomas B. Cochran, & Robert S. Norris, Techniques and
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zation from the U.N. Security Council."' 2 That short statement of
the law, of course, conceals a great deal of subtle and imprecise
jurisprudence, but the critical point here is that even a neighbor's
significant violation of a major arms control treaty-including perhaps
even a rival state's breaching the Zero Treaty and starting to re-
establish a prohibited nuclear weapons arsenal-might not justify an
immediate, unilateral preemptive military strike designed to interrupt
that re-armament. Unless the facts were clear, and the threatened
state (or the collection of treaty parties generally) could reasonably
interpret the mere act of violation to constitute an "imminent"
threat, thereby justifying an act of "anticipatory self-defense," or if it
could win an endorsement from the Security Council, categorizing the
nuclear breakout as a "threat to the peace," it would ordinarily not be
lawful for another state to vindicate its treaty rights via first-strike
military means.
While it is possible that the permanent veto-wielding members of the
Security Council would be united in a determined response to the
threat of a new nuclear arms race, there can be no guaranty that all five
would always interpret the situation identically. But if a military strike is
not legal, and if other economic and diplomatic response mechanisms
are insufficient to abort the danger posed by the rogue state's violation
of the Zero Treaty, what is to be done? Perhaps the United States or
some other self-appointed enforcer of the treaty would undertake to
violate international law by launching a military strike necessary to
sustain international security and make the treaty system work-but it
is not very satisfying to rest such an important treaty regime upon
animplicit assumption of extra-legal responses. 16 But what other mecha-
14ocedures for Verifying Nuclear Weapons Eliminalion, in CANBERRA COMMISSION ON TIIE ELMINA-
nON oF NuCLEAR WEAPONS, BACKGROUND PAPERS, supm note 56, at 167; Miller, supna note 154;
Leonard, supa note 149; Fetter & Oelrich, supra note 145; CANBERRA COMMISSION, suja note 12, at
74-98.
162. U.N. Charter, supra note 58, art. 42 (use of force pursuant to decision of the Security
Council), art. 51 (actions in self-defense).
163. Compare, for example, with the ongoing debates in international law and policy
regarding the propriety of military action, without a self-defense rationale or the authorization of
the U.N. Security Council, under the rubric of "humanitarian intervention" or "responsibility to
protect." Some authorities argue that such extraordinary measures, intended to prevent or
interrupt mass atrocities, would be "illegal but legitimate"; others find that categorization
unsatisfying. See Jane Stromseth, Ilelhinking Humanitarian Intevention: The Case for lucremntlal
Change, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: Ermuc:tL, LEGAL AND Pot.rrIcAL Dil.ENIMAs 232 (J.L. Holz-
grefe & RobertO. Keohane eds., 2003); INDEPFNDENT INTERNAtIONAI. COMMISSION ON Kosovo, THE
Kosovo REPORT: CONFLIr, INTERNATIONAL RESPoNSE, LEssoNs LEARNED 4 (2000); Kenneth Ander-
[Vol. 45724
WHAT WOULD ZERO LOOK LIKE?
nisms could be crafted to put military muscle reliably and lawfully
behind the agreement?"'
The second, related consideration builds upon the "self-help" rem-
edy noted above. That is, because nuclear weapons cannot be "un-
invented," some inherent residual capacity will always remain-
especially the (former) NWS would have an important ability to resurrect
their erstwhile nuclear weapons by re-assembling retained compo-
nents. This implicit enforcement option could play an important
stabilizing role, if the Zero Treaty's verification mechanisms were
sufficiently muscular to sound a timely and authoritative alarm when-
ever a State X was beginning the process of violating the obligations by
moving toward a renewed nuclear weapons capability. State Y could
then be legally authorized to respond in like manner, temporarily
suspending its own treaty commitments as a necessary and proportion-
ate response to the prior violation, adroitly reestablishing its own
offsetting nuclear force, and restoring a balance of power. "
Of course, the integrity of that mechanism relies upon several
disquieting uncertainties. Would State Y be able to re-build quickly
enough to overcome State X's head start? Would State X know that
the detection and response mechanisms were so stringent, or might it
gamble that it could succeed with a covert violation for long enough to
obtain a meaningful military edge? Might Ys information about X be
somewhat ambiguous, or based upon classified sources that it was
reluctant to disclose in public-and might it be strategically wise for Y
to begin its offsetting re-armament crash course in secret, not alerting
son, Legality oflntemention in Syia in Response to Chemical Weapon Attacks, 17 AN]. Soc'Y OF INr'L L.
INSIGHrS, no. 21,Aug. 30, 2013.
164. Harald Miller, Enforenent of the Rules in a Nuclear Weapons-Iree Worhl, in CUI:nvA'TING
CONFIDENCE, una note 3, at 33-66; NWC, supa note 2, at 109-10 (noting that both the United
Nations Security Council and General Assembly could play roles in enforcement of a nuclear
disarmament treaty; rejecting suggestions that the process could include turning over to the
United Nations a small number of nuclear weapons to use in an enforcement action against a
breakout attempt); Barry Blechman, Why We Need to Eliminate Nuclear Weapons-And flow to Do It,
in ELEMENTS OF A NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT TREAIY, slna note 3, at 17; Rebecca Bornstein, Enfoncing
a Nuclear Disarnament Treaty, in LEMENTS OF A NUC.FAR DIsARMAMErfl TRENly, supra note 3, at
149-66; Alexander Bollfrass, An International leseive Fone, in ELEMENTS OF A NtjCI.FAR DISARMAMENT
TREAlY, supra note 3, at 167-78; DEBATE, supra note 3, at 104-05, 118-20; Ernesto Zedillo, T7e Role of
Intemational Institutions in the Disarmament Process, in DElATE, supra note 3, at 287, 290.
165. See TAUBMAN, supa note 3, at 362-63 (noting that while, at first blush, the notion of any
possible reconstitution of nuclear weapons "seems a double cross to pure abolitionists," it provides
a necessary, realistic safeguard); Mack, suna note 102, at 221. The possibility of reconstitution also
implies that important elements of the current "deterrence" regime will continue to operate into
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X about the detection and counter-measures? Would incipient little
nuclear arms races of this sort proliferate under a Zero Treaty, and
would they be even more dangerous and nerve-wracking than the
current fully nuclear-armed structures? How would a self-help regime
of this sort operate when there are not just two potential arms racers,
but multiple states Z, as well?
An important part of the solution to the riddle about the need for
vast improvements in the verification and enforcement routines was
suggested by Jonathan Schell, writing in Foreign Affairs in 2000.166 He
submitted that the then-current paradigm of U.S.-Russia (or, today,
P5and broader) mutual suspicion and a relatively blasE attitude about
proliferation would have to be replaced as outmoded. If the super-
powers awoke to the realization that effective abolition of nuclear
weapons was so profoundly in their respective national self-interests,
and if they appreciated that air-tight verification and enforcement were
indispensable to the safety and reliability of the regime, they would
inevitably change their attitudes about intrusive inspections, rigorous
implementation, and the whole concept of "openness." They would
abandon much of the paranoia about sovereign privacy and get much
more serious about proliferation, effective verification and enforce-
the indefinite future, and it further carries the danger of incipient little "reconstitution races,"
mimicking the arms races of the cold war. See END-STATE ISSUES, supra note 33, at 24; Perkovich &
Acton, supra note 8, at 102-06; see also JONATHAN SCHELL, THE FATE OF THE EARTH: THE ABo-
LITION 181-231 (critiquing the concept of nuclear deterrence); Rebecca Bornstein, Enforcenent
Scenario: Iran, in ELEMENTS OF A NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT TREArv, supra note 3, at 156-57 (dis-
cussing possible suspension of treaty obligations in the event of another party's breach); PIFER &
O'HANLON, supra note 79, at 191-97 (discussing reconstitution of weapons arsenals);
Christopher A. Ford, Nuclear Weapons Reconstitution and its Discontents: Challenges of "Weaponless
Detenrence," in DETERRENCE: ITS PAST AND FUTURE 131-215 (George P. Shultz, Sidney D. Drell, &
James E. Goodby eds., 2011).
Other "self-help" legal remedies may also be applicable. In response to a "material breach"
of a treaty, an innocent party may generally suspend or terminate its counter-performance of
treaty obligations. VCLT, supra note 138, art. 60. The doctrine of "countermeasures" may pro-
duce a similar result, enabling a state aggrieved by another state's violation of a legal obliga-
tion, to respond by temporarily suspending its own performance in a timely, proportional
fashion, intending to drive the first state back into compliance. See Art. 22 and commentary in
Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongfid Acts, [20011 2 Y.B. INT'L L.
COMM. 2 at 75, available at http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/
9_6_2001.pdf.
166. Jonathan Schell, The Folly of Arms Contro 79 FOREIGN AFF. 22, Sept.-Oct. 2000; see also
Perkovich & Acton, supra note 8, at 97 (arguing that if the leadership injust three countries-the
United States, Russia and China-became fully committed to nuclear disarmament, then the
concept could be made to work).
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ment, insisting that all potential loopholes for cheating be conclusively
foreclosed. They would simply not allow any other state-one of their
erstwhile "clients," a neutral, or a rogue regime-to retain a nuclear
weapons capacity that they were abandoning themselves.' 6 7 We cannot
know today whether such epiphanies will actually occur among the P5,
the other nuclear weapons possessing states, and the many other
relevant players, but the progress toward the zero accords will have to
foster such an evolution.
3. Timing and the Negotiating Process
In their first Wall Street Journal piece, the Gang of Four skillfully
articulated the necessary linkage between two essential components
of the progression toward zero, calling for commitment to both the
big-picture "vision" of a nuclear weapons-free world and the small-
picture immediate "steps" necessary to pursue it. They wrote, "Without
the bold vision, the actions will not be perceived as fair or urgent.
Without the actions, the vision will not be perceived as realistic or
possible."16 8
One immediate implementation question concerns the appro-
priate forum within which the Zero negotiations on both "vision" and
"steps" would optimally occur. There are many possibilities here, none
of which commands automatic assent. "t' The Conference on Disarma-
ment (CD) is the UN-affiliated body that has been the primary venue
for elaborating numerous prior arms control accords, including the
NPT, CWC and CTBT.170 Alas, the CD has fallen into desuetude,
167. As Schell explains, once the leading states had committed themselves to nuclear
abolition and taken serious steps toward that goal, they "would possess an implacable will, based
on the most elemental national interest," to ensure that all other states were pursuing the same
path, "and they would possess the wherewithal to do it-including, certainly the resolve and means
to defeat and overthrow" any regime that was resisting. SCHELL, supra note 165, at 44.
168. 2007 Op Ed, supra note 1; see ablo TAUBMAN, sufna note 3, at 349 (quoting Obama
national security advisor Gary Samore's statement noting that "'[t] he most important thing is the
marriage between a vision and practical steps, because if you just announce the vision of
abolishing nuclear weapons, then that can be seen as naive, and even dangerous"' and that "'[t] he
most important thing that the four horsemen did was to conceive of a strategy that combined a
vision, a long-term vision with short-term practical steps that were achievable.'").
169. See NWC, supra note 2, at 29-35.
170. See U.N. Office at Geneva, Disarmament: An Introduction to the Conference, http://
www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/ (httpPages) /BFI8ABFEFE5D344DC1256F310031 1CE9?Open
Document (last visited Feb. 23, 2014).
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blocked by political discord and unable-for more than fifteen years-to
engage in productive treaty-developing labor.' 7 ' A series of freestand-
ing, ad hoc negotiating conferences could be convened instead-such
processes generated the 1997 Ottawa agreement on anti-personnel
land mines' 7 2 and the 2008 Oslo agreement on cluster munitions.' 7 3
Perhaps the NPT could supply the umbrella beneath which the negotia-
tors convene, led by the P5 or by a sympathetic and symbolic leader
such as Japan. The United Nations (the General Assembly or any
of several subsidiary bodies) could also function as host, as it recently
did for the 2013 Arms Trade Treaty.' 1" Finally, perhaps the Nuclear
Security Summit process could be converted from its sole focus on
retrieving and improving the security of nuclear weapons-usable mate-
rials to consider a broader disarmament agenda.' 7 5 The draft ZeroAg-
reement and Zero Treaty are agnostic regarding these procedural
questions, not specifying any particular vehicle for conducting the
negotiations. Likewise, the number and identities of the states directly
participating in the negotiations remains an important variable "to be
determined."
A second frequently-asked question is "How long will all this take?" In
2006, 125 countries voted in favor of a U.N. General Assembly resolu-
tion calling for immediate commencement of nuclear disarmament
negotiations,'7" and the Zero Agreement presented here follows that
171. See Tom Z. Collina, IN Body 14mns Grup to Break Deadlock, ARMs CONTRo. TODAY
(Sept. 2013), http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2013_09/UN-Body-Forms-Group-to-Break-
Deadlock (lack of consensus has prevented the CD from agreeing to a work plan for the past
16 years).
172. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of
Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, Sept. 18, 1997, 2056 U.N.T.S. 241, 36 I.L.M. 1507
(1997) (entered into force Mar. 1, 1999) [hereinafter Ottawa Convention].
173. Convention on Cluster Munitions, May 30, 2008, CCM/77, available at http://www.
clustermunitionsdublin.ie/pdf/ENGLISHfinaltext.pdf [hereinafter CCM].
174. Daryl G. Kimball, The Arns Trade Trealy at a Glance, ARMS CONTROL. TonAY (July 2013),
http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/ans..strade.e-treaty).
175. The Nuclear Security Summit process was inaugurated by President Obama to focus
international attention on the need to safeguard sensitive nuclear materials and sites against the
danger of terrorism and to rally heads of governments to undertake immediate and long-term
unilateral and collective actions to redress the vulnerabilities. The first Sununit meeting was held
in Washington, D.C. in 2010; the second in Seoul, South Korea in 2012; the third (and presumably
final) in The Hague, The Netherlands in March 2014. See NucLEAR SECURn1Y SUMIr, https://
www.nss2014.com/en (last visited Mar. 20, 2014).
176. G.A. Res. 61/83, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/83 (Dec. 18, 2006), available at http://
www.un.org/en/ga/search/view doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/61/83&Lang=E.
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animating spirit. Beyond that prompt starting point, however, the
viability and utility of crafting a specific timetable for getting to zero
are debatable. In the 1950s and 1960s, activists boisterously cham-
pioned the concept of a "time-bound" progression toward general
disarmament, insisting that states should, in one swoop, specify the
whole series of intermediate agreements (including restrictions on
chemical, biological, and conventional forces, as well as nuclear)
and specify a "due date" for each.' 7 More recently, Rajiv Gandhi's
1988 proposal for nuclear disarmament likewise sought to convert
the aspiration into concrete terms, by establishing a deadline of
2010.17" The Global Zero Action plan 7"' does likewise, and the 2007
Model Nuclear Weapons Convention includes options for specific
scheduling. s'
As these proposed schedules for arms control agreements were
continuously frustrated, others became wary about the virtue of publish-
ing specific (or even quite general) timetables. President Obama's
open-ended articulation representsjust about the fill extent that many
observers are willing to go, saying only, "This goal will not be reached
quickly-perhaps not in my lifetime."'"' In that spirit, the proposed
Zero Agreement and Zero Treaty do not include projected timetables.
177. ARMs CONTROL II, supna note 4, at 94-116; MYRDAL, sumpra note 7, at 108-110; Nuclear
Files: Project of the Nuclear Age Pace Foundation, McGIy-aZorin Accords, (Sept. 20, 1961), avail-
able at http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclear-weapons/issues/arms-control-
disarmament/mccloy-zorin-accords_1961-09-20.htm (establishing principles for progress, in stages,
toward general and complete disarmament).
178. GANniI's AcrloN PlAN, supra note 11, Annex I, at 186, (identifying three stages for the
progression toward nuclear elimination, with complete nuclear disarmament being reached in
2010); see abo id. at 133-40 (identifying several other contemporary disannament proposals, many
of which specify projected dates for getting to zero).
179. The current iteration of the Global Zero Action Plan contemplates four phases of
nuclear reductions, getting to complete abolition in 2030. Get the facts, GlOAL. ZERO, http://
www.globalzero.org/get-the-facts/GZAP (last visited Feb. 23, 2014)).
180. NWC, supra note 2, at 68-84 (citing articles VII-XII, presenting "phases" of progress
toward zero, without specifying target dates); see atbo Barry Blechman, Why We Need to Eliminate
Nuclear Weapons-And How to Do It, in ELEMENTS OF A NuL.EAR DISARMAMENT TRElAIY, sufna note 3,
at 17; Rebecca Bornstein, Enforcing a Nuclear Disarnament Tieaty, in Ei.EMENIS OF A NUCLEAR
DISARMAMENr TREAIlY, supra note 3, at 23 (presenting a timeline for the progression to nuclear
disarmament); Cathleen Fisher, The Phmed Elimination f Nuclear Weapons, in Nuc.EAR WEAPONS:
TilE RoAD To ZERO 39, 49-51 (Joseph Rotblat ed., 1998) (discussing the debate about whether it is
useful to establish a deadline date).
181. Obama, Prague Speech, suna note 39.
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The notion is that the process could commence soon, with the aspira-
tional Zero Agreement signed in, say, 2015, and the participants would
thereafter press forward with all deliberate speed, reflecting both the
urgency of their mission and the criticality of getting the job done
right.
Those draft documents do, however, preserve a related point, in
carving out a space for the articulation of a new diplomatic infra-
structure necessary to goad the world community toward zero. Two
new creatures would emerge. First, under the Zero Agreement, a
Contact Group would be established. This informal collection of
leading countries would steer the rest of the participating states for-
ward, publicizing the ongoing efforts, urging the reluctant to partici-
pate, and convening biennial "review conferences" at the head-of-
government level that would assess progress and problems. The Contact
Group would be small (e.g., fifteen states), led by the P5, and include a
representative sampling of diverse, interested and politically effective
countries. 182
Second, the Zero Treaty would elicit a new, formal multilateral in-
stitution, captioned here as the Zero Treaty Organization (ZTO).
Like its counterparts established under the Chemical Weapons Con-
vention18 3 and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty,' 8 4 this body woul-
dbe charged with operating the treaty, conducting the inspections and
other verification and enforcement operations under it, and resolving
issues about compliance. The ZTO could be established by the Zero
Treaty, or even before it, to help pave the way for its negotiation and
entry into force. A now-common variation is for the negotiators to
conclude both the permanent treaty and an associated interim agree-
ment on immediate "provisional application" of key provisions, includ-
182. Possible models for the Contact Group could be the Non-Proliferation and Dis-
armament Initiative, a collection of activist countries in the field, and the "Open Ended
Working Group," established by the U.N. General Assembly to discuss nuclear arms control
initiatives outside the Conference on Disarmament. See George Perkovich, Reducing the Role
of Nuclear Weapons: What the NPDI Can Do, THE CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL
PEACE, Nov. 27, 2012, available at http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Perkovich-Diminshing
NuclearWeapons.pdf; Taking Forward Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament Negotiations,
GA. Res. 67/56, U.N. Doc. A/Res/67/56 (Jan. 4, 2013); Tom Z. Collina, Disarmament Consensus
Eludes UN, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, November 2013, available at http://www.armscontrol.org/print/
6030.
183. CWC, suna note 139, art. VIII.
184. CTBT, supra note 129, art. II.
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ing the establishment of a "preparatory commission," complete with a
"provisional secretariat" to facilitate final preparations for entry into
force and full operation of the main treaty."a'
The ZTO would consist of three organs: an Assembly (responsible
for overall policy direction, in which each party to the treaty is a
member); an Executive Council (a smaller group-perhaps thirty to
forty members-responsible for day-to-day decisions); and a Secretariat
(the professional staff). The proposed Zero Treaty largely follows
the CWC and CTBT models in this area, suggesting institutional and
operational arrangements that are certainly important for the regime,
and not very different from those precedents. For the sake of brevity,
the full panoply of standard institutional arrangements is not specified
in the draft.'86
4. Collateral Measures
Finally, there is an array of associated issues that the makers of the
draft Zero Agreement and Zero Treaty will have to ponder. Even if
ultimately these points are largely invisible in the final texts, they may
be the subject of important "side agreements" or intermediate accords
that help make the progression toward nuclear elimination seem safer
and more feasible.
For example, in many intensely contested regions of the world,
incentives for the possession or pursuit of nuclear weapons cannot be
divorced from contentious neighbors' adversarial security postures ona
host of longstanding political issues and irritants. It is almost impossible
to imagine nuclear abolition in South Asia, the Middle East or North-
east Asia, for example, without some significant amelioration of exist-
ing regional tensions. The hope is that the affected states may be able
to contextualize today's embedded problems and recognize that join-
185. CWC, supra note 139; Resolution Establishing the Preparatory Commission for the
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Jan. 13-15, 1993, Legal Series PC-OPCW
1, 1994 [hereinafter Paris Resolution]; CTBT, sufna note 129; Resolution Establishing the
Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization and Text
on the Establishment of a Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban
Treaty Organization, Nov. 19, 1996, CTBT/MSS/RES/1 [hereinafter Resolution Establishing
CTBT Preparatory Commission].
186. See Alexander K. Bollfrass, Govemtance of a Nucear Disarmament Treaty, in ELEMENTS OF A
NucLEAR DISARMAMENT TREAIY, supra note 3, at 179-208.
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ing the long-term aspirations of the Zero Agreement can facilitate, not
conflict with, efforts at regional stability.
Conclusion of a Zero Treaty does not require the lion to lie down
with the lamb-severe international problems and military com-
petition are likely to survive forever. Nor does it require the deus ex
machina of an all-powerful world government. 18 But getting to zero
does require the participants to achieve the important insight that
possession of nuclear weapons impedes, rather than assists, recon-
ciliation of their legitimate security interests. Progress toward nuclear
abolition, therefore, need not assume that the current array of
regional troublespots can all be quickly resolved, but it does require that
they at least abate, in the sense that the participants are willing to
proceed in their competition without the presence of nuclear weapons-
still a tall order. The Zero Agreement will incorporate the partici-
pating states' commitment to address these various regional pre-
dicaments, and outside states' willingness to promote non-nuclear
rapprochement.8 8
In the same vein, countries cannot reasonably contemplate aboli-
tion of their nuclear weapons without pondering the roles, missions,
and capabilities of their non-nuclear forces. For the United States-
surrounded by friendly neighbors and ocean buffers, possessing un-
matched weapons technology and logistics capabilities, and boasting
superb fighting units-the prospect of a world that could resort
"only" to conventional warfare would be most welcome. But for other
star-crossed countries an imbalance in non-nuclear capabilities may
create unwelcome exposure, and international peace and stability
cannot long tolerate important security vulnerabilities or asymmetries.
Creating the conditions for the elimination of nuclear weapons will
therefore require addressing constraints upon general purpose conven-
tional forces as well, even if we cannot today outline what the simultane-
ous solution may look like or how (if at all) it would be reflected in
treaty text. 18
187. Paine, Cochran & Norris, supra note 144, at 154.
188. See Jonathan Dean, Global and Regional Secunity in a Nuclear Weapon Fee World, in
CANBERRA COMMIsSIoN ON TiE EiIMINATION OF NucLEAR WEAPONS, BACKGROUND PAPERS, sufra
note 56, at 196, 202-05; Jack F. Matlock, Jr., Regional Animosities and Nuclear Weapons Pmolifrmlion,
in REYNJAVIK REVISITED, sufna note 3, at 399-424.
189. See Perkovich & Acton, supra note 8, at 16 (arguing that the prohibition of nuclear
weapons will not "make the world safe for conventional war among major powers."); Dennis M.
Gormley, American Chnvenitional Supeoity: The Halancing Act, in GErrING To ZERO, supra note 3,
at 317-43.
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Defenses against nuclear attack-including anti-missile and anti-
aircraft systems, as well as civil defense programs-pose a similar
puzzle. On one hand, effective defenses could conceivably stabilize
nuclear abolition, by raising the threshold for a militarily-successful
breakout and helping to ensure that even a successful treaty violator
would still face formidable obstacles in making effective use of its
illegal, unilateral nuclear capability. Especially if the potential ag-
gressor's arsenal were small (surely much smaller than the ICBM,
SLBM, and bomber fleets maintained by the United States and Russia
today) even a modest interception capability could blunt a threatened
attack, frustrating the violator's malign purpose. On the other hand,
an efficacious defense before abolition has been accomplished could
also provide a shield for aggression, enabling a bad actor to strike a
vicious first blow, confident that it could largely protect itself from any
disorganized, hasty retaliation.
The question of missile defense is particularly fraught today, as some
in the United States pursue anti-missile technology with a fetishist's
zeal, and as the Russian leadership claims, perhaps unreasonably, to
find the capabilities inherent in the emerging U.S. programs threaten-
ing to it. When both sides dig in their heels so rigidly, the immediate
prospects for arms control are dim; even more ambitious under-
takings, such as nuclear abolition, will have to deal with (or dodge) this
question sooner or later.'o
Finally, this succession of treaties may have to address the topic of
"sweeteners" in a serious way. The scope of a modern arms control
agreement often extends somewhat beyond the specific question of
reductions or limitations on weaponry, and this political reality may
well apply to several of the steps on the path to nuclear elimination,
too. One of the three main pillars of the NPT, for example, concerns
each party's "inalienable right" to pursue nuclear energy for peaceful
190. See Ria Novosti, Rissia Skepira Over Obama's New Nuclear Reduction Proposal, supra
note 116 (Russian officials rebuff U.S. proposal to pursue further bilateral cuts in strategic
weapons, while United States is developing a missile defense system); Ria Novosti, Nuchlar Arms
Reduction Deak to Becone Multilateral-Lamov, AToMINFo.RU (June 22, 2013), http://www.
rianovosti.com/world/20130622/181811968.html (same); PIFER & O'HANLoN, supra note 79,
at 113-38 (discussing missile defense issues); Christopher A. Ford, Nuclear Weapons Reconstiltution
and its Discontlents: Challenges of "Weaplness Deteirence", in DETERRENCE: Irs PAsr AN) FUTURE 131,
157-60 (George P. Shultz, Sidney D. Drell & James E. Goodby eds., 2011); John Pike, Ballistic
Missik Defense: Enduring Questions, in NUCI.EAR WEAPONS: TIE ROAD TO ZERO, supra note 14, at
191-212.
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purposes, and many NNWS parties vigorously complain that the ad-
vanced civil nuclear technology holders have failed to fulfill their end
of the bargain about facilitating "the fullest possible exchange of
equipment, materials and scientific and technological information"'
for those ends. The Chemical Weapons Convention similarly contains
obligations relating to "the fullest possible exchange of chemicals,
equipment and scientific and technical information"1 9 2 relating to
peaceful applications of chemistry and to the removal of undue re-
strictions on international trade in chemicals-and, once again, many
economically disadvantaged states resent the crabbed implementation
of those provisions.
The draft Zero Agreement and Zero Treaty accordingly contemplate
that sweeteners of some sort may be necessary to help induce countries
tojoin in the effort to eliminate nuclear weapons. In principle, no state
should need to ask, "What's in it for me?" regarding nuclear abolition-
the improved safety and security for the entire planet should be
sufficient incentive for all to participate. But some states-who have
never possessed or pursued nuclear weapons, but who might nonethe-
less be required to submit to intrusive and expensive verification
procedures-may need more persuasion about the value ofjoining the
instruments. Accordingly, some textual acknowledgement, similar to
that of the NPT, about sharing the peaceful benefits of nuclear energy,
could be appropriate.
IV. DRAFr ZERO AGREEMENT
This section offers a draft text, with annotations, presenting
one picture of what the next or initial step on the road to nuclear
disarmament might look like: a non-legally-binding instru-
ment through which the participating states confirm (or, for most
of them, re-confirm) their commitment to the ultimate objective
and their determination to take immediate steps in pursuit of it.
This "framework" document, reifying the concept of getting to
zero, could be negotiated and signed relatively soon, perhaps
in 2015, in conjunction with the next Review Conference for the
NPT.
191. NPT, supra note 44, art. IV. Article V of the NPT likewise promised that the anticipated
benefits of "nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes" would be made available to NNWS on a
non-discriminatory basis and at a low fee. Feiveson, supra note 102, at 57-76.
192. CWC, supra note 139, art. XI.
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Zero Agreement193
For the Elimination'9 4 of Nuclear Weapons
The Participating States,' 9 5
(PP1196) Determined for the sake of all mankind to create the condi-
tions for a world without nuclear weapons;19
(PP2) Desiring to take prompt, effective steps in ajoint enterprise in
pursuit of that goal;' 98
193. Some arms control agreements have adopted "neutral" or descriptive titles, which serve
well to advertise the contents of the instrument, but forego any effort at retaining a "popular
name" or catchy title. For example, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction is routinely
referred to as the "Chemical Weapons Convention," CWC, suna note 139. In contrast, the
"Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty" avoids a mouthful of words, and adopts the language
that has long been associated with CTBT, sufna note 128. Alternatively, some treaties are
informally named after the city in which they are concluded or signed, such as the Ottawa
Convention on land mines, supra note 172. This draft follows the approach of designating a
simple, evocative, colloquial title.
194. Again, there is a rhetorical choice here, among words such as "elimination," "pro-
hibition," and "abolition." Some advocates favor the term "abolition," while others avoid the
seemingly religious or messianic zeal that might connote. See Holdren, supra note 4; CWC,
supra note 139 (using "prohibition"); Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their
Destruction, Apr. 10, 1972, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163, 11 I.L.M. 309 (1972) (entered into force Mar. 26,
1975) [hereinafter BWC] (using "prohibition"). Some might perceive a nuance of content
difference, with "prohibition" describing a "legal" action and "elimination" referring to the
physical act of destroying the devices; cf Catherine McArdle Kelleher, Introduction, in GETTING TO
ZERO, supra note 3, at 1, 5 (likening the campaign for nuclear disarmament to the earlier global
efforts to eradicate smallpox or slavery).
195. The term "Participating State" is used instead of a term such as "party," reflecting the
fact that this document is not legally binding. See Guidance on Non-BindingDocuments, U.S. DEPT. OF
STATE, http://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/guidance/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2014).
In this iteration of the text, the specific Participating States are not identified by name;
the document is drafted as being open for signature by all states. An alternative is to identify (by
name or by defining characteristics) a collection of perhaps twenty to forty key states that would
be invited tojoin this Zero Agreement.
196. The preambular paragraphs are provisionally numbered in this draft and in the Zero
Treaty, for convenience. In the final version of the documents, numbers would be deleted from
the preambles, but retained in the operative paragraphs.
197. Conceptually, this Zero Agreement would be designed to help "create the conditions
for" a world free of nuclear weapons; the following Zero Treaty would help effectuate the
transition from a world with few nuclear weapons to a world with none.
198. This document contemplates two types of follow-on actions by individual states or
groups of states. First, it outlines an anticipated series of interim, legally-binding agreements that
would incrementally but definitively reduce nuclear weapons stockpiles around the world and
contribute to nuclear disarmament in other ways. Second, it includes an Annex, in which
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(PP3) Anticipating that a systematic series of agreements will be de-
veloped, and cooperative reciprocal unilateral actions will be under-
taken by many states, '") in the coming years to approach that goal in a
manner that is global, comprehensive, timely, balanced, predictable,
secure, verifiable, enforceable, sustainable, irreversible, and legally-
binding;2001
(PP4) Fearing that the catastrophic power of nuclear weapons cannot
be contained in either space or time, and has the potential to destroy
all civilization, to devastate the entire ecosystem of the planet, and to
jeopardize the survival of the human race;21o
(PP5) Believing that as long as nuclear weapons exist, the possibility of
their proliferation and use cannot be forever precluded, and thus they
will continue to pose the most extreme threat to all humanity;202
individual states would offer non-legally-binding unilateral measures (colloquially referred to as
"house gifts") that they were prepared to take immediately, tojump start the process. The concept
of a "joint enterprise" stresses that many (or all) states will have to play roles in pursuit of nuclear
disarmament; the task can be led by, but is not the exclusive responsibility of, the United States,
Russia, and the other NWS.
199. The anticipated unilateral actions undertaken individually by concerned states (such as
the proposals suggested in the Annex) would be "cooperative" and "reciprocal," in the sense that
each participant would take notice of the offerings of the others, and each would be encouraged
to match (or even to leapfrog) the steps of the most progressive. But since individual countries
are positioned asymmetrically with respect to current civil and military nuclear programs, the
steps would not be identical and could not be exactly uniform. The steps would be "unilateral," in
the sense of not being legally binding, and not necessarily being the product of sustained
negotiation or dialogue.
200. This list of defining (and somewhat overlapping) adjectives is the "mantra" of condi-
tions that a durable zero undertaking would have to meet; the ultimate objective is a regime that is:
global (or universal) (applicable to all countries and all places on, under, and above Earth);
comprehensive (covering all types of nuclear explosive devices and components, regardless of
type or status); timely (not indefinitely delayed-although this document does not attempt to
identify a specific timetable); balanced (calling for appropriate, corresponding actions from each
state); predictable (allowing all states to see where the process is leading at each stage); secure
(not jeopardizing any state or group of states at any point in the process); verifiable (to prevent
secret cheating); enforceable (to respond effectively to violations); sustainable (not subject to
fatal disruptions from temporary perturbations); irreversible (or permanent) (to ensure against
the return of nuclear weapons); and legally-binding (to bring the full weight of international law
in support of the institution). See supna text accompanying notes 134-38.
201. This rhetoric is adapted from the ICJ Advisory Opinion on Nuclear Weapons, supra note
59, 1 35.
202. In addition to the possibility of deliberate use of a nuclear weapon, the specter of
accidental or mistaken use cannot be ruled out. SeeJonathan Granoff, The Process of/ero, 26 WORLD
Poicy J. 85, 86-88 (2009), available at http://gsinstitute.s3.amazonaws.com/assets/gsi/docs/
WPJ_2009.pdf (recounting examples of accidents and false alarms regarding nuclear weapons).
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(PP6) Affirming that all human life is sacred, and that all members
of the human family have the equal, inalienable right to life, liberty,
peace, security and dignity;o 3
(PP7) Underscoing the legal obligation contained in Article VI of the
1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons "to pursue
negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of
the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and
on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and
effective international control";204
(PP8) Reaffirming the statement of "Principles and Objectives for
Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament," adopted at the 1995
Conference on the Review and Extension of the Non-Proliferation
Treaty;205
(PP9) Commending the recognition, in the Final Document of
the 2000 Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, of
"an unequivocal undertaking" by the states possessing nuclear
weapons to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear ar-
senals, through implementation of a series of "practical steps"
and of the applicability of the principle of irreversibility in nuclear
disarmament;2 0o
203. (. NWC, supra note 2, at 46 (citing Preamble, 1 4).
204. This Article VI obligation applies to all parties to the NPT-NWS and NNWS alike-but
does not apply to non-parties to the NPT (India, Israel, North Korea, and Pakistan). Note that
Article VI goes even beyond nuclear disarmament, by including a commitment to pursue "general
and complete disarmament." Some states may object to repetition of this far-distant goal, even
in a preamble, while others may insist that this objective not be overlooked, although this
instrument deals only with nuclear weapons. See David S.Jonas, General and Complete Disarmanent:
Not fust fin Nuclear Weapons States Anymore, 43 GEO.J. INT'L.. LAw 587 (2012).
205. Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, Federation
of American Scientists, NPT/CONF.1995/32/DEC.2 (April 17-May 12, 1995), available at http://
www.fas.org/nuke/control/npt/text/prin-obj.htm.
It is possible that the four non-NPT states may object to so many preambular paragraphs
referencing and drawing upon the work product of NPT meetings.
206. The Final Document from an NPT Review Conference is not, in itself, legally binding,
but it represents a commitment by the NWS to take actions that are necessary to sustain the
NPT and the non-proliferation enterprise. This passage is quoted from the Arms Control
Association, 2000 NIT Review Conference Final Document, ARMS CONTROL AssocaAION (Apr. 24-
May 19, 2000), available at http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2000_06/docjun (discussing Article
VI and Preamble, 8-12, 15, regarding "practical steps" in implementation of Article VI, steps #5
and #6).
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(PP1O) Noting that the Final Document of the 2010 Review Con-
ference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty affirmed that "all States need
to make special efforts to establish the necessary framework to achieve
and maintain a world without nuclear weapons" and called, inter alia,
for discussion of "policies that could prevent the use of nuclear wea-
pons and eventually lead to their elimination."o7
(PP11) Recalling Resolution 1(I) of the United Nations General
Assembly, adopted unanimously onJanuary 24, 1946, calling for propos-
als "for the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons,"
and the many subsequent resolutions of the General Assembly also
calling for the elimination of nuclear weapons; 208
(PP12) Recalling also the Final Document of the United Nations
General Assembly's First Special Session on Disarmament in 1978,
which recognized the imperative of removing the threat of nuclear
weapons and halting and reversing the nuclear arms race until the total
elimination of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems has been
achieved;2 09
(PP13) Emphasizing the determination of the United Nations Secu-
rity Council, as expressed in its Resolution 1887 of September 24, 2009,
"to seek a safer world for all and to create the conditions for a world
without nuclear weapons, in accordance with the goals of the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), in a way that pro-
motes international stability, and based on the principle of undimin-
ished security for all";210
(PP14) Recalling the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of
Justice of July 8, 1996, in which it affirmed that the threat or use of
nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of interna-
207. 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons, May 2010, Final Document: 2010 Review Conference of the Pa ies to the Treaty on the
Non-Irolbferation of Nuclear Weapons, I.B.iii and Action 5(d), NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I) (May 3-
28, 2010), available at http://www.un.org/ga/search/view-doc.asp?symbol=NPT/CONF.2010/
50.
208. Establishment of a Commission to Deal with the Problems Raised by the Discovery of
Atomic Energy, supra note 5. There are a great many General Assembly resolutions calling for
abolition of nuclear weapons; this citation to the very first such resolution has particular salience,
but others could be cited, too.
209. The United Nations General Assembly has convened four "Special Sessions on Disarma-
ment"; this annotation refers to paragraph 20 of the final resolution of the first such conclave.
G.A. Res. S-10/2, 1 20, U.N. GAOR, 10th Special Sess., Supp. No. 4, U.N. Doc. A/S-10/4, at 3
(May 23-JunJun 30, 1978), available at http://www.un.org/disarmament/HomePage/SSOD/A-S-
10-4.pdf.
210. S.C. Res. 1887, supra note 41, at 1.
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tional law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles
and rules of humanitarian law;21 1
(PP15) Concluding that the financial, 2 social, environmental,
medical,2 13 intellectual, and psychological burdens of developing and
maintaining nuclear weapons are an intolerable waste of human and
material resources;
(PP16) judging that urgent progress toward nuclear disarm-
ament can facilitate resolution of regional security issues, and con-
versely that amelioration of those regional tensions can also assist
in advancing the progress toward global elimination of nuclear
weapons;214
(PP17) Appreciating the value of nuclear energy for diverse peace-
ful purposes in electrical power generation, medicine, and other
fields, when conducted under appropriate and effective international
safeguards; 215
(PP18) Assessing that the creation and operation of additional inter-
national diplomatic mechanisms can effectively contribute to the ad-
vancement of the pursuit of nuclear disarmament;216 and
(PP19) Applauding the contributions to global peace and stability
211. I.C.j. Advisory Opinion on Nuclear Weapons, supra note 59, 1 105 (2)E.
212. By some estimates, the United States has spent $7.5 trillion on nuclear weapons and
their delivery systems since the onset of the nuclear age. David Krieger, The Challenge ofAbol-
ishing Nuclear Weapons, in THE CHALLENGE OF ABOLISHING NUCLEAR WEAPONS 3, 9 (David Krieger
ed., 2009); see also BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, AToMIC AUDTr: THE COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES OF
U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS SINCE 1940 3 (Stephen I. Schwartz ed., 1988), available at http://
www.brookings.edu/research/books/ 1998/atomic (estimating the cost of the nuclear arsenal at
$5.5 trillion through 1998); Dana Priest, Aging U.S. Nuclear Arsenal Slated for Costly and Long-
Delayed Modernization, WASH. POST, Sept. 15, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/
national-security/us-nuclear-arsenal-is-readyfor-overhaul/2012/09/15/42823 7 de-f830- lel-8253-
3f495ae70650_story.html.
213. See NWC, sun note 2, at 120-25 (surveying the adverse health and environmental
consequences of producing and testing nuclear weapons); JOHN LORETZ, INTERNATIONAL PHYSI-
ClANS FOR THE PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR, ZERO IS THE ONLY OrION: FOUR MEDICAL AND
ENVIRONMENTAL CASES FOR ERADICATING NUCLEAR WEAPONS (2010), available at http://nuclear-
zero.org/.
214. See supra text accompanying notes 187-88 (regarding the role of regional security issues
in getting to zero).
215. This paragraph acknowledges the "dual use" nature of much nuclear material, equip-
ment, facilities, and technology; the task of preserving and enhancing the peaceful applications
while eradicating the weapons functions is among the biggest challenges for the regime. See supra
text accompanying notes 82-86 & 143-54. In contrast, the NWC discourages the use of nuclear
power for energy production. NWC, supna note 2, at 132-33.
216. See sunra text accompanying notes 182-86 (regarding the creation of a modest new
diplomatic infrastructure to promote progress toward nuclear disarmament).
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accomplished by numerous treaties in force or pending that deal with
nuclear weapons, nuclear weapon free zones, chemical weapons, bio-
logical weapons, and other instruments; 2 17
Have agreed as follows:
1. The Participating States confirm that a world without nuclear
weapons is desirable and attainable,2 "' and that they are under a
moral and legal obligation2 1' 1 to pursue it promptly and vigorously.
Participating states will 22o do everything in their power to cooperate
in creating the conditions necessary for the global, comprehensive,
timely, balanced, predictable, secure, verifiable, enforceable, sustain-
able, irreversible, and legally-binding elimination of all nuclear
weapons."
2. All Participating States that have not yet done so should in the
near future join the 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Bio-
logical) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction; the 1993
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production,
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruc-
tion; and the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. All
Participating States will promote universal adherence and obser-
vance of these instruments.2 2 2
217. The agreement could identify by name, or categorically, some of the various bilateral
nuclear arms control treaties, such as New START, supra note 78; START I, supra note 110, and the
INF Treaty, supra note 79; the various regional Nuclear Weapon Free Zone treaties and protocols,
supa notes 118-122; and major multilateral agreements dealing with non-nuclear weapons, such
as the CWC, supra note 139; the BWC, supra note 194; and others.
218. This passage confirms that the goal of nuclear disarmament is both desirable and
attainable, thereby expressing the participants' commitment to uniting the two elements of the
ideal and the practical.
219. NPT parties are under a legal obligation, pursuant to Article VI, to pursue nuclear
disarmament; all states share the moral imperative to seek that objective.
220. This Zero Agreement, like most non-legally-binding documents, generally uses the
verbs "will" or "should," to describe participants' intentions, rather than "shall," which is
customary for a legally-binding document such as the Zero Treaty. The Zero Agreement likewise
avoids phrases such as "undertake to" or "commit to," which would be more appropriate in the
Zero Treaty.
221. This sentence repeats the "mantra" from preambular paragraph 3.
One specialized issue here concerns the concept of "peaceful nuclear explosions" (PNEs),
supra note 136. The Zero Treaty would have to prohibit PNE devices because they could be used to
circumvent the ban on nuclear weapons. This coverage could be ensured by including the
somewhat cumbersome term "nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices" throughout
the text; more likely, a suitable "definition of terms" section would ensure that PNEs are covered.
222. Here, the Zero Agreement endorses the leading existing multilateral arms control
agreements, including the BWC, CWC, and CTBT. It uses the more general term "join," instead of
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3. The Participating States will support the development, adher-
ence and observance of regional nuclear weapon free zone treaties
and their associated protocols and will urge eligible states to partici-
pate fully in those regimes.
4. Each Participating State that possesses nuclear weapons will
immediately224 cap2 2 5 the total number of its nuclear weapons and
undertake additional measures of transparency regarding its nuclear
weapons programs.
5. The Russian Federation and the United States of America will
promptly and urgently enter into negotiations and conclude an
agreement for the further reduction of their nuclear weapons, with
the goal of reducing their current total inventories by approximately
fifty percent.2
"ratify," since the BWC and CWC are no longer open for signature, and any newcomers wouldjoin
those treaties by accession, rather than ratification. BWC, supra note 193, art. IX.1; CWC, supai
note 140, art. XVIII.; CTBT npm note 129, art. XII. The BWC and CWC have attracted wide, but
not universal, adherence; the CTBT has not yet entered into force, lacking ratification by the
United States, China, and other essential participants.
The Zero Agreement could also endorse the NPT and urge the remaining non-parties tojoin
that treaty, too-but doing so might be politically offensive to India, Israel, North Korea, and
Pakistan, who might be inclined against this Zero Agreement, ifaffiliating with it required them to
abandon their longstanding antipathy to the NPT.
223. This paragraph echoes preambular paragraph 19, in supporting the creation and
implementation of new and existing regional nuclear weapon free zone arrangements, which are
of special interest to nuclear disarmament. See supl text accompanying notes 117-123.
224. Alternatives would be to institute this provision at a (soon) fixed time, at a point when
specified other reductions had already occurred, or "as soon as possible." In particular, the
sequencing of events specified in paragraphs 4 and 5 may be problematic-will other states
institute caps on their nuclear weapons before, or only after, the United States and Russia have
undertaken the next step in their bilateral reductions?
225. This provision is sometimes referred to as a "freeze" on national weapons stockpiles, but
the better concept is to impose a "cap" or ceiling on those inventories, which would allow a state to
reduce its weapons. This paragraph would also allow a state, for now, to continue to produce new
nuclear weapons (for example, to replace defective or obsolete devices) as long as there was at
least a one-for-one offsetting elimination of existing devices. Routine maintenance of nuclear
weapons would also be permitted for as long as the devices exist.
226. The (unspecified) transparency measures would be designed to enhance other states'
abilities to determine with high confidence the numbers and characteristics of each participating
state's existing nuclear weapons inventories, as a precursor to later verified reductions.
227. This paragraph elicits a successor to the 2010 New START, sunna note 78, which imposes
a series of limitations upon various categories of U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons, to be
effectuated by 2018. The proposal here calls upon those two countries to move forward
aggressively with additional limitations now, rather than waiting until 2018 approaches. The target
of a fifty percent reduction in weapons is intentionally somewhat vague, in leaving for those two
states the potentially difficult and controversial questions of "counting rules" and other provisions
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6. Thereafter, the People's Republic of China, the French Repub-
lic, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America will enter
into five-party negotiations228 with the goal of achieving deep reduc-
tions in their respective nuclear weapons stockpiles in a balanced
and progressive fashion.22 9 They may implement these agreed reduc-
tions in stages. 230 They will seek to achieve as soon as possible the
lowest possible levels of nuclear weapons, retaining no more than
100 weapons each.23 1
7. Simultaneously, those five states will enter into negotiations
with the Republic of India, the State of Israel, the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea, and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan,232
to incorporate both deployed and non-deployed weapons, as well as dealing with both strategic
and shorter-range systems. See supra text accompanying notes 104-116; see also David Holloway,
in REYKjAVIK REvIsrIED, supa note 3, at 1-31 (arguing that the process of moving toward nuclear
disarmament must begin with Russia and the United States); Pan Zhenqiang, Abolishing Nuclear
Weapons: VWy Not Outlaw Them First ? in DEBATE, supra note 3, at 249, 253 (asserting that as "[f] irst
among unequals, the United States and Russia must lead.").
228. Although China, France and the United Kingdom currently possess many fewer nuclear
weapons than do the United States and Russia, before long, the current bilateral (U.S.-Russia)
structure of nuclear arms control will have to transform into a plurilateral negotiation, incor-
porating all the P5). See Ria Novosti, Russia Skeptical Over Obama's New Nuclear Reduction Iroposa,
supra note 116 (Russian officials insist that other NWS will have to participate in the next round of
nuclear weapons reductions); RIA Novosti (Jun. 22, 2013), supra note 189 (same); PIFER &
O'HANLON, supra note 79, at 178-81 (multilateralizing arms control).
229. It is possible that an initial round of negotiations would not provide for equal numbers
of nuclear weapons for all five states, but before long, asymmetries would have to be ironed out.
230. Alternatively, these "stages" could be overtly identified and the numbers and dates
could be spelled out in the text, but that would seem to import a level of specificity beyond our
current abilities to foresee the acceptable arrangements and timing. Cf Paine, Cochran, and
Norris, International Arrangements, supra note 143, at 149-52 (outlining three stages and fifteen
steps toward nuclear elimination); Leonard, sufna note 143 (describing four phases).
231. Achieving a common ceiling of 100 nuclear weapons for each state would require
substantial reductions by all five participants, while still preserving for each the deterrence
structure of a devastating nuclear capability. See Benjamin Friedman, Christopher Preble, & Matt
Fay, The End of Overkill? Reassessing U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy, CATO INSTITUTE (2013), available at
http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/the-end-oLoverkill-wp-web.pdf. But see
Keith Payne et. al., Minimum Deterrence: Examining the Evidence, NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC
POLICY (2013), available at http://www.nipp.org/Final%20for%20Distro%207.17.pdf.
232. This paragraph focuses on the four states that are not party to the NPT and that
therefore retain a legal right to possess nuclear weapons. (But see the special legal obligations
applicable to North Korea, supra notes 55 & 56.) The paragraph does not deal with Iran or any
other state that might be thought to be illicitly pursuing a nuclear weapon or the capability to
build one; those states are all currently NNWS parties to the NPT.
Under the phrasing of this paragraph, the negotiations do not have to engage India, Israel,
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with the goal of capping, reducing and eliminating the respective
nuclear weapons stockpiles of those four states.' These negotia-
tions may proceed in stages, including via regional or other groups,
as well as bilaterally, plurilaterally, and multilaterally.234
8. Thereafter, the relevant states235 will enter negotiations to
reduce their nuclear weapons stockpiles to zero. These negotiations
will include all nuclear weapons, irrespective of range, type, age,
size, mode of delivery, or status as deployed, non-deployed, reserve,
retired, stored, awaiting disassembly, or otherwise, and regardless of
whether the device is intended for peaceful or military uses.
9. All Participating States will support and encourage these
negotiations and endeavor to promote their success.
10. Each Participating State possessing nuclear weapons will revise
its war plans to eliminate any requirement for a capability to launch
weapons on short notice; remove its nuclear weapons from high alert
status;238 and maintain its missile warheads in peacetime without
North Korea, and Pakistan participating around the same table or signing the same instrument.
All of the P5 would help facilitate agreements with these four states.
233. A special difficulty here is posed by the fact that longstanding Israeli policy is to neither
confirm nor deny the existence of the nuclear weapons stockpile that it is widely credited with
possessing. See sufnn note 66.
234. These four states might not reduce their holdings of nuclear weapons all the way to zero
while the P5 retain as many as 100 weapons each. This Zero Agreement does not have to specify
the exact sequence of the respective national cuts.
235. It is undetermined who would participate in the negotiation of the Zero Treaty. Surely
the P5 and the four non-NPT states would have to be included. Perhaps "all" states would join the
negotiation, because they would all have to be part of the Zero Treaty regime. But perhaps a
smaller group, led by the states that possess nuclear weapons or the capability to build them
relatively quickly (or by some larger, but still not universal group), would conduct the principal
negotiations, with the others being pressed to accept the resulting document more or less as
drafted. See supra text accompanying notes 169-75.
236. Different states may use different categories to describe their nuclear weapons holdings;
this provision is intended to ensure that the instrument does not accidentally exclude any
weapons just because they are not currently in the "stockpile," or because they are accounted in
some arcane non-deployed status.
This provision is also intended to cover both military weapons and so-called "peaceful nuclear
explosions." See supra text accompanying notes 137 & 222.
237. Although only a handful of states will possess nuclear weapons that would be destroyed
pursuant to the Zero Treaty, the verification and enforcement provisions would require universal
application, so the Zero Treaty will need to have global coverage.
238. "De-alerting" means relaxing the stringent requirement for being able to use a weapon
(especially an ICBM) on very short notice. This can be accomplished by internal procedures, or
can be made more visible and reliable through adoption of measures such as "turning off power to
missiles, decoupling warheads from missiles, immobilizing missile silo lids, and discontinuing
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targeting coordinates and flight paths inserted into missile guidance
computers."" Each state will maintain the highest standards of safety
and security over its nuclear weapons, components, and facilities.2,1 o
Any nuclear weapons permanently removed from delivery systems
will be verifiably disassembled into their constituent elements or
stored in conditions and under monitoring arrangements that would
preclude them from being quickly or secretly restored to an opera-
tional condition.
launch-on-warning systems." NWC, supra note 2, at 60, 127-29; seeAlexei Arbatov, DealetingNuclear
Forres: A Substitute or Supplement to Disarmament?, in CANBERRA COMMISSION ON TlE EuMINATION OF
Nuc.AR WEArONS, BACKGROUND PAPERS, sup-a note 56, at 303; Paine, Cochran, & Norris, Practical
Interim Steps, sup-w note 142, at 99, 102; Bruce G. Blair, De-Alerting Strategic Forces, in REYKJAVIK
REVISIfED, supra note 3, at 47. The United States has already removed many nuclear weapons from
alert status, but an estimated 1800 U.S. and Russian warheads are still on high alert on missiles
ready to fire within five to fifteen minutes. Kristensen & Norris, Global Nuclear Weapons iventories,
supra note 89, at 76; Hans M. Kristensen & Matthew McKinzie, De-Alerting Nuclear Farres, Buu.. OF
TIIE AToMIC SCIENTISTS, June 19, 2013, http://www.thebulletin.org/de-alerting-nuclear-forces;
Hans M. Kristensen & Matthew McKinzie, Institute for Disarmament Research, ReducingAlei Rates
of Nuclear Weapons, UNDIR/2012/6, http://www.unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/reducing-
alert-rates-of-nuclear-weapons-en-307.pdf; Christopher A. Ford, Playing fin Time on the Edge ofthe
Apocalypse: Maximizing Decision Time for Nuclear Leaders, in DETERRENCE: Irs PAST AND FurtURE 217-77
(George P. Shultz, Sidney D. Drell & James E. Goodby eds., 2011). Different states may have
different vocabularies, procedures, and categories for alert status.
239. The United States and Russia have already re-targeted many, but not all, of their nuclear
weapons to aim at unpopulated ocean areas; these targeting codes may be altered again relatively
rapidly. KRISTENSEN & MCKINZIE, I)e-AletingNuclear Forces, supra note 238; Kristensen & McKinzie,
ReducingAlert Rates of Nuclear Weapons, supa note 238; Ford, supra note 238, at 244. Different states
may have different categories and different vocabularies for their targeting codes and practices.
240. The participating states might additionally undertake to "cooperate" in increasing the
safety and security of their respective nuclear weapons stockpiles. For example, the United States
has provided Russia with considerable assistance in materials protection, control and accounting
under the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program. See WMD, TIE LUGAR CENTER,
http://www.thelugarcenter.org/pages/wmd-nonproliferation (last visited Mar. 20, 2014); Bonnie
Jenkins, Adapting to the Times: The Evolution of U.S. '/eat Reduction liograms, ARMs CONwRoL ToAY,
(Jan./Feb. 2011), http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2011_01-02/Jenkins; Alan Heyes, The Global
Paitneiship on WMI: A Wok in Pogress, ARMS CONTROL TODAY (Apr. 2013), https://www.arms
control.org/act/2013_04/The-Global-Partnership-on-WMD-A-Work-in-Progress; EMILY MELA,
PARTNERSIIIP FOR GLOBAL SEcuRrlY, POICY UPIDATF, REPORIED Accouru~stIMENTs OF SEI.Ecrn
TiHREr REDUGIrION AND NoNPRoIFERNFION PROGRAMS BY AGENCY FOR FIsCAi.YEAR 2012 (Aug. 2013).
But states often jealously guard the secrecy of their nuclear weapons infrastructures, and may be
reluctant to solicit outside involvement; moreover, a tight reading of the NPT would inhibit
anything that could be construed as NWS assistance to another state's nuclear weapons program.
241. The Zero Agreement does not establish a timetable or sequence for the events
described in paragraphs 10-14; some of these developments will occur incrementally and
simultaneously, in support of the negotiation and implementation of the agreements to achieve
deep multilateral cuts in nuclear weapons stockpiles.
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11. Each Participating State will destroy or convert to other pur-
poses all systems it possesses that were specially designed for the
delivery of nuclear weapons. 12 For systems that are capable of
both delivering nuclear weapons and performing other functions,
the Participating State will modify the system, to the fullest ex-
tent possible, to minimize its capability for delivering nuclear
weapons.
12. Each Participating State will destroy or convert to other
purposes any facilities and equipment specially designed or in-
tended for2 44 conducting nuclear weapons tests at all the sites
under its jurisdiction or control215  that have been used or are
primarily intended for the testing of nuclear weapons. It will col-
lapse, permanently fill, or otherwise seal any existing boreholes or
tunnels within the boundaries of such sites that could be employed
for nuclear weapons tests or that contain radioactive debris from a
prior test.246
242. This provision posits that the Zero Treaty would require the elimination of all dedicated
strategic nuclear delivery systems (such as ICBMs and SLBMs); an alternative would permit a party
to retain a small residual arsenal of these devices, in the event that reconstitution of a nuclear
weapons capability becomes lawful (as in response to another party's violation of the Zero Treaty).
The Zero Agreement contemplates that the elimination or conversion of these dedicated delivery
systems would commence promptly, but not necessarily be completed until the Zero Treaty
became effective.
243. Some bilateral U.S.-Russia nuclear arms control agreements have developed procedures
for converting a dual-capable delivery system (such as a long-range bomber) to enable it to
perform only a non-nuclear mission, and for reliably tagging it or otherwise making a converted
asset observably different from the original. See START I, supra note 110, Protocol on Procedures
Governing the Conversion or Elimination of Items Subject to the Treaty; New START, sufnn
note 78, Protocol, Part III. But conversion of a strategic nuclear delivery system to other purposes
may not be reliably irrevocable. That is, perhaps a bomber that was adapted to perform a
non-nuclear mission could relatively easily and quickly bejury-rigged to deliver a nuclear weapon,
too, in an emergency.
244. The Zero Agreement would not regulate all items that are "used for" or "necessary for"
nuclear weapons testing activities, because such a standard would capture too many pedestrian
facilities and equipment of no special interest in this context-e.g., a dormitory at a test site,
where technicians sleep while preparing a test explosion, or a bulldozer, shovel or hammer used
in routine construction activities there. A standard of "primarily" or "specially designed for" may
be more suitable, albeit vague.
245. Use of the term "jurisdiction and control" is intended to include all of a country's
national territory as well as any other locations outside its territory where it exercises actual
authority. SeeCWC, sunra note 139, art. 1.2,4.
246. The CTBT, which prohibits nuclear weapons test explosions, does not require shutter-
ing or repurposing of thre sites where its parties have conducted nuclear tests, but the Zero
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13. Each Participating State that possesses nuclear weapons or an
advanced civil or military nuclear program247 will contribute to the
cooperative development of the conditions for the elimination of
nuclear weapons by undertaking the following actions:248
a. ceasing the chemical separation or isotopic enrichment of
fissile material intended for use in weapons or in excess of civilian
needs;
b. enhancing the effectiveness of international and domestic
controls over fissile material;
c. accepting and fully implementing the Additional Protocol
with the International Atomic Energy Agency;249 and
d. exchanging data regarding the past production, consump-
tion, transfer, disposition, loss, and possession of fissile material.2 5 0
14. The Participating States will negotiate and promptly con-
clude a comprehensive, legally-binding treaty to regulate the pro-
duction, possession, transfer, storage, use, handling, and disposal of
fissile material. 2 5 1 This treaty will include the creation of addi-
tional reliable international controls over facilities for the mining,
extraction, concentration, conversion, enrichment, fuel fabrication,
separation, processing, and use of fissile material, the storage and
disposal of spent fuel, and any reprocessing of fuel. The treaty will
Agreement and Zero Treaty should do so, to further constrain a state's ability to violate the basic
prohibitions. NWC, supa note 2, at 114-15.
247. The Zero Agreement or its negotiating history will have to clarify which states are
considered to possess "advanced civil or military nuclear programs," and are therefore subject to
more intense monitoring. The roster of such states could grow or shrink over time. See CTBT,
supra note 129, Annex 2 (listing 44 states with advanced civil nuclear programs).
248. Again, the Zero Agreement does not specify when these various steps are to be
undertaken; presumably the sequencing would be a matter of intense ongoing international
bargaining.
249. The Additional Protocol is a legal instrument providing the International Atomic
Energy Agency reinforced authority to implement safeguards and conduct inspections to protect
against the diversion of nuclear materials to weapons purposes. Many, but not all, states have
concluded such agreements with the IAEA. SeeFACTSHEETS AND FAQs: IAEA SAFEGUARDS OVERVIEW:
COMPREHENSIVE SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS AND ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, INT'L AroMIC ENERGY
AGENCY, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Factsheets/English/sg-overview.html (last visited
Feb. 18, 2014); THE 1997 IAEA ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL AT A GLANCE, ARMS CONTROL ASSOCIATION
(Oct. 2013), http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/IAEAProtoco.Ass'N (last updated Feb. 2014).
250. Many of the commitments in this paragraph would become legally binding pursuant to
an FMCT, supra text accompanying note 132.
251. Efforts to negotiate a FMCT have been repeatedly thwarted for more than a decade, but
some way around that impasse will have to be developed. See suna text accompanying notes
132-133.
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establish an international nuclear fuel bank to ensure reliable,non-
discriminatory access to supplies of nuclear fuel and other materials
for peaceful purposes under the auspices of the International Atomic
Energy Agency and preclude diversion of those materials for weap-
ons purposes. The treaty will also include an obligation to account
for past production, consumption, transfer, disposition, and loss of
nuclear materials to the maximum extent possible. 2
15. In support of these negotiations and initiatives, the Par-
ticipating States will meet to discuss, develop, cooperatively test,
and implement the key elements of a highly effective worldwide
verification system to ensure adequate monitoring of compli-
ance with the ultimate obligation to destroy all nuclear wea-
pons. This verification system will include multiple components
such as: national and multilateral technical means of verification; 25
routine on-site inspection;254 submission of relevant data to a
global database;2 5 5 reliable sensors, tags, and seals;2 5" societal verifi-
252. Some past production of fissile material can no longer be adequately accounted
for; some quantities may remain permanently "lost" in various states' systems, due to poor
record-keeping and inventory control. But the FMCT will have to obligate parties to conduct
forensic accounting procedures to the maximum extent possible. See PERKOVICH & AcroN,
supra note 8, at 53-57 (calling for "nuclear archeology," to discern past national produc-
tion of uranium and plutonium); TAUBMAN, supra note 3, at 51 (noting that neither the
United States nor Russia can account fully for all the nuclear materials it has produced);
FIssILE MATERIAL PANEL, supra note 83, at 82-89 (suggesting nuclear archeology); Paine,
Cochran, & Norris, Techniques and Procedures, sufnua note 160, at 170-71; James M. Acton, Fissile
Materials and Disarmament. Long-terim Goals, Short-term Steps, in GETTING TO ZERO, suna note 3,
at 245, 250.
253. Seesufna note 159 (discussing national technical means of verification).
254. "Routine on-site inspection" refers to procedures through which inspectors from one
state, or from an international organization, are permitted to enter another state and conduct
data-gathering operations relevant to an assessment of compliance with an arms control treaty. In
some modern arms control arrangements, these occur with great frequency, becoming a system-
atic, relatively non-problematic feature of the operation of the treaty. See CWC, supra note 139,
art. IV.3, 5, Verification Annex; New START, su/na note 78, art. XI, Protocol, Part V.
255. Several arms control treaties require parties to declare specified categories of informa-
tion regarding their holdings of regulated weapons or to contribute on an ongoing basis to an
exchange of treaty-relevant data. See, e.g., CWC, sufna note 139, art. III (requiring declarations
regarding possession of chemical weapons, production facilities and other items); New START,
suna note 78, art. VII and Protocol Part Two.
256. Sensors, tags and seals can be used to preclude or detect tampering with inspectors'
equipment or to ensure that observed items are reliably counted. See, e.g., New START, supra
note 78, Annex on Inspection Activities, section VI.
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cation;2 and challenge on-site inspection. The verification sys-
tem will be sufficiently rigorous and intrusive that Participating
States will have confidence in its ability to detect, identify, attribute,
and substantiate violations within the time required to mount effec-
tive responses. 251
16. In support of these negotiations and initiatives, the Participat-
ing States will meet to discuss and develop specific plans and propos-
als for the international legal and institutional components of a
highly effective worldwide enforcement system that would both deter
and ensure an adequate response to any violation of the ultimate
obligation to destroy all nuclear weapons. This enforcement system
will include multiple components such as: diplomatic measures,
resort to the institutions of international law, punitive economic
measures, criminal prosecution, and military measures. The enforce-
ment system will be sufficiently rigorous and powerful that Participat-
ing States will have confidence in its ability to deter violations, punish
violators, negate the effects of any violation, and ensure that viola-
tions do not result in military or other gains."
257. See Perkovich & Acton, supm note 8, at 65-67 (explaining that societal or civil society
monitoring makes the entire community responsible for helping to verify treaty compliance.
There could be legal obligations to report treaty violations, and protection for whistleblowers.
With modern technology, the possibilities for accurate and timely detection and communications
expand; while this process may be most applicable in open, democratic societies, even a small
number of dissidents in an authoritarian regime could make a difference). See sunn text
accompanying note 160.
258. "Challenge on-site inspection" refers to procedures through which a suspicious state or
an international organization is authorized to conduct extraordinary, short-notice data-gathering
activities inside a target state, when doubts have emerged regarding compliance with the treaty.
The procedures for initiation of such an intrusive inspection, and the rights, functions, and
equipment to be exercised by the inspectors require painstaking negotiation. See, e.g., CWC, supra
note 140, art. IX, Verification Annex, Parts X, XI; CTBT, supra note 129, art. IV.D, Protocol Part 11;
see also DEF.BAE, supa note 3, at 65-67.
259. There is admittedly some circularity in this paragraph: It asserts that countries will have
confidence in the efficacy of the verification system because the verification system will be
constructed in a way that gives countries confidence. But at this point, it may be the best that can
be done-the future verification system for the Zero Treaty will depend heavily upon improved
monitoring technologies and revised attitudes toward transparency that we cannot today fully
specify. One of the primary functions of the Zero Agreement will be to begin the process through
which states will develop and negotiate agreements about new verification technologies and
political relationships that will give substance to these claims. See supm, text accompanying notes
155-61.
260. Again, an effective enforcement system for the Zero Treaty, enabling it to rise to the
rigid standards of success identified here, remains to be conceptualized, developed, negotiated,
and instituted. The availability of "military measures" is a key component here-it is far from clear
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17. In support of these negotiations and initiatives, the Par-
ticipating States will create an international organization compe-
tent to operate the verification and enforcement systems, to pro-
mote effective implementation of the treaty to destroy their nuclear
weapons, and to resolve disputes that might arise under it. 2 "
18. As states dismantle their nuclear weapons, the compo-
nents will be irreversibly altered in form or content, perma-
nently converted to purposes unrelated to nuclear weapons, or
held in secure storage under conditions that preclude their
being quickly or secretly reassembled into weapons.2"2 All such
operations will be conducted pursuant to verification by the
international organization and in accordance with the highest
standards for security, safety of people and protection of the
environment.
19. The Participating States will cooperate in the research
and development of alternative nuclear fuel cycles that serve
peaceful purposes and present stronger barriers to potential
exploitation for nuclear weapons. As such technologies become
available and economically viable, the Participating States
will promote their adoption and use on a non-discriminatory
basis.
how the parties can empower a reliable, effective military response to a violation in a manner
consistent with Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter and the veto power of the P5 in the Security
Council. See supra text accompanying notes 162-67.
261. The new international organization would be similar to the CWC's OPCW and the
CTBT's CTBTO; it may have some special relationship to the IAEA. The organization could
be created in the Zero Treaty, or could be established prior to conclusion of that accord,
in order to help facilitate its negotiation and entry into force. See supra text accompanying
notes 183-86.
262. See supra text accompanying note 145 (describing the accountable "components" of a
nuclear weapon).
263. This provision is similar to that of the CWC, pursuant to which each party "during
transportation, sampling, storage and destruction of chemical weapons, shall assign the highest
priority to ensuring the safety of people and to protecting the environment." CWC, sulna note 139,
art. IV.10.
264. Some analysts believe that an alternative nuclear fuel cycle based on thorium,
rather than uranium, might provide competitively priced electrical power, with less utility for
weapons purposes. See Thorium fuel tycle--Potential benefits and challenges, INT'l. ATomc ENERGY
AGENCY, IAEA-TECHDOC 1450 (May 2005), http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/
PDF/TE_1450_web.pdf; Tho/wium, WORLD NucLEAR ASS'N (Nov. 16, 2013), http://www.world-
nuclear.org/info/Current-and-Future-Generation/Thorium/; Roger Harrabin, Thoium Backed
as a "Fiure Fuel, "BBC Nvs (Oct. 31, 2013) http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-
24638816. This may also be a place where "sweeteners" of various sorts may be useful to
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20. The Participating States will develop and implement new and
expanded security guaranties or other types of security relationships
that might be extended to states potentially jeopardized by future
conflicts, to assist in creating the conditions for a world without
nuclear weapons.26 5
21. The Participating States will devote their energies to the
easing of regional tensions and to the resolution of regional
conflicts so all states may achieve their legitimate security inter-
ests as they create the conditions for a world without nuclear
weapons.266
22. All Participating States will promote this Zero Agreement and
the agreements that are developed pursuant to it, and will encourage
all states to participate in the relevant negotiations and to accept the
obligations of the relevant agreements.
23. Participating States offer the unilateral voluntary under-
takings, attached as Annex 1 to this document, as examples of
immediate steps they will initiate to facilitate progress toward
the elimination of nuclear weapons. The Participating States will
encourage all states to continue and expand their contributions to
this roster and to fulfill their commitments under it. 2 6 7
help induce states to join the process, such as offering them economic assistance, tech-
nology sharing, or development aid. Alternatively, perhaps that set of bargaining chips would be
deferred to the Zero Treaty. See supra text accompanying notes 192-93 (discussing possible
sweeteners).
265. Two types of security guaranties have been contemplated: a "negative security
assurance" is a promise by an NWS that it will not use nuclear weapons against an NNWS
(provided, for example, that the NNWS fulfills its non-proliferation commitments); a
"positive security assurance" is a commitment by an NWS that it will come to the aid of an
NNWS that is attacked by another state with nuclear weapons (again, possibly subject to specific
conditions or limitations). The NWS have each provided various versions of these assurances;
the NNWS have sought stronger statements, subject to fewer caveats. See Negative Security Assur-
ances, REACHING CRITICAL WILL, http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/resources/fact-sheets/critical-
issues/5442-negative-security-assurances; U.S. "Negative Security Assurances" at a Glance, ARMS
CONTROL Ass'N (Sept. 2012), http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/negsec; Negative Security
Assurance Audiences, CENTER FOR STRATEGIc & INT'L STUDIEs (Jan. 2010), http://csis.org/blog/
negative-security-assurance-audiences; John Freeman, Te Experience of the Chemical Weapons
Convention: Lessons for the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, in ELEMENTS OF A NucLEAR DISARMAMENT
TREAtY, supa note 3, at 125 (comparing the assurances offered as part of the Chemical Weapons
Convention).
266. See supra text accompanying notes 187-88 (regarding regional security issues).
267. The "house gifts" listed in Annex 1 could include both procedural undertakings (e.g.,
a commitment to enter into negotiations on future reductions) and unilateral substantive
offerings (e.g., a pledge to immediately reduce the country's numbers of weapons or their alert
status, or to increase the transparency of its stockpiles.) Broadly speaking, they constitute
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24. The Participating States will continuously monitor the imple-
mentation of this Zero Agreement and will meet at two-year intervals
at the head of government level2 68 to review its progress and to
consider additional measures necessary to promote its objectives.
Participating States XXX will serve as a Contact Group, to facilitate
accomplishment of these objectives.269
25. This Zero Agreement is not legally binding, but it represents
a solemn undertaking by the Participating States on a matter of
the greatest international importance and urgency. It is open for
signature by all states, 270 and will remain open for signature
indefinitely. 2 7 1
Done, at (place), this (date)
Signatures of Participating States:
"confidence-building measures," or "transparency, security, and confidence-building measures,"
even without being legally binding.
Many states participating in the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit tendered comparable
house gifts; reportedly, ninety percent of those voluntary commitments were fulfilled within
two years. COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, IIGG Report Card, sufna note 74; MICHELLE CANN,
KELSEY DAVENPORT & MARGARET BALZA, ARMS CONTROl. Ass'N AND PARTNERSHIP FOR GLOBAL
SECURITY, REPORT: THE NUCLEAR SECURIY SUMMrr: ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL COMMITMENTS,
Mar. 20, 2012, http://www.armscontrol.org/files/ACA_NSS-Report-2012.pdf; MICHELLE CANN,
KELSEY DAVENPORT & SARAH WILLIAMS, ARMS CONTROL ASS'N AND PARTNERSHIP FOR GLOBAL
SECURY, THE NUCLEAR SECURITY SUMMrI: PROGRESS REPORT,July 2013, http://www.armscontrol.org/
files/NuclearSecuritySummitReport_2013.pdf; see also CANBERRA COMMISSION, supra note 12, at
52-65 (identifying immediate, reinforcing, and final steps in the progression toward nuclear
disarmament).
268. The Nuclear Security Summits have been convened biennially at the head of state
or head of government level. See 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit: Key Facts, https://www.
nss20l4.com/sites/default/files/documents/keyfactson the_2012_seoulnuclearsecurity.
summit.pdf.
269. Alternatively, the Zero Agreement could create more "diplomatic infrastructure," to
facilitate pursuit of the Zero Treaty, such as a permanent staff, annual meetings, and a research
and publication program. In this version, the ongoing "Contact Group" (likely comprising the P5
and a handful of like-minded other leading states) would be charged with continuous responsibili-
ties to promote the objectives on a day-to-day basis.
270. As noted above, an alternative concept would be to specify that only particular states
would join this Zero Agreement, or that only particular states would participate in the ne-
gotiations, but other states would still be invited to sign. See suina text accompanying notes 195 &
235.
271. Because this document is non-legally-binding, it does not require any of the usual treaty
"boilerplate" provisions regarding entry into force, amendment, withdrawal, registration, official
languages, etc., that will be included in the Zero Treaty, art. XI, infra, text accompanying
notes 379-92.
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Annex 1: Immediate Unilateral Undertakings by Individual
Participating States
[Examples of cooperative, reciprocal, voluntary "house gifts" that
could be offered by one or more states, individually or in collab-
oration:] 272
- A declaration that fissile material removed from newly-dismantled
nuclear weapons will not be used in new nuclear weapons; that
fissile material from civil nuclear programs will not be used in i-
clear weapons; that no newly produced fissile material will be used in
nuclear weapons; and that the International Atomic Energy Agency is
invited to monitor implementation of these commitments on a perma-
nent basis.
- A declaration of the state's total inventory of highly enriched ura-
nium and plutonium.
- A declaration of the state's holdings of nuclear warheads and deliv-
ery vehicles.
- A declaration of the state's nuclear infrastructure facilities.
- A commitment to develop and use an agreed standard format to
make public declarations of current and past national fissile material
production and holdings.
- Creation of procedures for international monitoring of the secure
storage of nuclear weapons designated for dismantlement, to confirm
that such weapons and the fissile material they contain are not re-
introduced into weapons stockpiles.
- Institution of additional transparency measures at sites where nuclear
weapon test explosions have been conducted.
- An invitation, by states that currently conduct inspections of each
other's nuclear forces, to allow third-country officials to join actual or
practice inspections as observers.
- Expansion of the monitoring operations established under the
Open Skies Treaty, through acceptance of additional types of sensors,
272. Seegenerally Fissi.E MATlERIAl.PANEL, supra note 83, at 28-38, 59-70 (suggesting nuier-otis
possible declarations and procedures).
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the institution of overflights in additional geographic areas, the
reduction of advance notification of overflights, the reduction or
elimination of exclusion zones, and/or the use of repeated or continu-
ous overflights by remotely piloted aircraft.
- A declaration by a state possessing nuclear weapons that it will
not be the first to break the current moratorium on nuclear
testing.
- A declaration by a state possessing nuclear weapons that it will not be
the first to use a nuclear weapon in combat.27
- A declaration by a state that expands, or makes more legally binding,
its offer of security assurances.
- A declaration that a state will cap at current levels its nuclear
weapons stockpiles and/or a declaration that it will not build any new
nuclear weapons.
- Removal of specified numbers of nuclear warheads from their deliv-
ery vehicles.
- Confirmed irreversible dismantlement of specified numbers of
nuclear warheads or delivery vehicles.
- A declaration that codes for directing nuclear weapons to specific
targets have been (or will be) altered to aim only at unpopulated ocean
areas, or removed altogether from missile guidance computers and
henceforth will not be stored there in peacetime.
- Revision of war plans to reduce or eliminate any requirement for a
capability to launch weapons on short notice.
273. Treaty on Open Skies, Mar. 24, 1992, S. Treaty Doc. No. 102-37 (1992) [hereinafter
Open Skies Treaty]. Under the Open Skies Treaty, parties agree to allow reciprocal aerial
overflights of their territories by foreign aircraft equipped with photographic and other sensors
that gather military-related data in order to build confidence that no hostile or threatening
activities are underway.
274. See Daniel Ellsberg, Roots ofthe Upcoming Nuclear Crisis, in Ti iE CI iALLENGE OF AnOlIil NG
NucI.EAR WEAPONs 45, 52-53 (David Krieger ed., 2009) (listing 25 occasions from 1948 to 2008
when the United States threatened or considered the first use of nuclear weapons).
275. U.S. Drr'i OF DEFENSE, Reqort on Nuclear Employment Sira/egy of the United S/aes, Specified
in Section 491 of 10 U.S.C. (June 19, 2013), http://www.defense.gov/pubs/ReporttoCongiesson
USNuclearEmploymentStrategySection491.pdf; Press Release, The White House, Fact Sheet:
Nuclear Weapons Employment Strategy of the United States (June 19, 2013), availible al http://
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- Establishment of regional forums to promote security and coopera-
tion for a world without nuclear weapons.
- Creation of a national commission to compile a thorough his-
tory of the state's nuclear weapons program and collect supporting
evidence.
- Convening a multilateral group of national experts to develop
improved measures for monitoring and verifying the possession and
elimination of fissile material and nuclear weapons.
- Convening a multilateral group of national experts to develop
effective enforcement measures and mechanisms appropriate for a
world without nuclear weapons.
- Convening a multilateral group of national experts to consider
appropriate provisions for a world without nuclear weapons regarding
the possible retention of fissile material by the states that currently
possess nuclear weapons or by all states, either as a temporary hedge
against treaty violations or permanently.
V. DRArr ZERO TREATY
This section attempts to peer even further into the future, to
imagine the political and legal structures that would be suitable for
assisting states in making the final ascent from a world with low
levels of nuclear weapons held by a few states to the summit of a world
free of nuclear weapons altogether. The proposed draft accord is
necessarily quite speculative; it would be shaped in important re-
spects by the experience-likely to be protracted over many years-in
implementing the goals of the Zero Agreement, and it would de-
pend upon new monitoring technologies or modalities for verification
of compliance and new political accommodations to permit robust
transparency and enforcement activities that are scarcely conceivable
today.
Unlike the preceding Zero Agreement, this Zero Treaty2 7" would be
legally binding; it would be joined, sooner or later, by all states.
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/19/fact-sheet-nuclear-weapons-employment-
strategy-united-states (announcing that the United States will "examine and reduce the role of
launch under attack in contingency planning").
276. There is no legal significance in the vocabulary of "agreement" versus "treaty." Under
the VCLT, sufna note 138, art. 2.1, the nomenclature of an instrument does not affect its status.
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Zero Treaty
For the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons277
The States PartieS278 to this Treaty,
(PPI ) 2 Determined for the sake of all mankind to end forever the
scourge of nuclear weapons;
(PP2) Convinced that a global, comprehensive, timely, balanced,
predictable, secure, verifiable, enforceable, sustainable, irreversible,
and legally-binding280 treaty constitutes the most effective and reliable
mechanism for achieving that objective;
Here, the different terms are used for the two documents simply to differentiate them for ease of
reference.
277. The following discussion assumes that by the time the world is ready for negotiation and
conclusion of this Zero Treaty, the following crucial conditions will have been satisfied:
(a) the CTBT will be in force;
(b) a comprehensive FMCT will have been negotiated and brought into force;
(c) the United States and Russia will have negotiated and implemented one or more new
agreements achieving deep cuts in their respective nuclear weapons arsenals (including strategic
and shorter-range weapons, both deployed and non-deployed), reaching very low levels of
retained weapons and incorporating new, more intrusive verification mechanisms;
(d) China, France, and the United Kingdom will have joined the reductions process,
implementing deep cuts in their respective nuclear weapons arsenals and accepting intrusive
verification;
(e) India, Israel, North Korea and Pakistan will have joined the reductions process, eliminat-
ing or implementing deep cuts in their respective nuclear weapons arsenals and accepting
intrusive verification;
(f) Iran and all other states will have either abandoned their nuclear weapons aspirations and
capabilities or agreed to restrict their nuclear weapons arsenals to very low levels and accept
intrusive verification;
(g) all other states will have supported the process and no new states will have begun to
pursue nuclear weapons; and
(h) regional tensions (in the Middle East, South Asia, Northeast Asia and elsewhere) will have
greatly abated, to the extent that affected states accept that possession or possible possession of
nuclear weapons does not support their legitimate security objectives. f Paine, Cochran, and
Norris, International Arrangements, supra note 144, at 141-42 (listing interim steps that would be
assumed to be in place to create the conditions for nuclear weapons elimination).
278. Unlike the non-legally-binding Zero Agreement, this legally-binding document uses the
term "party" rather than "participating state."
279. The preamble to a treaty is not generally considered legally operative, as the main text
is, but can be instrumental in interpretation of the treaty, as reflecting the parties' "object and
purpose."
280. This paragraph repeats the mantra from the Zero Agreement, preambular paragraph 3,
supra, text accompanying note 200.
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(PP3) Believing that the time is finally ripe for achieving the com-
plete abolition of nuclear weapons, which has for decades been fer-
vently desired by people around the world;
(PP4) Redeeming the pledge contained in Article VI of the 1968
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons "to pursue
negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation
of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament,
and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict
and effective international control";2 8 1
(PP5) Aware that the use of nuclear weapons would have deva-
stating consequences for mankind 2 2 and that as long as nuclear
weapons exist, the possibility of their use cannot be forever pre-
cluded;
(PP6) Affirming that all human life is sacred, and that all members
of the human family have the equal, inalienable right to life, liberty,
peace, security and dignity;28 3
(PP7) Welcoming the contributions made by a series of agree-
ments and unilateral actions by many countries that have created
the conditions for achieving a world without nuclear weapons; 2 ""
and
(PP8) Inspired by the vision of a world forever free of nuclear
weapons;
Have agreed as follows: 28 5
281. In addition to citing Article VI of the NPT, the preamble to the Zero Treaty could also
contain quotations from various NPT review conferences. The provisions from the 1995, 2000 and
2010 conferences, as cited in preambular paragraphs 8-10 of the Zero Agreement, will mostly be
"old news" by that time.
282. Regarding the effects of even a single nuclear explosion, and the consequences of a
general nuclear war, see Suliu., supra note 166, at 3-96. See albo Tj IE EFFEUIS oF NucEiAR WEAlONS
(Samuel Glasstone & PhilipJ. Dolan eds., 3d ed., 1977), available at http://www.fourmilab.ch/
etexts/www/effects/; OFFICE oF TECHNOOGY ASSESSMENt, TimE EFFEGrS OF NUCLEAR WAR (May
1979), availabl kathttp://www.fas.org/nuke/intro/ntike/7906/lhttp://www.fas.org/nuke/ilntro/
nuke/7906/.
283. Of NWC, supra note 2, at 46 (citing pmsbl.1 4).
284. The preamble could include here citations to some of the important inteim agree-
ments that created the progression from the initial Zero Agreement to this Zero Treaty, such as
the CTBT, FMCT, and nuclear weapon free zone agreements.
285. One or more protocols or annexes (not drafted here) may be appended to the Zero
Treaty to provide additional details of the specifications for implementation, inspections, defini-
tions, etc. Cf CWC, supra note 139; New START, suproa note 78.
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Article I
Fundamental Obligations28 "
1. Each Party to this Treaty shall12 7 never, under any circum-
stances:288
a. Develop,28' test, produce, acquire, possess, retain, stockpile,
deploy or transfer 29o nuclear weapons or their components,
except as specified in Article II;
b. Use, threaten to use, or engage in any military or other
preparations to use '' nuclear weapons;
c. Develop, test, produce, acquire, possess, retain, stockpile,
deploy or transfer delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons,
except as specified in Article II; or
d. Assist, encourage, collaborate with, participate with,' or
induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohib-
ited to a Party under this Treaty.
286. CJ NWC, supra note 2, at 48 (citing article I); CTBT, supra note 129, art. I ("Basic
Obligations"); CWC, supra note 139, art. I ("General Obligations").
287. Unlike the Zero Agreement, the Zero Treaty, as a legally-binding document, uses the
mandatory verb "shall," instead of "will" or "should," and it refers to "Parties" instead of
"Participating States."
288. The language of "never, under any circumstances" is subject to the qualification that
reconstitution of a nuclear weapon inventory could in some circumstances be a key, allowable
response to an illegal "breakout" attempt by another Party.
In contrast, the CWC, which uses similar language, was intended "to bind states parties not to
acquire and use chemical weapons even if attacked by hostile states with such weapons." TomAs
GRAHLAM,JR. AND DAMIENJ. LAVERA, CORNERlFINEs OF SECURnY 1168 (2003) (also interpreting the
BWC in the same absolutist fashion).
289. As with prior arms control agreements, this provision does not attempt to regulate
"research," defined as activity that occurs in a library or laboratory, where the capabilities for
verification of compliance would be too difficult, and where the problem of dual capability is most
pronounced. In contrast, the NWC does ban nuclear weapons related research. NWC, sufra
note 2, at 48 (citing article 1(1) (g)).
290. This string of prohibitory verbs combines terms from CWC, sujna note 139, art. I; CTBT,
suprm note 129, art. I; and elsewhere.
291. The language of "engage in any military preparations to use" comes from the CWC,
supna note 139, art. 1.1(c); this text adds a prohibition on "other" types of preparations. See NWC,
supra note 2, at 48 (citing article I(1)(a)(b)). The negotiating history of the treaty would have to
make clear that activities such as the continued possession ofcomponents of disassembled nuclear
weapons, as permitted by the Zero Treaty, would not constitute prohibited "preparations to use."
292. Prior treaties prohibit actions that would "assist, encourage, or induce" behavior
incompatible with the agreement; this proposed text adds "collaborate with" and "participate
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2. Each Party shall destroy all the nuclear weapons that it owns or
possesses, or that are located at any place under its jurisdiction
or control."
3. Each Party shall destroy or convert to permitted purposes" 4 all
the delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons that it owns or pos-
sesses, or that are located at any place under its jurisdiction or
control.
4. Each Party shall destroy or convert to permitted purposes all
the facilities and equipment that it owns or possesses, or that
are located at any place under its jurisdiction or control,
that have been used or principally designed or intended for
use in the research, testing, manufacturing, storage, process-
ing, maintenance, or elimination of nuclear weapons or com-
ponents.295 The following designated facilities and locations
shall be subject to special monitoring: [list, by country, particu-
larly important sites or buildings that have performed signifi-
cant nuclear weapon-related work and will be verifiably de-
stroyed or converted to other purposes; specialized monitoring
arrangements will be developed for each and described in an
annex.] 296
with" to capture coordinated planning and operational activities that might not otherwise be
covered. See CWC, supra note 139, art. 1.1(d); Ottawa Convention, supra note 172, art. 1.1(c);
Oslo CMC, supra note 173, art. 1.1(c). The CTBT prohibits "causing, encouraging, or in any way
participating in" the conduct of a nuclear explosion, CTBT, supra note 129, art. 1.2.
293. The Chemical Weapons Convention also deals with weapons that are "abandoned" on
the territory of another state; that scenario seems unlikely with nuclear weapons. CWC, supra note
139, art. 1.3. The CTBT requires parties to "prohibit and prevent" nuclear weapons tests at
locations under their jurisdiction and control; following that model, the Zero Treaty could
prohibit and prevent possession of nuclear weapons, but since this draft requires destruction of
nuclear weapons at all locations under a party's jurisdiction and control, the "prohibit and
prevent" language would seem redundant. CTBT, supr note 129, art. 1.1.
294. Some prior agreements use the term "activities not prohibited"; the term "permitted
purposes" here aims at the same concept, but avoids a double negative. But it is noteworthy that
under international law, treaties do not usually "permit" activities-a state is considered inher-
ently free to undertake any activities that are not specifically prohibited by law. See CWC, supn-a
note 139, art. II.9, VI.
295. At some suitable point in the negotiation process, each state would be required to
declare or list all its relevant facilities, and other states could contest whether additional sites
should be added to the roster, to ensure that all appropriate locations were covered.
296. The Treaty could list here particular sites or installations that would require special
monitoring. See, e.g., the Savannah River Site and Y-12 National Security Complex (used for
producing radioactive materials for nuclear weapons), Pantex Plant (for assembling and refurbish-
ing nuclear weapons), and Kansas City Plant (for producing or procuring non-nuclear compo-
nents). See Our Locations, NAT'L NUCLEAR SEC. ADMIN. (NNSA), http://nnsa.energy.gov/aboutus/
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5. All destruction, closure, conversion, maintenance, storage, trans-
portation, and other operations required by the Treaty shall be
monitored by the Organization."' In conducting these opera-
tions, each Party shall assign the highest priority to ensuring
security, safety of people and protection of the environment."'
Destruction and conversion operations shall be completed no
later than seven years after the entry into force of this Treaty.29 9
ourlocations (last visited Feb. 18, 2014); LISBETH GRONLUND, ERYN MACDONALD, STEPHEN YOUNG,
PHILIP E. COYLE, III & STEVE FETTER, MAKING SMART SECURTIY CHOICES: THE FUTURE OF THE U.S.
NucLEAR WEAPONS COMPLEx 64-79 (2013), available at http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/
nwgs/nuclear-weapons-complex-report.pdf; Nuclear Matters Handbook, supra note 81, at 93-102;
Geoff Brumfiel, Laser Lab Shifts Focus to Warheads, 491 NATURE 159, Nov. 7, 2012, available at
http://www.nature.com/news/laser-lab-shifts-focus-to-warheads-1.11745 (National Ignition Facil-
ity at Lawrence Livermore Laboratory will direct more attention to weapons work). It could be
quite time-consuming to negotiate, on a case-by-case basis, the applicable monitoring procedures
for each site, but that would be preferable to attempting to negotiate a one-size-fits-all monitoring
plan, which would inevitably have to be adapted to the unique circumstances at each location. See
Paine, Cochran & Norris, Techniques and Procedures, sufnu note 160, at 174-77 (discussing monitor-
ing requirements for specific types of facilities).
297. The Treaty will need to establish an extensive set of procedures governing the opera-
tions of the Organization in monitoring the parties' destruction of nuclear weapons and in
conducting inspections to ensure that no hidden stockpiles remain or are being created. These
procedures will likely be based upon those of the CWC, sufna note 139, Verification Annex; the
CTBT, supra note 129, Protocol; and New START, sufna note 78, Protocol. But new technologies
and political relationships will have to evolve in order to support the much greater intrusiveness
necessary for effective verification of the Zero Treaty.
Here, the fundamental concept is that the each state will retain national control over the
regulated items, subject to international (or reciprocal) monitoring; an alternative would be to
vest partial or even total control over some components in the international organization.
298. The requirement to assign highest priority to ensuring the safety of people and to
protecting the environment is drawn from the CWC, sun-a note 139, art. IV.10. See NWC, supra
note 2, at 130-32.
299. Alternatively, negotiators could determine that the deadline for completing destruction
operations should be shorter or longer than seven years, depending on political conditions of
the time and on how many nuclear weapons were still in national stockpiles. The Zero Treaty
could also include a detailed timetable, corresponding to the several interim deadlines estab-
lished in the CWC's "order of destruction," with specified percentages of national stockpiles to be
destroyed within two, five, seven, and ten years. CWC, supra note 139, Verification Protocol,
Part IV(A), 17. The Zero Treaty will be dealing with much smaller numbers of items than the
CWC, which regulated the disposition of over 70,000 tons of chemical agent, but destruction of
nuclear weapons is a challenging and time-consuming task.
The Zero Treaty might also make provision for destruction "as soon as possible, but in no case
later than XX years" regarding any nuclear weapons that were not known to exist at the time the
Treaty enters into force, but were discovered subsequently. However, the vigorous verification and
transparency measures to be implemented before the Zero Treaty is concluded should mean that
there would be no lingering unknown "hidden" weapons.
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6. Each Party shall, in accordance with its constitutional processes,
adopt the necessary measures to implement its obligations
under this Treaty, including:
a. Prohibiting natural and legal persons anywhere on its terri-
tory or at any other place under its jurisdiction or control
from undertaking any activity prohibited to a Party under
this Treaty, including by enacting or expanding penal
legislation;""'
b. Prohibiting natural and legal persons having its nationality
from undertaking any activity prohibited to a Party under
this Treaty anywhere, including by enacting or expanding
penal legislation;
c. Concluding appropriate agreements to extradite to another
Party persons to be prosecuted for actions inconsistent with
this Treaty;so' and
The timetable for converting or destroying delivery vehicles and the buildings and other
facilities that constitute the nuclear weapons infrastructure could be set to match the seven-year
period forelimination of nuclear weapons; alternatively, itcould be extended, dependingon how
many such items and sites remain at the time the Zero Treaty is concluded and on whether parties
wish to convert or to destroy them. The Treaty could specify a date, or could leave that to
case-by-case determination through the Organization.
300. Paragraphs 6a and 6b are adapted from CWC, supmr note 139, art. VII.1, to prevent
circumvention of the treaty obligations imposed upon states, by requiring the states to extend
similar obligations, in the form of penal legislation, to their nationals and throughout their
territories. The treaty could go further and declare that actions inconsistent with the treaty
constituted international crimes (suitable for prosecution in an international tribunal) or
crimes of universal jurisdiction (suitable for prosecution by any state, regardless of the loca-
tion of the act or the nationality of the actor). These prohibitions could apply both to per-
sons and to corporations and other entities. See NWC, sufna note 2, at 49, 66-68 (citing
articles 1(5), VI, VII(1)-(2)); Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 1, Jul. 17,
1998, UN Doc. A/CONF. 183/9, 2187 UN.T.S. 90; 37 I.L.M. 1002 (1998) (entered into
force Jul. 1, 2002) [hereinafter Rome Statute] (treaty creating the International Criminal
Court, with jurisdiction to prosecute "the most serious crimes of international concern.").
For a discussion regarding universality jurisdiction, see REsIIEMEr (THIRD) OF FOREIGN REiA-
ioNs LAw OF nlE UNIrED STrrs § 404 (1987) (discussing the small category of offenses
"recognized by the community of nations as of universal concern," enabling any state to assert
jurisdiction).
The Zero Treaty could also require each party to designate a National Authority, to
serve as the focal point for domestic implementation measures and for communications
and liaison with the Organization. See CWC, su/na note 139, art. VII.4; CTBT, supma note 129,
art. 111.4.
301. See NWC, supna note 2, at 68 (citing article VII(2)).
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d. Adopting appropriate measures to protect persons pro-
viding to the Organization information regarding actions
related to or inconsistent with this Treaty.3o2
Article II
Permitted Activities
1. A Party,3 0o may retainon4 and maintainso0 components"; for a
limited number3 0'7 of nuclear weapons, provided that:
302. This provision is designed to promote adequate protection for whistleblowers, who
alert the Organization to prohibited actions, and who might otherwise be subject to retaliation by
governments, employers or others. See NWC, supra note 2, at 66, 72 (citing articles VI(1)(b),
VII(C)).
303. In this draft, "any" Party would be allowed to hold these components of nuclear
weapons; an alternative would confine that right to only those countries that had previously
(and legally) possessed nuclear weapons (i.e., the P5 and the four non-NFT states). As drafted,
the provision might allow and encourage some "proliferation" of nuclear weapons compo-
nents, as some current NNWS might decide to build small stockpiles of weapons compo-
nents for the first time as a hedge against another country's violation of the Zero Treaty. On the
other hand, the alternative concept would perpetuate an unpopular "discriminatory" aspect of
the NPT.
304. The Zero Treaty could further restrict a party's right to retain components of
nuclear weapons by limiting the maximum quantity of such items that could be held and/or
by establishing a progressive timetable under which the party must reduce or eliminate its
holdings.
The concept of "retaining" these components implies that a party would be allowed to
"extract" them from intact nuclear weapons that it was destroying but perhaps not be allowed to
"create" new components from scratch. The drafters of the Zero Treaty could be explicit about
this by allowing or prohibiting new manufacturing of components.
The provisions of this article would have to apply, mulails mulandis, to the components of
nuclear weapons that were dismantled prior to the entry into force of the Zero Treaty as well as to
those disassembled tinder it.
305. The Zero Treaty could include a definition of the sorts of "maintenance" activities a
party would be permitted to undertake regarding these components. If so, it could define a
distinction between maintenance, testing, repair, refurbishment, remanufacturing, etc.
306. The Zero Treaty will need to define the critical "components" being regulated.
Notionally, these could include: (a) the fissile material (extracted from the uranium or plutonium
"pit" or "physics package"); (b) the shaped chemical high explosive; and (c) the "electronics
package" of detonator charges. Different types of weapons might include different critical
components. See supa text accompanying note 145.
307. The Zero Treaty could specify here the specific quantities of various components that
parties would be allowed to retain.
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a. All components shall be held in safe and secure conditions
in declared storage facilities;308
b. All components shall be permanently tagged and continu-
ously monitored;" 9
c. No storage facility shall contain all the components neces-
sary to create a nuclear weapon;310
d. Any movement or reassembly of components shall not be
conducted quickly or secretly, and not for more than one
weapon at a time;311 and
e. Ten years after this Treaty enters into force, the Parties
shall evaluate whether the right to hold components shall be
further restricted or prohibited.3 12
2. A Party may withdraw components from a storage facility for
destruction or for use in applications unrelated to nuclear
weapons, 313 provided that:
308. The Zero Treaty, or decisions of the Organization implementing it, will need to
establish standards for the safety and security of the storage facilities and the procedures for
making the required national declarations. The Zero Treaty could require the storage sites to be
publicly declared, or they could be disclosed in confidence to the Organization.
309. A critical challenge for the Zero Treaty's verification arrangements will be to design a
system allowing reliable monitoring of thes6 components without providing the monitors with too
much information about the party's design of nuclear weapons.
310. In addition, the Zero Treaty could require that facilities storing the components of
nuclear weapons should be located at some substantial distance apart to further reduce the
possibility for quick, secret reconstitution. Cf START I Treaty, sufna note 110, art. IV.11
(requiring at least 100 km separation between certain ICBMs, launchers, and other related
equipment). For "two-stage" nuclear weapons, the Zero Treaty could specify a degree of physical
separation of the two types of explosive devices.
311. The Zero Treaty or its implementing procedures could specify how rapid and trans-
parent the potential re-constitution process could be by defining, for example, how many
subcomponents each nuclear weapon must be broken down into, how far apart the components
must be held, what physical impediments might block access to the storage facilities, whether the
party would have to announce publicly whenever it was handling, moving, or reassembling
components, whether permission would be required from the Organization prior to any move-
ment of components, and whether the party would need to invite observers from the Organization
to monitor the process. Perhaps the timetable required for reconstituting weapons could be
gradually further stretched out over the life of the Zero Treaty.
312. The parties could decide-such as at a review conference for the Zero Treaty-to
amend the Treaty to restrict or prohibit the right to hold components. Alternatively, the Treaty
could specify at the outset that a party's rights in this regard should automatically expire after a set
period of time.
313. Probably, the main component that a party might be interested in converting to
peaceful purposes would be the fissile material. It is possible that by the time the world gets close
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a. The component shall be destroyed or irreversibly converted
into a form unsuitable for use in a nuclear weapon; or
b. The component shall remain tagged and subject to continu-
ous3 14 monitoring.
3. A Party may retain delivery systems for nuclear weapons, pro-
vided that:
a. No inter-continental ballistic missiles or submarine-launched
ballistic missiles shall be retained;3 1 5
b. All retained delivery systems shall be dedicated exclusively
to purposes other than the delivery of nuclear weapons;
any features specially related to the delivery of nuclear
weapons shall be removed or converted to other purposes;
and the delivery system shall remain subject to inspection;316
and
to concluding a Zero Treaty, countries will already have extracted sufficient quantities of any
components from nuclear weapons that were disassembled and destroyed in prior years, so they
would have little need to re-use any further components from the last remaining nuclear devices,
and those items could be consigned to permanent storage or destruction.
314. In some applications, perhaps, periodic, rather than continuous, monitoring, or
monitoring ofa statistical sampling would be sufficient and less burdensome.
315. This provision is grounded on the proposition that the short flight times of ICBMs
and SLBMs make them uniquely threatening and on the fact that they have been tra-
ditionally allocated almost exclusively to nuclear missions, with little if any role in conventional
warfare.
An alternative would be to allow the retention of a limited number of ICBMs or SLBMs and
making them available for delivery of nuclear or conventional weapons in response to another
state's illegal breakout activity. This limited number could be reduced over time. If any ICBMs or
SLBMs may be retained, the Treaty will also need to address the extent to which those weapons
may be maintained, refurbished, remanufactured, etc. The Zero Treaty could also allow a party to
convert these missiles to peaceful purposes, such as in launching space vehicles.
Another alternative would be to require elimination of ballistic (and cruise) missiles of
shorter ranges, too-at least any such systems that had ever been tested or deployed with nuclear
weapons. Cf NWC, supra note 2, at 84 (citing article XII requiring destruction of heavy bombers,
ballistic missile submarines, and ground-launched cruise missiles as well as ICBMs and SLBMs).
316. Prior U.S.-U.S.S.R. (and Russia) treaties have included provisions for the conversion of
nuclear delivery systems such as long-range bombers, to non-nuclear missions. See START I, supra
note 110, Protocol on Procedures Governing the Conversion or Elimination of Items Subject to
the Treaty; New START, sayn/ note 78, Protocol, Part III. In the absence of frequent inspection,
however, such conversion may not be reliably irreversible.
Again, an alternative would be to allow the retention of a limited number of nuclear-capable
bombers and other delivery systems, making them available for delivery of nuclear weapons if
another state has illegally reconstituted its nuclear weapons. This limited number could be
reduced over time.
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c. No new systems designed for the delivery of nuclear
weapons shall be developed, tested or deployed, 1 and no
system designed for purposes other than delivery of nuclear
weapons shall be tested in a nuclear weapons mode."'
Article III
Definitions,'"
1. "Nuclear weapon" means any device that is capable of re-
leasing nuclear energy in an essentially uncontrolled manner
and that has a group of characteristics that are largely appropri-
ate for use for warlike purposes, regardless of whether the
device is intended for warlike or peaceful purposes. The term
includes weapons that are deployed, non-deployed, inactive, on
reserve, retired, awaiting destruction, and in any other status.3 D"
2. "Component" of a nuclear weapon means any constituent
element of a nuclear weapon.
3. "Destroy" means to disassemble, denature, deform, disable,
incapacitate, or render in an essentially irreversible way into a
form unsuitable for weapons purposes.
317. This provision would require a definition of what counts as a "new" system as opposed to
a modification of an existing type. ( SALT II, supa note 107, at art. IV.9 (associated Agreed
Statements and Common Understandings) (allowing each side to deploy one new type of ICBM,
and defining "new" for this purpose).
318. C ABM Treaty, supra note 105, arts. 11.1, VI (restricting the testing of interceptor
missiles and radars "in an ABM mode"); Standing Consultative Commission Agreed Statement,
U.S.-U.S.S.R., Nov. 1, 1978, available at http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/abmt/text/abmagr.ht
(further defining the tenn). The Zero Treaty cannot refer to testing "with" nuclear weapons
because under the Zero Treaty there would be no nuclear weapons to test with.
319. Cf NWC, sunra note 2, at 50 (citing article II presenting eighty definitions).
320. The first sentence of this definition is adapted from the Treaty of Tlatelolco, sulpm
note 117, art. 5. This definition is designed to capture so-called "peaceful nuclear explosion"
devices, as well as weapons, and to capture all nuclear weapons regardless of their status. See supa
text accompanying notes 78-81, 137, 222 & 307.
321. For this purpose, the main components of a nuclear weapon would be the fissile
material, the high explosive detonator, and the electronics, although numerous other items are
relevant. See sufnn, text accompanying notes 145 & 306 (regarding components of a nuclear
weapon).
322. This definition is based on the CWC's definition of "destruction of chemical weapons."
CWC, supra note 139, Verification Annex, Part IV(A), [ 12. The notion is that an actor who was
attempting to construct a new nuclear weapon would not be materially advantaged by having
access to destroyed components of a previous weapon; the task would be essentially as difficult,
expensive, and time-consuming as starting from scratch. See GRoNLUNo Er AL., supa note 296,
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4. "Delivery system" means any mechanism that has been devel-
oped, tested, or deployed for, or is capable of, transporting a
nuclear weapon to a target.
Article IV
Nuclear Weapons and Delivery Systems
1. Each Party shall declare, upon entry into force of the Treaty
for it, and annually thereafter, all the nuclear weapons
and components it owns or possesses or that are located at
any place under its jurisdiction or control, and shall provide
to the Organization its plan for destroying or converting
them.
2. Each Party shall declare, upon entry into force of the Treaty
for it, and annually thereafter, all the delivery systems for
nuclear weapons it owns or possesses or that are located at
any place under its jurisdiction and control, and shall provide
to the Organization its plan for destroying or converting
them.
3. The declaration shall specify the location, characteristics, condi-
tion, storage procedures, and destruction or conversion method
and timetable for each item, on a standard form developed by
the Organization." 4
at 52-55 (process for verifiably dismantling nuclear weapons); START 1, supra note 110, Protocol
on Procedures Governing the Conversion or Elimination of the Items Subject to the Treaty
(describing procedures for eliminating strategic delivery vehicles); Dismantlenent Fact Sheet,
NA nONAL NUCLEAR SECURlY ADMINISTFRATION (Feb. 11, 2013), http://www.nnsa.energy.gov/
mediaroom/factsheets/dismantlement-0 (describing procedures for dismantling nuclear
weapons).
323. For most states, this provision would require simply a declaration that it possessed no
nuclear weapons, but even a state that had allowed another state to base nuclear weapons on its
territory would be required to declare that fact. Cf NWC, supra note 2, at 58 (citing article III
collecting into one article all the required declarations).
324. The Organization-or a provisional precursor to it-will have to be operational even
before the Zero Treaty enters into force to accomplish the preparation of suitable standardized
forms for reporting required data.
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Article V
Nuclear Weapon Test Sites
1. Each Party shall declare, upon entry into force of the Treaty
for it, all sites at which it has conducted nuclear weapon test
explosions, 2 and provide to the Organization its plan for
completing the actions required by this article.32 6
2. Each Party shall closeS2 7 or convert to purposes unrelated to
nuclear weapons all its declared nuclear weapon test sites3 28
and submit them to continuous monitoring.
3. Each Party shall collapse, fill, or permanently seal all emplace-
ment boreholes and tunnels at such sites.32 9
4. Each Party shall destroy or convert to other purposes and
submit to continuous monitoring all equipment or facil-
ities330 specially designed for purposes of conducting nuclear
weapon tests.331
325. Some countries have conducted nuclear tests outside their own national territory; in
those instances, two states would have to collaborate to fulfill the obligations of this article. Similar
collaboration was required to implement provisions of the INF Treaty, sufna note 79, Memoran-
dum of Understanding Regarding the Establishment of the Data Base for the Treaty Between the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Elimination of
Their Intermediate Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, U.S.-U.S.S.R. (Dec. 8, 1987), available at
http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/inf/text/inf3.htm [hereinafter INF MOU] (identifying U.S.
bases in Germany, the Netherlands, Italy and elsewhere subject to inspection by the Soviet Union)
and the CWC, supra note 139, Verification Annex, Part II, 1 19-21 (establishing procedures for
conducting an inspection of a chemical facility owned by one state but located in the territory of
another state).
326. The Treaty could specify a required deadline for completing the various actions
required by this article. Some (such as collapsing any remaining emplacement tunnels) could
probably be accomplished quickly, while others (such as converting sites and equipment to
permitted purposes) could require quite a bit of time, at least for some locations.
327. True "closure" of a large area, such as the Nevada National Security Site, may not be
practical; more likely, such locations would be "converted" to other purposes, which could include
military activities not connected to nuclear weapons. See Nevada National Secuity Site, supra note
150 (regarding Nevada National Security Site).
328. This text would require that a country could not conduct even "permitted" nuclear
weapons-related activities at a test site. It may be more "efficient" to allow such activities to be
conducted at a former test site, but perhaps the history of that location should override efficiency.
329. This provision would effectively lengthen the time required before a party could
conduct a nuclear weapon test.
330. Alternatively, the text could list the specific items of equipment and facilities that would
be subject to intense regulation.
331. The monitoring could be accomplished by cameras and other mechanical sensors, by
roving or permanent observers, or otherwise, according to the characteristics of the particular site.
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5. Each Party shall remove from the site or render unrecoverable
or unusable any residual fissile material that has remained from
previous testing. *
Article VI
Nuclear Weapon Laboratories, Facilities and Personnel333
1. Each Party shall declare, upon entry into force of the Treaty
for it, all laboratories and related facilities or sites at which it has
conducted nuclear weapon-related research, development,
fabrication, production, maintenance, or testing activities, m
and provide to the Organization its plan for completing the
actions required by this article.
2. Each Party shall close or convert to purposes unrelated to
nuclear weapons all such laboratories, facilities and sites
and submit them to continuous monitoring.336 A converted
laboratory, facility or site shall be rendered no more capable of
being re-converted to nuclear weapons purposes than is any
other comparable laboratory, facility or site used for peaceful
337purposes.
3. No Party shall construct new laboratories, facilities or sites for
purposes of nuclear weapon-related research, development,
fabrication, production, maintenance, or testing.338
332. See EBEN HARRELL & DAVID E. HOFFMAN, HARv. KENNEDY SCi. BELFER CTR., PROJEGr ON
MANAGING THIE AToM, PLuIONIUM MOUNTAIN: INSIDE THE 17-YEAR MISSION TO SECURE A DANGEROUS
LEGACY OF SOvIET NUCLEAR TESTING (2013) (describing the dangers of recoverable plutonium at
abandoned Soviet nuclear test site).
333. Cf NWC, supna note 2, at 82 (citing article XI).
334. Most such locations are well-known, so making the declaration would not be burden-
some, but there might be a need to specify more precisely which types of locations are to be
included in the declaration and to create procedures for challenging another party's omission of a
location that should have been listed.
335. Again, the Treaty could specify deadlines for completing each of these types of actions.
336. Continuous monitoring of national weapons laboratories is likely to pose special prob-
lems, since they will continue to conduct sensitive national security work unconnected to nuclear
weapons; intrusive monitoring risks revealing national security and proprietary information.
337. This provision is adapted from CWC, supra note 139, art. V.14, designed to ensure that a
party does not retain any special advantage from a converted nuclear weapons asset.
338. This provision includes a prohibition even on undeclared "defensive" nuclear weapons-
related research and other functions. In contrast, some other treaties do not categorically prohibit
activities that are not directed at producing offensive weapons. See CWC, sulna note 139, art.
II.9(b) (permitting chemical weapons activities that are related to protection against chemical
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4. Each Party shall destroy or convert to other purposes and
submit to continuous monitoring all equipment specially de-
signed for purposes of nuclear weapon-related research, devel-
opment, fabrication, production, maintenance, or testing.
5. The following designated facilities and locations shall be sub-
ject to special monitoring: [list, by country, particularly impor-
tant laboratory buildings or items of equipment that have
performed significant nuclear weapon-related work and will be
eliminated or converted to other purposes; specialized monitor-
ing arrangements will be developed for each and described in
an annex.]
6. Each Party shall declare all individual scientists, technicians and
researchers who participated in nuclear weapon-related re-
search, development, fabrication, production, maintenance, or
testing activities at any time in the previous ten years, and shall
report annually on a standardized form the professional activi-
ties of each.3n For any declared person who has been involved
weapons), and the BWC, supa note 194 art. 1.1 (allowing biological weapons related actions
undertaken for "prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes").
339. The Treaty could list here particular laboratory facilities that would require special
monitoring. See, e.g., DARIT A Critical Cominmaent of Stockpile Stewa~rdship, NAI.ONAL SEcuRIvI
SCIENCE, http://www.Ianl.gov/science/NSS/issue2_2010/stoy2.shtml (describing the Dual-
Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test Facility); Pulsed Iligh-Enegy Radiographic Machine
Emitting X-Rays, http://www.active-duty.com/MWPHERMEXhighEnergyWpns.htm (describing
PHERMEX facility at the Los Alamos Laboratory); U.S. DEFr. OF ENERGY, OFFICE OF IE IN-
SPECTOR GENERAL, INSPECTION REPolr: AccoUNTAIal.InY AND CONTROL OF Exi'itosivs Ar LAWRENCE
LIVERMORE NAIlONA. LABORKiORY's HIGII ExP.osivEs ArtP.ICuIONs FAcurlY, INS-O-13-06 (Sept.
2013), available at http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2013/10/f3/INS-O-13-06.pdf (discussing
the HEAF explosives research facility at Lawrence Livermore); GRONLUND ET AL., supra note 296,
at 30; NAT'I. NUCLEAR SEC. AnuoN., SUMMARY OF EXPERIMENTS CONtUCrE) IN SuIrowr OF SO:K-
PILE STEWARDSHIP (2013), available at http://nnsa.energy.gov/sites/default/files/nnsa/2013-10-29
%20Quarterly%20SSP%2OExperiment%2OSummary-FY13-4Q%20final.pdf (describing nuclear
weapons-related activities at national laboratories using variety of sophisticated machines and
equipment). As noted above, regarding other facilities in the nuclear weapons complex, it could
be quite time-consuming to negotiate, on a case-by-case basis, the applicable monitoring proce-
dures for each laboratory and associated site, but that would be preferable to attempting to
negotiate a one-size-fits-all monitoring plan, which would inevitably have to be adapted to the
unique circumstances at each location. See Paine, Cochran & Norris, Techniques and Procedures, in
CANBERRA COMMISSION ON TIE ElIMINATION OF NUC.EAR WEAPONs, BACKGROUND PAPERS, supmnn
note 56, at 175-78 (discussing monitoring requirements for specific types of facilities).
340. The concept here is to monitor the professional activities (the whereabouts and
"whatabouts") of anyone who, in the previous ten years, had participated in nuclear weapon-
related activities (perhaps confined to those who had devoted a substantial percentage of their
professional activity to that sort of enterprise). The content and level of detail of the reports
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in any way in nuclear weapon-related activities in the previous
year, the reporting shall be particularly detailed."
Article VII
The Organization3 1 2
1. The Parties hereby establish the Zero Treaty Organization,
to assist them in achieving the object and purpose of this
Treaty, to ensure effective implementation of its provisions,
including those for international verification and enforcement
of compliance with it, and to provide a forun for consultation
and cooperation.
2. The Organization shall consist of the Assembly, the Executive
Council, and the Secretariat.
3. The costs of the Organization's activities shall be paid an-
nually by Parties in accordance with the United Nations
scale of assessments, adjusted to take into account differ-
ences in membership between the United Nations and the
343Organization.
4. The Organization shall establish procedures for cooperation,
consultation, fact-finding, and resolution of disputes. "
remain to be worked out; a standard reporting format would be developed. The results of the
reporting might be held as confidential information within the Organization. There might be a
procedure through which the Organization or a party could suggest that another party should also
report on additional specified individuals.
341. This provision would not prohibit or regulate the person's activities or livelihood, but
would require reporting about them.
342. This draft is based upon the models of the CWC, sujna note 139, art. VIII, and the CTBT,
sufna note 129, art. II. It would eventually have to be greatly expanded, to deal with numerous
critical structural and administrative questions, such as the powers, procedures, and functions of
each organ; the composition of the Executive Council; and the privileges and immunities of the
organization and its staff members. These matters are not specified in this draft because they are
lengthy and-although important-they are not unique to the functioning of the Zero Treaty. q:
NWC, supra note 2, at 70, 86 (citing articles VIII, XIV).
343. This provision is comparable to CWC, supra note 139, art. VIII.7, and CTBT, sufnn
note 129, art. 11.9.
344. The Zero Treaty will probably include a lengthy section regarding procedures for
enabling and requiring the parties to cooperate through the Organization in resolving ambiguous
situations and settling disagreements. Again, these are not specified here because of their length
and familiarity. See CWC, supra note 139, arts. IX, XII, XIV; CTBT, supra note 129, arts. V, VI; see
abvo NWC, supra note 2, at 86 (citing article XIV).
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Article VIII
Verification34 5
1. The verification system for this Treaty shall include:
a. Declarations of relevant past and present data by each
Party;346
b. National and multinational technical means of verifica-
tion;3 47
c. Installation of tamper-proof tags and seals or other inventory-
control devices on nuclear weapon-related components,
items, canisters and facilities;348
d. Installation of remote and on-site radioactivity and other
sensors providing high-quality, authenticated, real time data
to the Organization;141
345. The verification mechanisms will have to be a major portion of the eventual Zero Treaty.
At present, the CWC, CTBT, and New START represent the "state of the art" in arms control
verification; they include provisions that are as robust, diverse, and effective as countries have to
date been willing and able to negotiate. But the Zero Treaty will demand much more far-reaching
inspection powers, running well beyond current experiences and capabilities; it will require new
monitoring, communications, and data processing technologies and new political relationships to
tolerate a higher degree of intrusions than have yet been contemplated. It is therefore premature
to offer detailed drafting suggestions here. See supa text accompanying notes 155-61; cf NWC,
supra note 2, at 63 (citing article V).
346. Cf CWC, supla note 139, art. III; New START, supra note 78, art. 111.8; INF Treaty, supma
note 79, art. IX; INF MOU, supra note 325; see Paine, Cochran & Norris, Techniques and Procedures,
in CANBERRA COMMISSION ON THE ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, BACKGROUND PAPERS, sufpm
note 56, at 168-71 (use of verified data declarations and exchanges in treaty monitoring).
347. See supra note 159 (explaining NTM and MTM); cf CTBT, supra note 129, art. IV.5,6;
New START, supra note 78, art. X; ABM Treaty, supra note 105, art. XII. See Paine, Cochran &
Norris, Techniques and Procedures, in CANBERRA COMMISSION ON THE ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR
WEAPONS, BACKGROUND PAPERS, suplu note 56, at 167-68 (role of NTM in verifying compliance with
nuclear elimination requirements).
Perhaps the parties will also create additional multilateral verification programs, such as
an international satellite monitoring agency. See U.N. Secretary-General, The Implications of
Establishing an International Satellite Monitoring Agency, A/AC.206.14 (1983), available at http://
www.un.org/disarmament/HomePage/ODAPublications/DisarmamentStudySeries/PDF/SS-
9.pdf; BhupendraJasani, Intemational Satellite Monitoring Agency--Has the Time come for Its Establish-
ment? (Feb. 10, 2003), available at http://esarda2.jrc.it/dbproceeding/mfile/P_2003_Como
2-10-jasani-040130.pdf; Mort Canty et al., Treaty Monitoring, in REMOTE SENSING FROM SPACE:
SUPPORTING INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY 167, 168 (Bhupendrajasani et al. eds., 2009).
348. See, e.g., New START, supra note 78, at Fourth Agreed Statement (authorizing the use of
tamper-proof seals on the weapons bays of certain deployed heavy bombers).
349. For comparison, the CTBT specifies that a variety of types of automated, high quality
internationally-controlled monitoring stations shall be established in the territories of its parties,
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e. Routine or continuous monitoring overflights by aircraft of
the Organization;s5o
f. Interdiction of traffic (on road, rail, sea and air) by the
Organization to inspect for and seize contraband;3 5 1
g. Unimpeded, systematic, routine on-site inspection;352
h. Taking and analysis of samples35 3
i. Public sources and societal verification, including via social
media;354j. The right of the Organization to interview any person confi-
dentially, to take sworn testimony, to mandate the produc-
tion of documents and materials, and to provide protection
to cooperating individuals;35 5 and
k. Challenge on-site inspection, including full, immediate ac-
cess to confirm compliance with the Treaty.356
including seismological, radionuclide, hydroacoustic and infrasound sensors. CTBT, supra note 129,
art. IV.16, Protocol.
350. This type of monitoring could be similar to that undertaken pursuant to the Open Skies
Treaty, supra note 273, but could provide broader geographic coverage, additional suites of
sensors, and more frequent overflights, including perhaps continuous observation by drone
aircraft. The aircraft might be owned and operated by the Organization or by individual parties.
351. This type of monitoring could be similar to that undertaken pursuant to the Prolifera-
tion Security Initiative. See Prolifemlion Security Initiative, DEPT. OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/t/
isn/c10390.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2014). The parties to the Zero Treaty would provide their
consent, pursuant to designated procedures, allowing the Organization to intercept suspicious
traffic.
352. Many arms control treaties have provided different types of programs for routine on-site
inspection, with varying kinds of powers for the inspectors. See, e.g., INF Treaty, supra note 79,
art. IX, Protocol on Inspections (permitting up to twenty inspections per year and continuous
monitoring at the portals of key facilities for thirteen years); CWC, supra note 139, Verification
Annex, Part X, 46-52 (presenting the procedures for "managed access," to balance the
interests of inspectors and the inspected state and facility); New START, supra note 78, art. XI,
Protocol, Part V (specifying two different types of inspections, totaling eighteen inspections per
year). The inspections under the Zero Treaty would be much more demanding and intrusive;
inspectors would need much more than the current exercise of managed access.
353. Inspectors could seek environmental samples of air, soil, water, flora, and fauna, as well
as materials or wipes from facilities of interest and biological samples from humans. Cf CWC,
supra note 139, Verification Annex, Part II, 11 52-58; CTBT, supra note 129, Protocol, 69.d, h.
354. See supra note 160 (regarding societal verification).
355. The Organization should have quasi-judicial legal power to exercise jurisdiction inside
the territory of parties and to protect and reward whistleblowers. Cf NWC, supra note 2, at 66,
68-69 (citing articles VI(1)(b), VII(C)); see also Perkovich & Acton, supra note 8, at 64 (under-
scoring the value of interviews of key personnel).
356. "Routine" inspection is undertaken on a regular basis, such as to confirm the accuracy
of a state's declared data, without any suspicion of violation; in contrast, a "challenge" inspection
would be initiated when concerns have arisen about non-compliance. Provisions for requesting
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2. The Organization shall sponsor collaborative research into
improved and additional sensors and verification tech-
niques. As these become available, they shall be considered
for implementation by the Organization on an expedited
basis.
3. The Organization shall promptly make available to each Party
all the information collected through the Treaty's verification
system, together with suitable analysis.
4. Each Party shall fully cooperate with the Organization in all
verification activities.
5. All verification activities shall be limited to the subject matter
of this Treaty and shall be carried out with full respect
for the sovereignty of states and in the least intrusive manner
possible, consistent with the effective and timely accomplish-
ment of their objectives. Each Party and the Organization shall
refrain from any abuse of the right of verification.foo
6. No Party shall interfere with the verification operations
of the Treaty or with national or multinational technical
means of verification of any Party operating in accordance
with international law. No Party shall engage in concealment
activities that impede verification of compliance with the
Treaty.
and conducting a challenge inspection may require detailed elaboration in the negotiations and
treaty text. See CWC, supra note 139, art. IX.8-25, Verification Annex, Part X; CTBT, supra note
129, art. IV.D, Protocol Part II.
357. Verification is never a "finished" product; the parties will have to continuously seek to
refine and upgrade their capabilities. This provision is based on CTBT, sunra note 129, art. IV.11.
358. Prompt circulation of data collected by the verification system will enable each party to
make its own judgments about others' compliance; analysis by the Organization will assist in
interpretation of the data. CTBT, supa note 129, art. IV.9.
The Treaty would also need provisions regarding the possibility that parties may provide to
and receive from the Organization sensitive information that should not be made public. See
CWC, supra note 139, Annex on the Protection of Confidential Information; CTBT, su/a
note 129, art. II.7.
359. This provision is based on CTBT, sutra note 129, art. IV.3.
360. This provision is based on CTBT, suin note 129, art. [V.2. Although the content of the
paragraph is correct, alternatively, it could be deleted, in recognition of the fact that the Zero
Treaty will require a transformation in states' attitudes regarding secrecy, such that they would no
longer be as protective against intrusive inspections.
361. Provisions of this sort have become standard for arms control agreements, with slight
variations. See, e.g., CTBT, supa note 129, art. IV.5,6; New START, supa note 78, art. X.
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Article IX
Enforcement" 2
1. The enforcement system for this Treaty shall include:
a. Diplomatic measures;
b. Legal measures;-""
c. Economic measures;365
d. Law enforcement measures;"'" and
e. Military measures.
2. If a Party believes that another Party may have violated the
Treaty, it may:
362. As with verification, the Zero Treaty will have to be path-breaking regarding enforce-
ment provisions. Existing arms control treaties provide a variety of mechanisms for consultations,
exchanges of information, and discussions in treaty organs to resolve concerns about compliance.
See, e.g., CWC, sulpa note 139, arts. XII, XIV; CTBT, sufnna note 129, arts. V, VI. But the Zero Treaty
will require the creation of much more vigorous and powerful mechanisms for response to treaty
violations. These will have to be the most demanding and innovative portions of the Zero Treaty,
eclipsing the accomplishments of current negotiators, in ways we cannot currently discern. See
supra text accompanying notes 162-67.
363. Diplomatic measures could include unilateral and collective political pressure, as well as
actions through regional organizations and the United Nations General Assembly.
364. Legal measures could include exercise of rights tinder the VCLT, supra note 139, and
resort to the International Court ofJustice and the United Nations Security Council, as well as to
the organs of the Zero Treaty Organization. See Rebecca Bornstein, Enpfmiement Scenario: Iran, in
EL.EME~rS OF A NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT TREAY, Vuzna note 3, at 156-58.
365. Economic sanctions and related restrictions could be imposed by one or several
countries, by the United Nations Security Council, or by the organs of international economics,
such as the World Bank or International Monetary Fund. See Rebecca Bornstein, Enfoncement
Scenatio: han, in ELEMENTS OF A NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT TREA1Y, sufna note 3, at 158-60.
366. The Zero Treaty requires each party to enact penal legislation prohibiting its nationals
and other real and legal persons from engaging in activities that would be prohibited to the state.
See supra note 301; Rebecca Bornstein, En/inrement Scenatio: Ran, in EiEMENrS OF A NUCLEAR
DIsARmA.MEr TREAIY, supra note 3, at 157. The International Criminal Court, sura note 300,
could also play a role in law enforcement operations.
367. The single most vexing point regarding enforcement of the Zero Treaty concerns the
question of what, if any military measures may be applicable in response to a serious violation. The
United Nations Security Council, of course, has the power to authorize or require the exercise of
force in response to a threat to the peace, UN Charter, supn note 58, art. 39. But the Security
Council may be blocked by the exercise or threat of a P5 veto. An individual state or group of states
may conclude that another party's illegal effort to break out of the Zero Treaty justified action
(such as a military strike against the sites at which the violating country was re-assembling or
storing its illicit nuclear weapons) as an exercise of national self-defense, even without Security
Council endorsement, but this judgment could be legally and factually problematic. See spra text
accompanying notes 162-64; Rebecca Bornstein, Enforcemen Scenario: Ian, in Ei.EMEr's OF A
Nuciu:AR DISARMAMENT TREATY, sufna note 3, at 160-62.
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a. Exercise the Treaty's provisions for consultations and dis-
pute resolution;"'
b. Use the good offices of the Secretariat to facilitate a resolu-
tion;sm
c. Bring the matter to the attention of the Executive Council
and the Assembly, which may impose sanctions under the
Treaty;370
d. Bring the matter to the attention of the United Nations
Security Council, the United Nations General Assembly, or
the International Court ofJustice;3 7 and
e. Terminate or suspend, in whole or in part, its performance
of its obligations under this Treaty, in proportional response
to the violation.372
368. See, e.g., CWC, supm note 139, arts. IX, XIV; CTBT, supra note 129, arts. IC, V, VI.
369. See, e.g., CWC, supra note 139, art. IX.3; CTBT, supra note 129, art. IV.31, V.2.
370. See, e.g., CTBT, supna note 129, art. IV.32. This draft contemplates that the Organization
itself, as well as individual parties acting on their own, could reach an official judgment about
whether a party had violated the treaty, and the Executive Council or Assembly could respond to
the breach with collective sanctions or other penalties. Alternatively, the treaty could reserve those
powers exclusively for the individual states.
371. See, e.g., CTBT, supra note 129, art. VI.2, VI.4; CWC, supra note 139, arts. XII, XIV.
372. The idea here is that if Country X perceives that Country Y is violating the obligation not
to re-assemble or otherwise possess a nuclear weapon, then Country X may likewise disregard the
constraint-without obtaining any consensus or approval from the Treaty bodies or the UN
Security Council. This "self-help" mechanism may be an appropriate and necessary component of
the enforcement regime, pursuant to traditional international law standards regarding an
innocent party's response to another party's material breach, VCLT, supra note 138, art. 60. But it
does pose additional problems here: (a) It is in some tension with the bold commitment in Article
I "never, under any circumstances" to possess a nuclear weapon; (b) It is a remedy that would not
be equally available to all parties-the former NWS would be in a much better position to
reconstitute their former nuclear weapons-so this avenue perpetuates some of the discrimina-
tory character of the NFT; and (c) It retains in the Zero Treaty a measure of the current practice of
nuclear deterrence, perhaps in an even more precarious form. See supra text accompanying notes
165-67.
An additional quandary is whether Country X would have to publicly and immediately
declare its termination or suspension. That is, in some circumstances it might be advantageous to
conceal the fact that X has detected Ys violation and is moving to counter-act it. But that approach
would implicate X in its own secret breach of the Zero Treaty.
This draft of the Zero Treaty contains two "escape hatches" from the obligation not to possess
nuclear weapons: this provision for suspension or termination in the case of another party's
breach, and the later provision in art. XI.7 for withdrawal due to supreme national interests. See
infra, text accompanying notes 384-86. The withdrawal option is even broader than the current
article, because it contemplates a party's ability to escape the Treaty for reasons unconnected to
another party's breach (such as the possession of a nuclear weapon by a non-state actor, or other
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Article X
Security Relationships
1. The Parties shall develop and implement comprehensive,
legally binding security assurances as safeguards against the
373threat or use of nuclear weapons.
2. The Parties shall develop procedures, institutions, and addi-
tional measures to assist in the resolution of regional security
problems in a manner that promotes the legitimate security
interests of all participants, without recourse to the possession,
threat or use of nuclear weapons. *
3. The Parties shall cooperate and provide assistance in the
development of defenses against nuclear weapons.
4. The Parties shall develop procedures, institutions, and addi-
tional measures to reduce conventional weaponry and military
budgets. 3 7 6
conditions that might be thought to jeopardize the party's supreme security interests.) But the
withdrawal clause requires ninety days advance notice before the action is effective.
373. The traditional topic of "security assurances"-both "negative" and "positive"-may
play a useful role in creating the conditions for nuclear disarmament. These assurances will have
less salience in a world free of nuclear weapons, but may have some continuing relevance. See
supra, text accompanying notes 265. Cf BWC, supra note 194, art. VII (parties undertake to assist a
party endangered by another state's violation of the treaty); CWC, supra note 139, art. X
(establishing provisions for assistance and protection against chemical weapons);John Freeman,
The Experience of the Chemical Weapons Convention: Lessons for the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, in
ELEMENTS OF A NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT TREATY, suna note 3, at 125-26; Rebecca Bornstein,
Enforcement Scenaio: iun, in ELEMENTS OF A NuCLEAR DISARMAMENT TREATY, supra note 3, at 155;
Frank Blackaby, Introduction and Summatiy, in NUcLEAR WEAPONS: THE ROAD TO ZERO, supra note 14,
at 10-11 (arguing that the NWS "speak with forked tongues" when they offer non-legally-binding
security assurances). The new security assurances might be included in the Zero Treaty; alterna-
tively, they might be concluded before or after it enters into force.
374. Construction of a world free of nuclear weapons does not require the complete
"resolution" of intractable regional problems, but it does require the various protagonists to agree
that possession or pursuit of nuclear weapons would be unnecessary (indeed, harmful) to
advancement of their respective legitimate national security goals. See supra, text accompanying
notes 187-88.
375. The question of defenses against nuclear weapons (including missile defense, air
defense, and civil defense) will have to be addressed long before the Zero Treaty is concluded, but
some provision dealing with those topics may be in order. New START acknowledges that the
relationship between offenses and defenses becomes even more important as offenses are
reduced. New START, supra note 78, pmbl 1 8. See srina text accompanying note 190.
376. As nuclear weapons are eliminated, the question of conventional forces will rise to even
greater prominence. See supra text accompanying notes 187-89.
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5. The Parties shall cooperate and provide assistance, as neces-
sary, to improve the safety and security of any retained nuclear
weapons components. 7 7
6. Each Party shall cooperate in, facilitate, provide assistance in,
and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible ex-
change of equipment, material, and scientific and technologi-
cal information concerning the development of nuclear en-
ergy for peaceful purposes. The Parties shall not maintain any
restrictions incompatible with the obligations undertaken in
this Treaty that would restrict or impede trade and the devel-
opment and promotion of scientific and technological knowl-
edge concerning the development of nuclear energy for peace-
ful purposes. Each Party shall review its existing national
regulations in the field of trade to ensure that they are
consistent with the object and purpose of the Treaty.171
Article XI
Final Provisions 37
1. This Treaty shall be open for signature by all states indefi-
nitely.
2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory states
according to their respective constitutional processes.
3. This Treaty shall enter into force 180 days after the deposit of
instruments of ratification by all states possessing nuclear
weapons and fifty other states.3 o For any state depositing an
377. The United States has provided considerable assistance over the years to Russia and
other states regarding materials protection, control and accounting, to safeguard nuclear weapon-
related materials. See TiHr LUGAR CENTER, supra note 240 at; Jenkins, supra note 240; Heyes, supra
note 240; MELIA, supra note 240.
378. This provision is based on CWC, supra note 139, arts. X.3, XI.2(c)-(e), and NPT, sufna
note 44, art. IV.2. See supra, text accompanying notes 191-92 (regarding sweeteners).
379. These provisions are traditionally split into several separate articles; they are combined
here simply for convenience. For comparison, see NWC, supra note 2, at 92-97 (citing articles
XV-XIX) and CANBERRA COMMIssIoN, supra note 12, at 99-106.
380. There are several possible formulas for the entry-into-force provision of the Zero Treaty.
As drafted, the instrument will not become operational until a high degree of consensus is
achieved: acceptance by all the states possessing nuclear weapons and fifty other states. However,
this procedure not only allows the P5 and a few other states to veto the Treaty's entry into force for
any state, it could also allow the treaty to enter into force without the participation by some
important states; the parties would then endeavor to persuade those "holdout" states to join the
regime promptly. Alternatively, the number of ratifications required for entry into force could be
raised even higher, perhaps to 100 states (although no existing treaty specifies such a high
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instrument of ratification thereafter, the Treaty shall enter
into force thirty days after the deposit.
4. This Treaty shall not be subject to reservations."'
5. This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration. 8
6. This Treaty shall be subject to amendments and changes as
follows: 38 3
a. Any Party may propose an amendment, which shall be
submitted to the Secretariat for prompt circulation to all
Parties. If one-third or more of the Parties notify the
Secretariat within sixty days after its circulation that they
support further consideration of the proposal, it shall be
considered at an Amendment Conference. The Amend-
ment Conference shall be held immediately following a
regular session of the Assembly. If the proposed amend-
ment is adopted at the Amendment Conference by a major-
ity vote of all Parties, with no Party casting a negative vote,
the amendment shall enter into force for all Parties ninety
days after the deposit of instruments of ratification by a
majority of all Parties.
b. A change may be related only to technical, administrative
or procedural matters. Any Party may propose a change,
which shall be submitted to the Secretariat for prompt
circulation to all Parties. The Executive Council shall evalu-
number). Another alternative would be to specify additional particular states whose participation
would be required, before the treaty could enter into force for any of them, thereby ensuring that
no state would be obligated unless all other major players are likewise engaged. For exam ple, the
CTBT, supra note 129, art. XIV.1 and Annex 2, names forty-four countries whose ratification is
required to bring the treaty into force; this provision has had the unfortunate effect of blocking
the treaty's implementation, despite the ratification by 161 states. The Zero Treaty could also
establish a high threshold for entry into force, but also allow individual states to waive that
requirement, bringing the Treaty into force sooner for them. Cf: NWC, sup/ra note 2, at 92 (citing
article XV(B)); Treaty of Tlatelolco, suipra note 117, art. 28.2.
381. If the Treaty is constructed with an annex or protocol containing the minute details of
the verification regime, it could permit Parties to make reservations on some of those details. See,
e.g., CWC, supra note 139, art. XXII; CTBT, supra note 129, art. XV.
382. Some arms control treaties are of unlimited (i.e., permanent) duration. See CWC, upa
note 139, art. XVI.1; CTBT, suipra note 129, art. IX.1. Others have fixed terms. See New START,
supra note 78, art. XIV.2. See also NPT, su/pra note 44, art. X.2 (specifying an initial term of
twenty-five years, after which a conference of Parties determined an indefinite extension).
383. This paragraph is a streamlined version of the now-standard provisions for both
"amendments" and "changes" to arms control treaties. See, e.g., CWC, suipra note 139, art. XV;
CTBT, supra note 129, art. VII.
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ate the proposed change and make a recommendation,
which shall be circulated to all Parties within ninety days. If
the Executive Council recommends that the proposed
change be adopted, it shall be considered adopted if no
Party objects within ninety days. If the Executive Council
recommends that the proposed change be rejected, it shall
be considered rejected if no Party objects within ninety
days. If any Party objects to the recommendation of the
Executive Council, the proposed change shall be consid-
ered as a matter of substance by the Assembly at its next
session. Any adopted change shall enter into force for all
Parties 180 days after adoption.
7. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have
the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that
extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the
Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. 384 It shall give
ninety days' advance notices8 of such withdrawal, including a
statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having
jeopardized its supreme interests.
8. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as in any way
limiting or detracting from the obligations of the Parties
under other international law. A Party's withdrawal from this
Treaty shall not in any way affect its obligations under other
384. This is the standard "supreme interests withdrawal" clause, common to arms control
treaties. It provides an "escape hatch" from the obligations, making it safer for states to enter the
agreement in the first place. See CWC, sauna note 139, art. XVI; CTBT, supa note 129, art. IX;
New START, suapw note 78, art. XIV.3. Withdrawal from an arms control treaty has been rare, with
only the 2002 U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty and the 2003 North Korean withdrawal from
the NPT as precedents. Christer Ahlstr6m, Withdrawalfrom Arns Control Treaties, in STOCKHOLM
INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE 2004 YEARBOOK, available at http://www.sipri.org/
yearbook/2004/files/SIPRIYBO419.pdf.
385. Alternatively, the time period specified for withdrawal could be shorter or longer. See
CTBT, supra note 129, art. IX.3 (six months' notice); CWC, supa note 139, art. XVI.2 (ninety
days' notice). A longer notification period provides other parties additional time to react to the
impending withdrawal, but in the case of nuclear disarmament, parties may feel the need for an
ability to respond very quickly to the most severe challenges.
386. Alternatively, the Zero Treaty could depart from precedent and prohibit withdrawal
(except, perhaps, in the case of material breach of the treaty by another party). Cf NWC, supra
note 2, at 96 (citing article XVIII(5), prohibiting withdrawal); Perkovich and Acton, supa note 8,
at 95-97.
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international law, including other arms control or disarma-
ment treaties.
9. The Protocol is an integral part of this Treaty. Any references
to the Treaty include the Protocol.388
10. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, and at five
year intervals thereafter, the Parties shall assemble in a Review
Conference to assess the operation and effectiveness of the
Treaty, with a view to ensuring that the object and purpose of
the Treaty are being realized. 8
11. The Secretary-General of the United Nations is hereby desig-
nated as the Depositary of this Treaty, and shall perform all
appropriate duties, including registering this Treaty pursuant
to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.s9 o
12. The Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish
texts of this Treaty are equally authentic. 39 1
In Witness Whereof, the undersigned, being duly authorized to that
effect, have signed this Treaty.
Done at (place) on (date).
VI. CONCLUSION
What are the prospects for this nuclear disarmament enterprise? Is
the world now ready-after decades of contemplation-to initiate, and
to pursue with the necessary vigor, the vision of abolishing all nuclear
weapons?
It is hard to be optimistic about escaping the nearly seventy-year
addiction to nuclear strategy, armaments and institutions. Even
with the zealous advocacy from today's Gang of Four-echoing thejudg-
ments and sentiments from Baruch, Reagan, Gorbachev, and Gandhi-it
is still difficult to summon the global commitment to ascend that
mist-covered mountain. The concept of nuclear arms controb-reducing
387. Cff CWC, supra note 139, art. XVI.3 (specifying that withdrawal from the CWC would not
affect a party's status under the 1925 Geneva Protocol).
388. Cf CTBT, supra note 129, art. X; CWC, sunpa note 139, art. XVII.
389. See, e.g., CTBT, supra note 129, art. VIII (providing for review conferences every ten
years); CWC, supra note 139, art. VIII.22 (providing for review conferences at five-year intervals).
390. Cf CTBT, supra note 129, art. XVI.1; CWC, supre note 139, art. XXIII.
391. Cf CTBT, supra note 129, art. XVII; CWC, suna note 139, art. XXIV.
392. The Zero Treaty would probably be accompanied by an agreement to apply provision-
ally some of the key provisions of the Treaty and to establish a Preparatory Commission that would
help pave the way for entry into force. See Resolution Establishing CTBT Preparatory Commission,
sulna note 185; Paris Resolution, supra note 185; New START, supra note 78, Protocol, Part VIII.
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and limiting the mass destruction inventories of the United States,
Russia, and others-is difficult enough, but it at least remains a cred-
ible "action item" on the contemporary political agenda; the concept of
true nuclear disarmament, on the other hand, may seem almost as
remote as ever.
Still, the goal of getting to zero remains persistent. It has been
endorsed by world leaders and the general public; it has been adopted
by the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly; and it
stands as a binding legal obligation under the essential Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty. Perhaps its time is finally coming.
As the draft Zero Agreement and Zero Treaty indicate, there are a
great many moving parts in this proposal, and several of them strain
credulity. To conceptualize a world free of nuclear weapons, we
have to presume a global readiness to effectuate the Comprehensive
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, and sequen-
tial deep cuts in nuclear arsenals by the nine states currently possessing
them; we need a resolution or at least mitigation of seemingly per-
petual regional tensions in the Middle East, South Asia and elsewhere;
and we have to assume that revolutionary new technologies for air-tight
verification and enforcement of compliance can be crafted and ac-
cepted by mutually suspicious sovereigns. That's asking a lot of the
public imagination.
On the other hand, the risks of sustaining the nuclearized status quo
beggar belief, too. It cannot realistically be argued that a heavily-
armed-and perhaps increasingly proliferating-world can perpetu-
ally dodge the specter of the use of nuclear weapons, by hostile forces
or terrorists, by design, accident, or horrific miscalculation. No one can
imagine that the world's current course will continue to escape forever
a cataclysm beyond history.
Alice in Wonderland's White Queen, who claimed to be able to believe
six impossible things before breakfast, would therefore enjoy a rich
smorgasbord of competing non-credible choices here: both the option
of an unprecedented exploration up the mountain and the option of
nervously remaining at our current base camp seem implausibly hazard-
ous and unsustainable.
The hardest part of nuclear disarmament, of course, is dealing with
the potential for cheating. What can we do to deter, detect and defeat
the potential bad actors, who might well perceive a powerful incentive
for secretly violating the disarmament norm in pursuit of an awesome
one-sided advantage? Where the stakes are so high-where the world
is proceeding well beyond the relatively modest accomplishments of
New START and a plethora of other incremental measures-the
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standards for acceptable confidence in verification and enforcement
must rise, too. Louis Henkin's famous aphorism about states' pattern of
compliance with international law-"alnost all nations observe almost
all principles of international law and almost all of their obligations
almost all of the time" "-may be comforting in many applications
and environments, but it would be a woefully inadequate measure of
success in the realm of nuclear weapons abolition.
In the effort to illuminate a path toward greater confidence in
compliance, legal draftsmanship may be of assistance. The enterprise
here to craft a pair of prototype instrunments-the short-term, non-
legally-binding Zero Agreement and the eventual legally-binding Zero
Treaty-can highlight, if not conclude or finesse, a variety of confound-
ing questions. Resolution of these "in the weeds" details will require
additional engagement of diplomatic, political, military, and technical
expertise, but the drafting exercise can contribute by raising the
visibility of the outstanding puzzles. Sometimes, it's helpful just to
imagine what the ultimate goal might actually look like.
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